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FOREWORD
R. N. Purvis, Q.C.
The constant growth in computer use throughout the world of business
and government is adding new horizons to the problem of business and
economic crime. The latter are changing rapidly as computers extend into
the activities and environments in which such crimes occur.
Whereas crime has traditionally occurred in environments of manual
human activities, some crime is now perpetrated inside computers in the
specialized environment of rooms with raised ﬂooring, lowered ceilings, large
grey boxes, ﬂashing lights, moving tapes and the hum of air-conditioning.
The methods of committing such crimes are also new. A new jargon' has
developed identifying automated criminal methods such as data diddling,
trojan horses, salami techniques, superzapping, scavenging and data leaking.
The forms of many of the targets of computer related crime are also new.
Electronic money, as well as paper money and plastic money (credit
cards) now represent assets liable to intentionally cause loss. Mone in
the form of electronic signals and magnetic patterns is stored and processed
in computers and transmitted ovpr telephone lines. Money is debitediand
credited to accounts inside computers. Inventories of products in ware-
houses and of materials leaving'or enten'ng factories, are represented by
documents of record inside computer systems.
The timing of some crimes is also different. Traditionally the timing of
criminal acts was measured in minutes, hours, days, weeks, months or years.
Today some crimes are being perpetrated in less than a second. Automated
crime must then be considered in terms of a new time scale because of the
speed of the execution of instructions in computers.
Geographic constraints do not inhibit perpetrators to this extension of
crime. A telephone with a computer terminal attached to it in one part
of the world can be used to engage in a crime in an on-line computer system
in another part of the world.
It may be thought, however, that the business community is neither
adequately prepared to deal with, nor suﬂiciently motivated to report, this
extension of crime to the authorities. Computer security studies for the
business community and interviews with professional accountants have
indicated that few crimes of this type are reported to law enforcement
agencies for prosecution. '
Computer abuse started with the emergence of computer technology in
the late nineteen forties. As the number of people in the computer ﬁeld
began to increase, the facet of human nature of doing harm to society
for personal gain took hold, as it does. I suppose, with any segment of the
human population. The problem of crime became especially acute as
computer technology. proliferated into sensitive areas in society. Seemingly
this ﬁrst occurred in military systems and then in engineering, science and
ﬁnally business applications.
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The ﬁrst recorded computer abuse occurred in I958. Pursuit of the
study of computer related crime and computer abuse has not been without its
controversy. In I970 a number of researchers concluded that the problem
was merely a small part of the effect of technology on society and was not
worthy of speciﬁc explicit research. The increase in substantial losses asso- -
ciated with intentional acts involving computers proved the fallacy of this
view. The explicit identiﬁcation of computer related crime as a subject for 3
research and development of preventive measures in criminal justice suffered
a similar fate in the mid 1970’s. Researchers argued that computers should
not be the focus in a study of types of crime: They believed the involvement
of computers should be subordinate to the study of each speciﬁc type of '
crime, both manual and automated. The uniqueness of characteristics of
computer related crime across all the different types of crime was not
considered sufﬁcient to warrant explicit research.
A formal study of computer abuse commenced in about 1971. In 1973
the first National Conference in the United States on computer abuse was
held and a comprehensive report was completed in 1974. Since then many
reports. papers, journal articles and books have been published describing
research. that has been done. ,
The interests of the criminal justice community began in response then
to increasing numbers of cases and action by criminal justice organizations,o
basically in Australia—The Corporate Affairs Commissions. '
Various States in the United States have introduced. statutes referable
to computer related crime. Asvyet, no State nor the Commonwealth has
legislated in Australia speciﬁcally to entrap a computer related crime
perpetrator.
The Seminar “Computer Related Crime” has sought to bring together
those having some experience and expertise in the ﬁeld and able to indicate
the areas warranting Iegisl'ativ'e and-professional attention.
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COMPUTERS AS TOOLS [N THE COMMISSION OF CRIME
R. A. Brown, B.A., LL.B., Ph'.D.,
Lecturer in Law,
New South Wales Institute of Technology
Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to examine some of the actual and potential
uses of the computer in the commission of crime. It is important to realize
from the outset that many computer-related crimes are not in any way
conceptually dilferent from crimes committed without the use of the com-
puter and also that there may be serious difﬁculties in the detection and
prosecution of crimes in which computers are used. To this end, it is
intended to examine some of the problems of detection and of evidence as
well as the substantive criminal law, in order to present a rounded picture
of the context of computer-related crime.
Topics to be considered speciﬁcally are:
Automatic Teller machines.
Electronic Funds Transfer.
The Computer as Symbolic Tool for Fraud. .
The Computer as Actual Tool for Fraud. .
Problems of Proof. '
Conclusions.
Automatic Teller Machines (ATMs)
There are a variety of practices involving ATMs that are, or should be,
subject to criminal sanction. In brief, an ATM operates either as a self-
contained unit‘ or connected on-line to the main computer of a bank or
building society. The user inserts a card bearing certain magnetically
encoded data and keys in a personal identiﬁcation number or PIN. The PIN
is equivalent to a signature on a deposit or withdrawal slip and if the relevant
computer veriﬁes that the PIN entered corresponds with the other data from
the card, the user is permitted to conduct various transactions on the accounts
covered by that card.
The simplest illicit activity involving the ATM is the use of another
person’s card and PIN. Many people have difﬁculty in remembering num-
bers and, despite the warnings circulated with the cards, insist on writing
the PIN down somewhere “handy” to the card itself. Hence, if the card is
stolen, the thief will often have access to the PIN.
Apart from the simple question of theft of the card itself, does the thief
commit any oﬂence if he/she uses the card and withdraws cash from an
ATM? In New South Wales, there is clear authority that no theft is com-
mitted in such a situation in the decision in Croton’. Here the accused used
a passbook on a joint savings account to withdraw substantial sums of
money deposited to that account by the other account holder. The High
l (I967) II7 C.L.R. 326.
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Court held that there could be no theft from that other account holder
as she was at no time in possession of the cash received by the accused.
Nor could there be a theft from the bank, as it transferred ownership in
the money by consent, having received a duly completed withdrawal slip.
The same arguments apply to the use of an ATM cardz. The bank’s
computer receives all the valid indicia of entitlement to withdraw funds via
the ATM and then pays out. Theft is, of course, not the only possible
offence committed in such circumstances. Consideration needs to be given to
obtaining by false pretences, obtaining property by deception and forgery.
Obtaining by False Pretences/Obtaining Property by Deception
There can be little doubt in the above example that D obtains the
ownership of certain money and that he/she does so with intent to defraud.
It is also reasonably clear that a false pretence can be demonstrated by a
course of conduct” and that no oral or written statements are required. Nor
does there appear to be a difﬁculty in terms of contemporaneity if the money
or property is obtained subsequently to, but as a result of, the operation of
the false pretence/deception on the mind of the victim‘. The difﬁculty that '
does arise in the use of the ATM is that the false pretence/deception, which
appears to be constituted by the unauthorized user of the card representing
by entering the correct PIN. that he/she is authorized to use it, does not
operate on the mind of any person at the time the money is obtained and
may in fact never do so if the falsity of this representation is known to the
bank when it becomes aware of the transaction from the ATM.
Existing case authority indicates that the pretence/deception must
operate. on the mind of some person5. If this authority is accepted, it would
seem that this element is missing in'the ATM situation. ‘There is, on the
other hand, some limited authority that deception can be found even if no
mind is operated on. In Hands“ the accused obtained a cigarette from a
vending machine by depositing a brass disc rather than a penny. In a very
brief judgment that really does not address the legal points in issue, the court
held that this taking possession of the cigarette was without the consent of
the owner thereof, so that Hands was guilty of larceny. ln Davies v.
Hacker/7 the defendant drove out of a car park when another driver had
inserted a coin to raise the automatic barrier. He was charged with dis-
donestly obtaining a pecuniary advange. The dismissal of the information
was upheld by the Divisional Court and the court noted that the deception
must be effective in securing the alleged pecuniary advantage. This is in
line with the authorities, but the case is noteworthy for the parenthetical
remark of Ackner .l. that “I do not suggest that an offence could not be
committed when there is some mishandling of a (machine and thereby an
advantage is obtained.”
2 See also Glenister [I980] 2 N.S.W.L.R. 597.
“(irecnlmlgh (I924) 24 SR. (N.S.W.) 289.
4 ('mu'ley U963) 82 W.N. (Pt. I) (N.S.W.) 238.
5 Davies “982] l A.E.R. 513; DPP v. Ray [1974] A.C. 370.
‘3 t I887) 16 Cox QC. 188.
7 I,|‘)72I Crim. LR. 708.
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Conceptually, it may be possible either to treat the ATM as having
sullicicnt intellect to be capable of itself being deceived, or to treat it as
nothing more than a conduit to the victim. The former approach will avoid
the contemporaneity problem, but it seems unlikely that the courts will by
themselves grant some form of legal personality to computers and their
peripherals. The latter approach does not avoid this problem and, if
adopted, the courts will have to fashion some very special concepts to
distinguish computer cases from other obtainings.
Consent
With the ordinary vending machine case such as Hands a person who
uses “slugs" to obtain goods from the machine clearly does so with'the
necessary intent for obtaining by false pretences“, but can it be said that the
obtaining of the goods is without the consent of the owner thereof? There
are two ways of analysing this situation: ‘
(l) the owner of the vending machine’s contents consents to transfer-
ring ownership therein to any person who is able to make the
machine operate, whether with coin of the realm or otherwise; or
(2) the owner only consents 'to transferring ownership of the goods t
persons who deposit the correct money. The second analysis '
obviously preferable. As Kenny noted,
A dishonest manoeuvre for which the name “trick” would seem
particularly appropriate is where a person extracts something from an
\automatic machine by inserting a worthless metal disc instead of the
proper coin. The property is plainly taken invito domino just as com-
pletely as if the machine had been broken open, or unlocked by a
skeleton key, since the owner has indicated that he only consents to
pass the ownership of the contents of his machine if the correct money
is ﬁrst put into it“. '
Is the same argument applicable to the use of an ATM? Given the
operation of such machines, the answer would appear to be uncertain. The
bank issues an ATM card to the particular customer and warns him/her
not to disclose the PIN number to any other person. It may be argued that
the bank is thereby stating that it only consents to transferring funds via
an ATM to the person to whom the card is issued. Any other person with-
drawing money from the ATM with the customer's consent will then not have
the bank’s consent to him/her taking ownership of that money and, to
defend a charge of obtaining, will have to rely on some claim of right made
in good faith vis-a-vis the bank, as the customer is not the owner of the
money paid out.
However, the bank cannot know whether a customer will deliberately
disclose the PIN to another person and this would seem to be a perfectly
legitimate action on the part of the customer. Since the ATM cannot identify
the individual using it other than by the presentation of a valid card and
 
8 It being obvious that transfer of ownership of the goods is intended, larceny is not
strictly applicable. -
9 C. S. Kenny, Outline: 0/ Criminal Law (19th Ed.) p. 285.
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the corresponding PIN, it is equally arguable that the bank is quite indifferent
to the identity of that individual and, as in Crown's case, is really consenting
to transfer ownership in the money to any person who provides appropriate
proof of entitlement to receive that money.
Forgery
The application of the law of forgery in this situation is at the moment .
subject to various technical difﬁculties consequent upon sometimes anaeron-
istic statutory language”. The crux of forgery is the making of a document
or other instrument that “tells a lie about itself”. In the operation of an ATM
for withdrawing cash, the entries keyed in will be initially recorded in the
computer’s memory and subsequently transferred to permanent storage on
magnetic tape or disc. A transaction record card is also produced by the
terminal. The first ditliculty to be met is whether any of these computer-based
methods of data storage would be classiﬁed by the courts as things capable
of being the subject of forgery. Section 250 of the Crimes Act 1900 deﬁnes
"Forging" as:
the counterfeiting, or altering in any particular, by whatsoever means
effected, with intent to defraud, of an instrument, or document, or of
some signature, or other matter or thing, . . .
The case law has stayed strictly with written documents or instruments as
being the subject of forgery” and there is little reason to believe that this
strict interpretation of the law will not continue.
Even if this hurdle is overcome, it is difficult to assert that any of these
things tells a lie about itself. What is effective is the implicit assertion that the
person presenting the card and operating the terminal is entitled to use the
card and relevant accounts and that assertion does not appear anywhere in
the instruments or documents produced by the transaction; in fact it is no-
where recorded. None of the things is used for any purpose other than the
recording of data; in particular, none is intended to be used as genuine for
deceiving any person. No one relies on the computer media or the trans-
action record card as a document that will induce any decision or action
by the reader, as the only relevant action, namely the payment over of
money to the ATM user, has already occurred. It is therefore clearly argu—
able that no document or thing is made “with intent to defraud", as the
effective operation of the user’s fraudulent intent is quite independent of the
making of the relevant records.
One further comment should be made. As stated above‘2 the PIN is
equivalent to a signature on a cheque or withdrawal slip. In the non-ATM
situation, if a properly signed withdrawal slip is handed over the counter
with a deposit book, the bank is not concerned with whether the person pre-
senting the slip is the author thereof. The validity of the signature and
possession of the deposit book give the bank authority to pay out funds to
the person physically present. In the ATM case, a person inserting the ATM
'0 See R. A. Brown, "Crime and Computers", (1983) 7 CrimJJ 68. pp. 78—81.
H Class (1857) De and B 460; Smith (1858) De and B 566.
'2 page 11 para 3.
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card and entering the correct PIN has given the equivalent of a correctly
signed withdrawal slip; there is absolutely no way for the ATM to diﬁeren-
tiate between the individuals who use it. One might compare this situation
with the presentation of a cheque signed by a person who had a valid
authority to sign, but whose authority has expired, unbeknownst to the bank.
This has been held to be forgery at common law”. However, it is not known
whether the various ATM systems actually record the PINs that are keyed
in, or whether they are merely checked against the correct PIN for the card
and then erased. If this erasure is the rule, there will be considerable difﬁculty
in arguing that the temporary store of the PIN in computer memory could
constitute a document, instrument or thing capable of being forged.
A second type of ATM fraud exploits a defect in the system of control
currently operating on ATM systems in use in Australia. ATM users will be
aware that if a cheque is deposited to a ATM-operable account ‘over the
bank counter in some banks, that cheque will be credited to the account
immediately, without the usual waiting time for clearance of a cheque. Hence,
cash can be drawn from ATMs when there are in fact no funds to meet the
cheque being relied on. Here the offender can certainly be charged under 3.
178B Crimes Act 1900 with obtaining money by passing a cheque which is
not paid on presentation, although there may be practical difﬁculties if, for
example, the cheque is post-dated” or if the person charged was not respon-
sible for “passing” the cheque. It should be noted that the easiest method of
preventing this type of fraud, which is quite common throughout Australia, is
for the banks to remedy the abovementioned system defect.
Other ATM frauds entail a greater degree of sophistication and com-
puter-related knowledge. One method relies on the fact that an ATM will
pay out money on receipt from the relevant central computer (possibly itself)
of a "PAY" signal which is transmitted if the PIN is correct and there are
sufﬁcient funds to the credit of the account. This “PAY" signal is, as far as
I am aware, not encoded, so that it is possible with apropriate equipment to
repeatedly issue the “PAY” signal to an ATM once the central computer has
verified the account until the ATM is emptied of cash; these subsequent with-
drawals will not be debited to the relevant account.
Electronic Funds Transfer Frauds.
Closely allied to the ATM is the concept of electronic funds transfer
(EFT). Usingtan ATM it is possible to transfer funds between the card
user‘s various accounts, such as current account, savings account and Bank-
card account. These transactions merely make electronic accounting adjust-
ments to the' user’s accounts within the particular bank. However, the same
processes can and do operate between banks and other financial institutions
and among many companies, both in Australia and overseas, and are being,
introduced in some stores“. Relevant financial transactions take place.
between different computers whereby, for example, Bank A will make a
'1' Blenkinsop (1848) 2 Car and Kir 531; Epps (1864) 4 Fos and Fin 81.
N Bratler v. 0' Sullivart [1957] S.A.S.R. 185.
15 Sydney Morning Herald, 6 December 1983.
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single payment covering the balance of all cheques drawn on it and being
cleared through Bank B. Such EFTs involve very large sums of money and
hence are an attractive target for computer-related crime.
E.F.T. frauds may be perpetrated:— I
(a) prior to transmission of the BET. message, e.g., by alterin
the payee before the message is sent;
. (b) during transmission, e.g., by intercepting and altering the
message between sender and recipient; or
(c) after receipt of the message.
Some interesting jurisdictional wrangles may arise if the message is sent
from New South Wales to Tasmania and is intercepted and altered in
Victoria. The question of interception of telecommunications will generally
be covered in Australia by Federal legislation, namely, the Telecommunica-
tiunx (Interception) Act 1979. Under 5. 7 of this Act, it is an offence
punishable by $5,000/2 years to intercept a communication passing over a
telecommunications system. Under 5. 6, “interception” is deﬁned as “listening
to or recording, by any means, such a communication in’ its passage over that
telecommunications system without the knowledge of the person making
the communication." The Act only applies to systems controlled by the
Australian Telecommunications Commission (s. 5.1) and does not prohibit
certain activities involving listening to or recording communications (s. 62).
The Act is silent on any matters other than interception or the divulging
of information obtained by interception, so that it does not per se penalize
alteration of a telecommunicated message. As mentioned above, this sort of
activity may well fall within the reasonable bounds of the law of forgery;
there is no serious conceptual difference between altering a written document
with intent to defraud and altering an electronic message with the same intent.
The same is, of course, true when dealing with message alterations before
and after the message has passed through the telecommunications system.
The Computer as a Symbolic Tool for Fraud
One of the greatest dangers inherent in the increasing computerization
of society is the fact that most people unquestioningly accept what the
computer purports to tell them. Hence, members of the public will pay
computer-produced accounts from organizations such as Telecom without
query and without any means of verifying the accuracy of those accounts.
If Telecom were to surreptitiously increase the charges made for telephone
calls, it is unlikely that anyone would be any the wiser. And if such an
occurrence were detected, it is easy to be put off by the response, “That was
merely a computer error", allowing a fraudulent operator to hide behind the
mechanical impersonality of the computer“.
In such cases, it is the fact that something has come from a computer
that makes the fraud possible, rather than the manipulation of the computer
to conduct fraudulent activities. Examples of this type of conﬁdence trick are
well documented outside the computer field. The “Trans World Diamond
Swindle‘”7 is a good example, where the trickster hid behind the name of a
18 See Donn B. Parker, “Crime by Computer" Scribner: (1976) p. 21.
‘7 See Sydney Morning Herald, 14 December 1983.
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reputable corporation while inducing investors to deposit jewellery with him
for a big public display and sale. Such activities will usually be dealt with,
in either the computer or non~computer context, by stealing or obtaining
charges, as the use of a computer is purely an incidental aspect of the
fraudulent obtaining of money or goods by inducing victims to rely on com-
puter—produced documentation.
The Computer as {an Actual Tool .
There are many more or less conceptually sound examples of the use of
computers as the actual tools for fraud in the literature, although it is often
diﬁicult to verify them with any acceptable degree of accuracy. The so—called
“Salami swindle" whereby a computer which calculates interest increments
for accounts is directed to deposit all rounded-off fractions of a cent to a
special account, has been described, but never speciﬁcally identiﬁed. There
are, however, veriﬁable cases of similar techniques. in 1981 investigations
at the Victorian TAB showed program manipulations directed to crediting
betting units to a particular account each time any person placed a particular
type of bet. In the U.S.A. there have been reported instances of minor price
increments being added to items in wholesale food sales, with the additional
payments being diverted”.
Another example can be found in the “Flagler Dog Track Fraud” from
New York. In this case, employees of the greyhound track, which used a
computer operated totalizator display board, used the computer to print
additional winning tickets between the time the results were signalled by the
race judges and the time they were displayed on the tote. This process
diluted the pool of winnings, but as all holders of winning tickets were still
paid, none of them ever had reason to complain. The case was discovered
only by accident”.
In New South Wales these activities may fall within the concept of
obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage by deception. Under 5. 1783A Crimes Ac!
I900: '
(l) Whosoever by any deception dishonestly obtains for himself
or another person any money or valuable thing or any
ﬁnancial advantage of any kind whatsoever shall be liable to
imprisonment for ﬁve years.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), "deception" means any
deception (whether deliberate or reckless) by words or con—
duct as to fact or as to law, including a deception as to the
present intentions of the person using the deception or any
other person.
There can be no doubt that money or “ﬁnancial advantage“ has been
obtained by the person who manipulates the programs, nor that this has been
done “dishonestly”. But the problem again remains that it is not until long
after the obtaining of the money or ﬁnancial advantage that these actions are
noticed. Can it then be said that there has been any “deception” of any
person?——if not, one essential element of the offence is absent and this may
present a fundamental stumbling block for prosecutors.
“3 See J. K. Taber, “On Computer Crime" (1979) Computer/Law Journal. p. 517.
w Ibid p. 523.
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Problems of Proof
In the absence of confessional evidence. a prosecutor will usually be
forced to rely on some material that is generated by the computer that has
been the subject of illicit action, or by another computer. Merely having all
the relevant data in digital form on some computer storage medium will be
of no value as those data will be totally incomprehensible to anyone. The
law has made some advances, both in common law development and by
statute, towards easing the difﬁculties of using computer-produced material
in evidence, but there are still major problems. Computer professionals are
often prepared to rely on machine-produced output without further examina-
tion, but this is not an atttiude that the courts have adopted and often for
very sound reasons. The admitted ease with which a computer can be
manipulated to produce false data by the criminal must also be taken into
account when data from that computer are to be relied on as evidence in a
criminal (or civil) trial.
Admissibility at Common Law
Recent judgments have shown the courts willing to rely on computer
output when the computer is treated as a tool used by skilled professionals
to determine complex questions. In Wood”, for example, the prosecution
sought to prove that W had handled certain stolen metal. Samples of metals
found at W‘s premises were subjected to metallurgical analysis in an attempt
to show that those samples couldonly have come from speciﬁc alloys that
had been stolen from the London and Scandanavian Metallurgical Co. Ltd.
Because of the complexity of the analyses, using X-ray spectrometry and
neutron emission analysis, it was necessary to use a computer to produce
meaningful results from the large quantities of data collected by the analysts.
The Court of Appeal took the view that, in this case, the computer was
merely a tool for doing something that the analysts could have done without
it, though only with considerable delays. As with other scientiﬁc instruments,
well-recognized by the law of evidence as involving special considerations,
the court was prepared to hold that provided there was evidence to show that
the computer was operated correctly, that it was used with appropriate
programs to produce these sorts of results and that the calculations it did
could be accepted as reliable, no question of hearsay or other exclusionary
rule of evidence arose and the computer print-outs were admissible in
evidence to prove the results of the analyses. The court commented:
[The computer printout] is more properly treated as a piece of real
evidence the actual proof. of which depended on the testimony of the”
chemist and Mr Kellie [the computer programmer] (supported by other
expert evidence)“. ’
This result had been anticipated in South Australia in the case of
Mehexz v. Retlman (No. 2)”. The accused had been convicted on a PCA
charge. The level of alcohol in his blood was measured by a device know
20 (I983) 76 C.A.R. 23.
2' (1983) 76 C.A.R. 23. 27.
22 (I980) 26 S.A.S.R. 244.
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as an Au-tolab which analyzed signals from a gas chromatograph to determine
the levels of alcohol in the samples being tested in the chromatograpsh. Hence,
the Autolab was a type of computer with a very speciﬁc function .
The defendant argued that the only basis on which the evidence pro-
duced by this machine could be admitted was pursuant .to the “Computer
Evidence“ provisions in Part VlA Evidence Act 1929—1981 (S.A.), and,
given the complexity of those provisions, the evidence was probably not
admissible“. .This argument was rejected by the court. King CJ, notin
that Part VIA was in addition to the common law and not in derogation bf it2 ,
held that the results were admissible at common law as the results of a
scientiﬁc test. He quoted with approval the following passage from Wigmore,
Vol. III, par. 795, p. I90 [246]
What is needed then, in order to justify testimony based on such
instruments, is: Preliminary professional testimony (I) to the trust-
worthiness of the process or instrument in general (where not otherwise
settled by judicial notice); (2) to the correctness of the particular instru-
ment. such testimony being usually available from one and 'the same
qualiﬁed person.
The other judges, White and Cox I], agreed.
In neither of these cases would the computer-produced evidence have
been admissible by statute. In Wood the Court of Appeal speciﬁcally so held,
noting that the relevant printouts were produced for the purposes of the
prosecution and would not therefore qualify under s. 1 (1) of theCriminal
Evidence Act 1965 (UK) as business records“. And in Mehesz v. Redman
(No. i)27 it was held that the -Autolab results were not admissible under
Part VIA of the South Australian Evidence Act. This produces the odd result
that the use of computers by the prosecution or defence in a criminal case
must depend substantially on the common law, whilst that avenue is often
closed for computer evidence generally, as will be shown.
Statutory Bases for Admissibility in New South Wales-
In those jurisdictions, such as New South Wales, that do not possess
special “computer evidence" provisions in their law, these common law
techniques for admitting computer output will be of limited value where what
is to be relied on is not the use of the computer as a tool by professionals
but as a store of accurate information. In such situations the question of
hearsay evidence does arise and, as with any written document, the computer
output must pass the existing legal hurdles before it becomes admissible.
If, for example, a building society‘s computer records were to be tendered
to prove the sort of ATM operation noted in pages 11 to 15 above it is
 
23 See judgement at King C], p. 245.
1‘ See Meltesz v. Redman (No. l) (1979) 2 S.A.S.R. 569.
25 Page 247.
’5 Nor. in New South Wales, under Part "C: see 33. l4cr= (l) and 14cc (3).
27 (I979) 21 S.A.S.R. 569. '
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believed. that the question of their admissibility in criminal proceedings would
have to be tested under Part lie of the Evidence Act 1898 (N.S.W.)”,
which deals with “Business Records‘m.
At ﬁrst glance, there is little doubt that the building society‘s computer
records are documents that form part of the records of a business for the
purposes of 5. 14cc (4) of the Evidence Act 1898 (NSW) However,
much more is required before those computer records become admissible in
evidence under Part "C.
The computer records from an ATM will contain data from several
different sources. These will be those data that:
(l ) were entered by the user from the terminal itself;
(2) the ATM read from the magnetic strip on the proffered card;
and
(3) were supplied by the appropriate central computer.
It is essential to remember that Part Ilc does not make documents
admissible; what it does do is to render admissible certain types of statements
contained in those documents”. Hence one must examine each statement in
the document and see whether it passes the various tests of the Part.
Data supplied by the User
To be admissible in accordance with s. 14CE (6), the relevant state-
ments must be made by a “qualiﬁed person" who is, basically, an owner,
servant, agent, employee or associate of the business". This description
clearly- does not include a customer of the society nor, a fortiori, a person
posing as a customer. Hence the statement made by that person, which will
consist of the entries keyed in from the ATM will not be admissible state-
ments under s. l4CE. The same will be true in all cases of computer fraud
except in those where, fortuitously, the criminal falls within one of the
categories of “qualified person".
Data from the Magnetic Strip
These data would seem to qualify for admission under s. l4CE (6) (b)
(ii) in that the ATM can properly, in this function, be described as a “device
designed for, and used for the purposes of the business in or for, recording,
. or identifying information . . .”. Although there is as yet no authority
on the point, it would seem that the exclusionary aspect of this subparagraph,
that the information so recorded or identiﬁed is not “information based on
information supplied by any person", should not apply despite the fact that
the ATM user could be said to “supply” this information by inserting the
curd. What is apparently intended is that there be no human intervention in
the process of recording or identifying so that that process is entirely auto-
mated and hence avoiding the possibility of a human entering incorrect data.
2383. I4 co to l4cv.
2” For an overview see F. McNifT, “Computer Documentation as Evidence" (1981) l
I L.LS. 45.
3" RI Murra Developments [I979] 2 N.S.W. L.R I93.
3' See deﬁnition in 5. Men (I).
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If this were not so, almost all 'such machine-reading processes could be
excluded if at any point in the chain there is some human assistance. For
example, if it were to be held that the devices used in libraries and department
stores to scan the “bar charts" commonly printed on labels of books or goods
did not fall within the inclusionary aspect of subparagraph (6) (b) (ii)
because some employee placed the scanning device on the bar chart, the
subparagraph would have very little room for operation.
Data from the Central Computer
These ‘data, which will consist of such things as the current balances of
the accounts covered by the ATM card, will themselves have to be tested
under s. I4CE (6) (b) (i) and (ii). In general, employees of the society
(qualified persons) will have opened the accounts and allocated account
number, PIN number, starting balance and other relevant data. From then
on, transactions to the accounts will have been made either through AIMS,
or over the counter in branches of the society, with either appropriate devices
or qualiﬁed persons making alterations to those data and thus raising all the
issues so far touched upon. This point will receive further expansion below.
In so far as the society‘s records contain data not placed there by
appropriate devices or qualiﬁed persons, the statements representing those
data will not qualify for admissibility under 5. Has. It may be that if there is
some ATM fraud conducted by a person who is qualiﬁed for the purposes of
a particular business. that difﬁculty will be overcome, though such an out-
come will he purely fortuitous. However, even if that is so, there will still be
a serious question as to whether such fraudulent statements as are made can
he said to be made by that person “in the course of and for the purposes of
the business" so as to qualify under s. l4CE (S): exactly the opposite would
appear to be the case! .
From a prosecutor’s point of view, these problems are compounded in
criminal proceedings by 5. Mat. Except in so far as it can be shown that the
data in the society’s records came from devices acceptable under s. 14CB (6)
(b) (ii), the prosecutor can be obliged under s. 14cc (2) to call as a witness
every person “concerned in the making of the statement tendered” unless it
can be established that one of the exceptions in s. 14CG (2) (b) has
occurred. This often so complicates the process for admitting the evidence
that is not even attempted.
Conclusions ’
From the foregoing, it is clear that many of the basic concepts of the
criminal law need revision in the light of the advent of computer-related
crime. The author is of the view that this can only be done through a com-
plete overhaul of much archaic thinking and statutory language. It may be
that crimes such as forgery can be adapted to computer media with little
fundamental change but the basic concepts of larceny, obtaining by false
pretences/deception, and the property offences generally will require careful .
re-examination 2. ’
32 see R. A. Brown op. cit.
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It is an oversimpliﬁcation to .think that these problems can be solved
by the creation of computer-speciﬁc offences. The history of the criminal
law contains many examples of new statutory offences having unexpected
effects upon useful existing structures, creating confusion and injustice. A
recent example can be seen in the New South Wales Court of Criminal
Appeal‘s examination of the oﬁences of motor manslaughter, driving in a
manner dangerous to the public and negligent driving in Buttsworth”. Within
the conﬁnes of this paper, it is clear that there is some overlap between
obtaining by false pretences at common law and obtaining by deception
under s. I78BA of the Crimes Act 1900, as there is between obtaining by
false pretences and larceny by a trick“. If the law were to grant some
limited form of legal personality to computer systems to allow them to be
deceived, one would immediately face questions like whether computers
can themselves be guilty of crime, whether they can act as innocent agents,
whether they can be parties of conspiracies, and so on”.
Nor will a general relaxation of the strictures of the law of evidence be
a panacea. The exclusionary rules of evidence have developed over time,
for various reasons which will need close consideration before such rules
are abandoned or modiﬁed. To simply admit into evidence all computer-
produced documentation would not only place it in a privileged category,
but would also not avoid the basic problem of all documentary evidence,
namely that, in so far as the statements in a document are to be relied on as
truly setting out those matters to which they relate, their accuracy cannot be
readily tested. Computer data are at least as fallible as the persons from
whom they are derived and few people outside the core of the computing
profession are aware of the possible defects, errors of calculation and other
“bugs”_that computers are heir to. Nor will the courts as currently con-
stituted necessarily be the best forum for settling such questions.
Even within the limited scope of this paper, it is apparent that con-
cepts of criminal liability for fraudulent activity are in need of detailed
reconsideration. Care must be taken to make the criminal law consistent,
so that if a certain activity is to be penalized when done with a computer,
should not the same activity be equally penalized when done in any other
context? The converse proposition requires identical scrutiny. These ques-
tions are, to my mind, ones for thorough examination by law reform
bodies and hasty responses by courts or legislatures are likely to cause more
problems than they solve. ‘
Perhaps the most obvious single reform suggested by this paper is a
complete re-think of the concept of criminal fraud. The common law left
fraud to be dealt with by the tort of deceit, subject only to larceny by a
trick and obtaining by false pretences. These crimes were themselves the
subject of tortuous reasoning to maintain the distinction between them“.
M11983] l N.S.W.L.R. 658.
“4 Petronius—Kuﬁ Unreported, New South Wales CCA 4 August 1978.
. “5 Similar questions have already arisen with respect to corporations.
"6 Ward (1938) 38 SR (N.S.W.) 308.
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One may be forced to adopt some concept of “dishonest obtaining of pro-
perty” without the need for any false pretence or deception on the part Of
the criminal. But any such development will itself need close scrutiny to
prevent it trespassing too far into the civil law realm and interfering with
justiﬁed civil claims for damages. Perhaps the existing requirement of false
pretence or deception can be retained provided it is amended to cover the
attempted deception of a' computer or other automatic device (such as a
vending machine). ‘
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Dr A. A. Brown
As the title of the paper indicates it is a look at the computer as a tool.
It is only one of the aspects of the use of the computer in crime, but it is
particularly the one that is likely to generate the greatest ﬁnancial damage to
whichever victim is unfortunate enough to suffer from somebody manipulat-
ing his computer equipment.
I have taken a little care to detail some of the most obvious methods
of computer related fraud. The simplest example with which we are all fami-
liar is the automatic teller, and fraud games with the automatic teller are,
as l have pointed out, relatively straightforward (I hope none of you insist
on testing out the methods I have suggested!). There are other methods and
certainly the banking community has been taking some serious thought about
rendering some of my suggestions less probable, but 1 think it is fair to say
that because of the individual’s ability to access certain accounts within a
bank via the automatic teller there are always going to be serious fraud possi-
bilities available. The fundamental control that banks currently exercise is
on the cash limits for withdrawals, but the scope of taking money out of these
delightful machines that are ready to pour cash into your hand if you are
prepared to sit there long enough is quite substantial and certainly worth
while continued activity to penetrate the systems available.
The greatest potential for really large scale fraud lies not in the auto:
matic teller but in the lield of electronic funds transfer which certain of the
banks and some retailers via point of sale terminals are going into in quite
a substantial way. The advantage of EFT from the criminal’s point of view
is the enormous sums that are transmitted .between institutions by that
process. I have not sought for that reason to detail the methods for doing
EFT frauds in the same way as I have the automatic teller, but to those
skilled in the computer industry (and there are a lot of them) the methods of
penetrating electronic funds transfer communications are still quite feasible.
The extent to which the systems that are introduced in Australia will have
adequate security is still a matter of some debate. ‘
As the law stands. as l have tried to point out, E.F.T. frauds may or
may not be caught in the existing criminal law net. In so far as there are inter-
ceptions of telecommunications we at least have the Commonwealth Tele-
communications (lnterception) Act, 1979, but it is extremely limited in its
protection for any type of communication transfer. The more probable
means of protection will be data encryption. That has its own defects and
there have been recent developments in mathematics in the United Kingdom
which seem to indicate that the data encryption standards currently in use
both in the United States and in Australia will not be an adequate protection
for encrypted EFT transmissions. This is an area certainly in which the
Commonwealth is going to be “the actor”. The communication system is
pretty well outside State law except to the extent that institutions use their
own dedicated communication lines that fall outside the scope of the Tele-
communications (Interception) A'cl.
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The computer is also treated as a symbolic tool for fraud and that is
“how most of us are likely to face it. The classic case, with which most of
us are heartily sick, is a major institution which sends a bill for $500,000.00
for telephone or electricity and when you object quite pointedly that it is a
little difﬁcult to run up that sort of bill will say “Oh, it’s a computer error”.
It may be, but most of the systems that are now installed should be incapable
of generating errors of that nature. They should really be at the stage where,
if major variations occur in assessments on particularly mechanized accounts
like the Telecom digital recorders which are used for assessing telephone
accounts, the computer should simply not produce anything at all—it should
be at a fail-safe point where if the data it is processing is simply too
ludicrous it stops. Unfortunately, that is not the case and certainly the media
of late have been making considerable play of the problems that Telecom,
in particular, has in producing computerized bills.
There are two problems; the ﬁrst, of course, is trying to ﬁght Telecom
or some other institution. I don’t blame Telecom when they say “This is our
bill. Our computer said it is correct and we are not prepared to question our
computer. You pay it or else". That is a fairly serious difﬁculty when your
phone is cut off. But the second, of course, is the more precise fraudulent
situation in which what is really happening is that somebody is ﬁddling
the accounts. Maybe Telecom is loading all its telephone charges by a cent
on every charge on every meter registration. You are never going to know.
They are simply taking a large amount of additional money by increasing
the rates above those you contracted for and if you do in fact query it, if
you are one of those few indiiv‘duals who bothers to maintain your own
telephone meter and count everything, the response is simply “Oh, it is a.
computer error. Yes, we will adjust it”. You, as one individual, get satis—
faction and everybody else goes on paying the inflated charge. As a fraudu-
lent technique that is not new—it was in operation long before computers
came into existence. The machine simply makes it a lot easier. If you are
going to add a tenth of a cent to every charge practically nobody is ever
going to notice but in terms of the number of meter registrations that Tele-
com might have the net proﬁt-is quite substantial. If some individual is
diverting the net to his own account he is going to be making a lot of money
out of it. As subsequent speakers will point out tracing how that is done
is enormously diﬂicult and l have made only a few comments on that area
myself.
The computer as an actual tool is one that rarely picks up the classic
described cases of computer fraud, i.e, using the machine not to symbolize
some correct accounting activity, but actually using it to make those tenths
of a cent in every transaction. The “Salami swindle" is a classic. Taking the
fractions of cents oﬁ bank accounts the bankers inform me is not really
possible and I tend to believe it, but as l have noted one case with the
Victorian TAB (see p. l7) where program manipulations were allowing a
person as yet both unidentiﬁed and unprosecuted to take a substantial
amount of money out of the TAB system by having credited to his account
one unit every time a particular type of bet was laid. Quite sophisticated
programming was involved and it was very hard to trace. By the time it
was, in fact, tied down the individual who was suspected had disappeared.
l have remained largely with the legislation of New South Wales. in
trying to describe how difﬁcult it is to prosecute these types of actmties.
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The legislation, good though it is in general, suffers from some serious
defects in this particular area. I hasten to point out that is true in every
jurisdiction. We are constantly dealing with concepts that relate to the 18th
and l9th centuries. These concepts are not irrelevant, they are adapt-
able to our purposes, but so far that adaptation has not taken place. The
simplest example that i can think of is in relation to forgery, creating false
computer media, false records on discs and tapes which should be in noway
different from creating false documents such as false cheques. Why we
should differentiate between recording information in a written form from
recordingthat information in some magnetic, electronic or other form is
something that seems to me conceptually indefensible. There is no sub-
stantive difference. Yet our legislation tends and, in some States is very
speciﬁc, in only allowing forgery to deal with forged written or typed docu-
ments and with very limited concepts of what is a document.
Touching upon the areas of proof and the difficulties of evidence in this
field we have a fairly substantial attempt in this State in Part IIC of the
Evidence Ac! to get computer related material in evidence. In general, that
legislation has been very successful and also extremely valuable in trying
to get before courts material they would otherwise reject. The question
always has to be asked “Why .would they have otherwise rejected it?" One
of the big problems with the computer is if the prosecution is going to use
a computer print-out to say “These are the facts upon which we rely to
prove our case against the accused", the accused is going to say “Well, using
the same computer and slightly different techniques 1 have produced a
different set of results". Both are going to be attempting to rely on claims
to accuracy of either the methods used or the machinery used and both
prosecution and defence are open to the same attacks as to their veracity,
accuracy and the detail that is contained in them. The machine itself is
good for reproducing data but it is also very good for changing that data.
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COMPUTER RELATED CRIME IN AUSTRALIA IN 1984
Kevin J. Fitzgerald
Independent Computer Control Consultant and
Executive Director, CIT-CARE
The thing that is frustrating about computer crime is that it is .a sensa-
tional news item. Who would have thought that the magical business
machine, with all its speech and efﬁciency advantages, could have a dark
side?
Unlike the motor car which was openly feared by many as a danger to
mankind, the computer won its place in the market-place by sophisticated
hard selling which helped management turn a “blind-eye" to the potential
dangers. It was also an organizational tool, not a personal tool, therefore
there was a lack of focus for marshalling the voices of discontent. With this
type of confusion the computer was welcomed as a solution to many business
problems. It was a panacea of all evils. Its very presence caused a re-think
of the way business systems should operate. Thus the emphasis was not on
control but on production of solutions. The machine started off without
controls—it was a certainty to produce criminal opportunities but we didn’t
see it. We saw a super business tool to revolutionalize business. The his-
torians will surely call this the time of The Information Revolution.
Sensationalizing computer crime statistics detracts from the real value
of collecting them. By developing a proﬁle of computer crime and presenting
that as evidence of the type of crime being conducted in the computing
environment, management can be encouraged to consider control aspects of
their computerized business systems. Claims by some that only 1 per cent
is discovered or 1 in 22 000 computer criminals go to jail are sensational
nonsense in the light of the real issue. What really matters is that manage-
ment, by concentrating on production alone whilst ignoring control security
and privacy issues, places at risk the assets with which they have been
entrusted by the shareholders, clients/ customers and/or taxpayers. Manage-
ment‘s custodial role has in many cases been forgotten.
The auditor, traditional watchdog for the shareholder and taxpayer,
has been one step (in the 70’s ten or twenty steps) behind the computerist.
His role was not effective but he/she is improving performance in the com-
puting environment where the threat of error or omission has greater likeli-
hood and consequences than the threat of crime. The computer, harnessed
by the auditor, has the capacity to be the most effective audit tool ever used,
but the competition for computing resources inevitably Sees the audit use of
the computer signiﬁcantly down the priority list.
Most of the cases collected by ClT—CARB, the Computer Abuse Re-
search Bureau at Chisholm Institute of Technology, are the simple cases.
The clever crimes netting huge dollar values are not as frequent as the
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folklore would have us believe nor are they likely to be reported if they are
discovered. However, studies of the control and security eﬁectiveness in
computer systems in this country reveal embarrassing holes which would
certainly enable the misguided whizz-kid to perpetrate crimes of spectacular
proportions. If such were the case in a business environment in which audit
was given scant resources then the chance of discovery would be minimal.
Because the law has problems deﬁning computer related crime CIT<
(‘ARB chose the term “computer abuse" as a means of overcoming the
“crime-which-isn’t-a-crime" problem posed by the deﬁnition difﬁculties at
law. Computer abuse has been deﬁned by ClT—CARB as .
Theft, fraud, embezzlement or damage related to computers and
includes:
(i) unauthorized manipulation of computer input and/or output;
(ii) unauthorized access to the system through terminals;
(iii) unauthorized modiﬁcation or use of application programs;
(iv) trespass on data processing installation. theft of equipment, ﬁles or
output; .
(v) sabotage of computer installation equipment;
(vi) unauthorized data interception.
Computer abuse incidents have occurred overseas, some of them quite
spectacular and there is no reason to suspect that they do not occur in
Australia. However, with the high tolerance level given by the business
world to this type of crime there is a low level of knowledge about computer
abuse because it is not reported.
The rapid growth and impact of the digital computer on society is
typiﬁed by the explosive popularity of microcomputers in this early part of
the 80‘s decade. The IBM Share report of 1980 predicts that by 1985 75
per cent of the USA. population will be information related jobs. The
opportunity for computer abuse will expand rapidly as computer literacy
and proﬁciency rises in society. Current needs for a distinction between
white collar crime and computer crime will eventually disappear—all white-
collar crime will be computer related, all business crime will become com—
puter crime. '
This situation really places the onus of protecting the computerized
business system from attack fairly and squarely on the shoulders of manage-
ment. Law enforcement cannot help. Rapidly expanding computer use and
computer literacy; a clear message by top management to computer manage-
ment which says “production, production, production” rather than “pro-
duction, control, production"; and a lack of conﬁdence in the legal system;
all point to potential danger for. computerized business systems unless manage-
ment is motivated to take cognizance of the vulnerabilities.
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Such situations also mean that no doubt organized crime has spotted
the weaknesses just as the terrorist groups have. It will not be long before
we are sure that such groups have started operations from computer an es
to perpetrate their crimes. If they had not been aware of the opportunities
beforehand they would certainly have picked it up from the glamour press
surrounding Stanley Mark Rifkin’s $10.2 million EFT theft from the Security
Paciﬁc Bank resulting in a self confession, restitution (believed incomplete)
and only an eight year prison sentence. (Note that Rifkin was recently
paroled after serving little more than three years.)
0
Currently the Australian computer abuse casebook has 124 incidents
of computer abuse. These incidents have been collected since September,
1978, and have mainly occurred since 1975. The value of the incidents range
from $0—$l,000,000. The total value of the losses is $5,643,266 from 65
incidents. Fifty-nine cases are classiﬁed as non-assessable. The average
value of the assessable incidents is $86,819.
Table 1 shows how computer related fraud incidents dominate the
casebook at the current time representing two-thirds of the total value.
Unauthorized use is not valued highly although it represents one-quarter of
the casebook in number. Sabotage is the second highest value by virtue of
one incident, a major ﬁre in Sydney deliberately lit by an angry operator.
If all the sabotage incidents could have been valued, there were six non-
assessed, perhaps this category would have challenged fraud as the leading
value in the casebook.
TABLE 1
THE ‘rvpas OF ABUSE
 
. /
Number Per cent Non No
Ch” of Cases ya!" Value Assessable Zero Value
3
Computer Related Fraud .. 64 4,571,466 8|.0 24 5
Unauthorized Use .. 30 6,400 DJ 19 6
Theft of Output l l 100,000 L7 8 2
Sabotage . . . . 7 , 15.9 6 0
Masterﬁle Destroyed 3 900 .02 l 1
Theft of Equipment 8 64,500 L] l 0
l2] 5,643,266 mo 59 14     
Theft of output probably represents the area potentially the most
dangerous due to the transportability of ﬂoppy discs and microﬁche as well
as the poor performance of passwords and other access control systems. As
microcomputer users convert their conﬁdential information to disc ﬁles, that ,
information which represents a competitive edge -will become a target for
industrial espionage.
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If we categorize the techniques of computer abuse into input, process-
ing, output and installation oriented techniques the following proﬁle emerges
from the Australian casebook:
TABLE 2
THE AUSTRALIAN COMPUTER ABUSE CASEBOOK PROFILE
. COMPUTER RELATED CRIME -
- I
 
 
 
 
 
 
I , I
Number Value ‘
of Cases of Cases , SNA.
1. Input Oriented Technique: ' S -
Adding fraudulent input . . . . 28 2.360.023 6
.Changedinput . . . . . . ‘ 11 739,830 4
39 3,099,853 10
31.5 °/. ‘ 55 ‘X,
2. Ilm'tallation Oriented Techniques '
Unauthorized use . . 29 67,300 17
Sabotage/Vandalism 9 905,000 ' 7
Theft of equipment . . 7 69,500 ‘ . .
Theft of computer consumables 1 . . . . 1
46 1,041,800 25
_‘ — 37.1 "/0 18.5 %
3. Processing Oriented Techniques ,
Unauthorized software changes . . l8 , 298.113 9
Masterﬁle changes . . . . . . 1 . . . . l
19 298.113 10
’ \ 15.3 ”A 5.3 %
4. Oulput Oriented Techniques
Masterﬁle Information Stolen . . 8 ' 109.500 6
Output Stolen . . . . . . 5 ' 100.000 2
13 209,500 8
’ 10.5 % 3.7 “/0
5. Technique not known . . . . . . 6 1,000,000 5
5.6 ‘2, 17.5 ‘7.
’ 123 ‘ $5,643,266 58
(100%) . (100%) (48%)   
N.B. Average for assessed cases $86,819.
° $NA : Non-Assessable cases.
31
 
Following the experiences of computer abuse casebooks from over-
seas the input oriented cases dominate the Australian casebook representing
55 per cent of the value. Installation oriented cases ﬁgure so high in the
proﬁle because of the high number of unauthorized use cases reported and,
once again, the inﬂuence of the $900,000 sabotage. In this category also is
the highest number of non-assessable cases—-a situation that perhaps under-
lines the lack of physical security in Australian installations.
Together these two techniques, input oriented and installation oriented
techniques represent the high, proﬁle techniques of Australian computer
abuse. These are the techniques that we know most about because they are
visible. The categories that perhaps should cause us most concern are the
ones that we do not know so much about—the processing oriented tech-
niques and the output oriented techniques. These techniques probably repre-
sent the majority of the “under-water iceberg"—-the part we cannot see—
because they are being executed either without detection or, if they have
been detected, management has been too reticent to reveal the abuse.
In relation to the relevance of using such ﬁgures for the purpose of
motivating management to ensure reasonable levels of control and security
in their computerized systems they are hardly likely to cause an immediate
rush to establish protective safeguards. What they' can do though is prove
that computer abuse does exist in Australia. The computer does provide an
enivronment in which abuses do occur and for many of these occurrences
it would appear that inadequate controls and security levels existed. The
opportunities confronting employees to commit white collar crimes have
never been greater. “Wide-eyed" acceptance by business managers of what
the technologists provide, including control and security facilities, does little
to encourage the hardware and software houses to build in better control,
security and auditability facilities.
If computer abuse is a people problem who then is responsible for
perpetrating the computer abuses that we know about? In all but one of the
Australian cases the perpetrator seemed to be a ﬁrst-time offender moti-
vated by greed and an awareness that the system had holes in its controls,
security and auditing systems. No doubt the knowledge that there was little
chance of being discovered also encouraged the perpetrators.
Tables 3 and 4 summarize the perpetrator proﬁles of the incidents that
we know about.
 
 
TABLE 3
PERPETRATORS BY MAJOR CLASSIFICATION
No. ’0 Per cent Non
Cuses] Value Value Assessable
S
EDI’ Employee . . . . . . 49 783,787 13.9 24
User Employee . . . . . . 36 3.l50.049 55.8 18
Outsiders . . . . . . . . l8 1,634,680 28.9 7
Unidentiﬁed, . . . . . . 2| 74,750 Lil l0
I24 $5,643,266 100 S9    
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The~recent rise in the reported incidence of user employee based com—
puter abuse reﬂects some high value crimes involving management person-
nel and senior users in fraudulent efforts. It is expected that such a trend'
will continue in line with the typical white collar crime pattern. This pattern
researched by criminologists suggests that the two age peaks for white collar
crime are in the early 20’s and the early 50's. It is the latter area, when
combined with increasing computer literacy which may well prove to be
the biggest problem for government and business in the future.
i
TABLE 4
PERPETRATOR RANKED BY .IOB POSITION—THE TOP FIVE
.
 
   
No. of Cases Value Asslzfszble
S
Programmers . . . . . . . . 22 373.!50 l0
('uslomers . . .. .. .. ' .. l0 705,l50 4
Input (‘Ierksu . . . . .. .. 8 l63,937 4; '
Students .. .. .. .. ’ ..' 8 . 600 6
Operators . . . . . . .- . . . l0 7.200 4 ,
The relatively low average loss resulting from the efforts by pro-
grammers suggests- that the attempts were not very ‘ambitious and were not
particularly clever. Not all of the programmer perpetrators attacked the
system via unauthorized modiﬁcations. Some attacked the-system with an
axe. some altered input data, some stole output and some made unauthor-
ized use of the system. In fact, apart from a “round down" incident and a
couple of “logic bombs" there have been no sophisticated program modi-
ﬁcation abuses reported to the Bureau.
There has been one case reported which is a professional crime. A
drug syndicate employed two computer operators to inﬁltrate a government
information system for information on courier surveillance. It was dis-
covered by a security ofﬁcer’s rdutine investigation of terminal usage logs.
The inﬁltration was based on the use of carelessly stored passwords.
What industry groups are being targeted by the abusers in this collec-
tion? Table 5 shows that the industry spread has no particular bias in either
value or number of abuses although government installations are subject to
a high reported incidence. ' _ ’
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TABLE 5
THE INDUSTRY SPREAD OF COMPUTER ABUSE
 
 
 
N0. of Case: Value Cases Nor/ﬁssgsable
8
Manufacturing . . . . . . . . 11 1,006,719 3
Banking .. .. .. .. .. 2 ..
Finance . . . . . . . . . . 12 1,357,286 6
Federal Govt . . . . . . . . 18 2,730,718 9
Dist/Wholesale . . . . . . . . 9 187,300 0
State Government . . . . . . 22 148,863 13
Comp. Industry .. .. .. .. 14 129,000 ~ 10
Retail . .. .. .. .. 6 9,000 4
Professional 1 22,000 0
Mining . .. .. .. .. 1 5.000 0
Local Government . . . . . . 4 2,780 0
Insurance .. .. .. .. .. 4 1,000 2'
Education .. t. .. .. 13 9,100 9
Unknown‘ 5 34,500 3
122 35,643,266 59   
' In 5 cases the industry is not known.
Like many other research groups CIT-CARB is more concerned about
the potential for future loss than the present evidence of actual loss. 'I‘he
speed of growth of the computer’s place in the information society, the lack
of concern for control and security represented best by the common
expression “It won’t happento me" and the rapid rise in computer literacy
and proﬁciency in society in general, all contribute to the inevitability of
several large computer related crimes in the 1980‘s in Australia.
The importance of the Australian computer abuse proﬁle to the business
community is in relation to the image that can be portrayed of the vulnera-
bility of most computerized business systems in action today. Generaliza-
tions are dangerous but the lack of acceptable control and security levels in
the situations reported to the bureau highlight the high risk level under which
most organizations operate. The measurement of risk in business systems
is a new and challenging ﬁeld. It is a method by which management can see
some relationship between money spent and the effective cover of vulnera-
bilities. Often for the ﬁrst time assets are recognized for what their value to
the organization is. vulnerabilities are discovered and the control and security
proﬁle matched to the risk proﬁle presented by the organization.
The current “it-won’t—happen-to-me” thinking is not good enough in
the light of the future developments of technology. Ignorance of risk pro-
ﬁles abounds in computer using organizations at the moment. The CIT-
CARB casebook can perhaps help to bring home the point that computer
abuse can happen and that safeguards are not always prohibitively expensive
or complicated.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
K. I. Fitzgerald
Unfortunately computer crime is almost an entertainment business. It is
one of those things that whenever we hear' people telling the details of crimes
and how it can be done, we .sit back in wonder. So, perhaps it is an enter-
tainment issue, the media certainly seem to concentrate on that line.
. My paper comes from work that has been done at the Chisholm
Institute of Technology in Melbourne from a group'called the Computer
Abuse Research Bureau. Whilst this seminar is related to computer crime,
computer abuse is a term which" we chose deliberately to include the act of
using a computer in ways that were not intended. Of course, in deﬁning our
ﬁeld in that regard it has become much- broader than looking at fraud.
Dr Brown has referred to fraud quite extensively but I would like to underline
another area/which can be quite diﬂicult, that is,'in relation to the theft of
information rather than the theft of money. I believe that that is an issue
that really ought to be tackled. We have a deﬁnition of theft which varies
from State to State, one which looks at denial of the use on the one hand and
the assumption of the ownership rights on the other, differing again between
common and code law interpretations. It is one of those things that I think
the world is really struggling with”. No doubt the efforts of Mr‘Justice Kirby
and the Law Reform Commission may well. provide a solution, but it is
something that I think all of us at this seminar probably need to give some
‘deep thought to_when we see espionage being provided with many more
opportunities than a few years ago. The microcomputer has come into our
. living rooms and we are being taught to use them by' our children. This will
result in a rapid increase of the level. of computer literacy in society and,
therefore, the ability of people to perpetrate crimes which we had not pre-
viously considered possible. \
Perhaps I should deﬁne my self as an observer of human nature in the
computerized business world rather than as a researcher. by way of an
apology for ﬁgures in the tables 1 have presented because, of course, ‘we'
are really only looking ”at things that people want to tell me about. As other
speakers have noted we are really talking about the tip of the iceberg. For
example, if the banking fraternity is the one that handles most money why-
have they' only got a couple of cases of computer related crime? There are
'only a few case books collected throughout the world and Australia has quite
a sizeable number of cases on its casebook compared to other places. Of
course, Donn Parker in America started off this whole collection of casebooks
in the computer crime area with an American casebook now totalling some
thousand cases. I have only 123 cases, so we have a very small picture here.
worth just over $5.5 million collected from about 1975. If one looks at
the whole spectrum of computer crime in society based on those ﬁgures it
could be an issue not worth considering when one considers that shoplifting
was worth $600 million last year. So we are really not talking about
huge ﬁgures if we are looking at the past and at the recorded data: Obviously
we need to get into‘ the scenario and perhaps the EFT examples are the
ones that are going to really shine through—they are the ones that have
shown us the major overseas crimes in the past.
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Table l (p. 29) shows up the class of computer related crime that I have
called computer related fraud which makes up the majority of the cases.
But obviously some of the other areas are of great interest even though
they are of much lower value. The “unauthorized use” area has 30 cases
but I am sure that there are a lot more cases in that category. Obviously
people are not going to cost out and call it a crime that someone might use
their computer to produce the mailing labels for the local church or cricket
team or whatever and obviously we are not really concerned about that.
However, there are degrees that one can go to and the Americal legal
fraternity has recognized the illegal use of computers. lt has even tried to
stop people printing out the regular Snoopy calendars and so on.
Sabotage is very visible and therefore can be recorded. If someone is
going to throw a bomb at a computer centre obviously we will an normally
know about it and we have not that many cases of sabotage in Australia. It
is frightening when one thinks of the target value that a computer makes for
a would be perpetrator or political activist or a disgruntled employee. One
of the central themes of my paper is that it is up to management to protect
itself from these acts rather than to rely upon legal protection and obviously
that is good management technique. It is surprising to me, as a person who
is now earning his living in this area, the amount of‘sweeping under the
carpet" that does occur in the whole area of computer abuse and particularly
in the important area of white collar crime. Of course, thatIS not unusual
with white collar crime, it is regularly being‘‘swept under the carpet".
I am sure that you will take issue with me in including theft of equip3
ment as a computer crime and obviously I would agree with you. But we
put theft of equipment into our classiﬁcation of computer related crime
because of the incredible blind spots that people seem to have. It has prob-
ably shown up very strongly at the moment in relation to micro-computers
where top executives are massaging some quite conﬁdential data on the
micros without any. concern at 'all for the security of that data. It is an
issue that one ought to expect people to be protective of but they are leaving
themselves wide open and thus with that sort of background the ﬁnal para-
graphs of my paper (p. 33) do refer to a technique which I think manage-
ment is going to have to adopt on a broader scale than they are at the
moment in relation to risk analysis. That is, to look at what risks are in fact
confronting the computer environment in their organization, what threat the
computer has to the organization and to try and rank the threats that are
there. It is an issue peopleare starting to accept as a way of protecting
themselves.
In Table 2 (p. 30) we tried to classify our data on the same lines as
_ the American casebook classiﬁcation, that is in four areas and the “input
oriented technique” is the one whiéh in terms of value shows up as the major
area with over half of the casebook in that area. It is probably because
obviously it is the easiest area to pick up the information from. Input
manipulation has been something that the internal audit profession has been
able to look after and observe in manual systems and electromanual sys-
tems and, of course, in the computer area it has not been something all that
dillicult to see We should be able to protect ourselves in that area and
should have learnt from the mistakes of the past, but I am ﬁnding that that
is not the case. I am sure that it will take some time before people really
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do start to get down to taws and protect themselves and every new technique
of inputting information into the computer, e.g., poxnt of sale terminals and
EFT, brings with it another wave of problems.
When I ﬁrst started off the Bureau in 1977 I thought that 1 would be
looking at a lot of pretty fancy programming oriented crimes with some
pretty smart people getting involved. The ﬁgures do not reﬂect that and
just as I know more about input crimes because they are easy to ﬁnd, I am
sure that 1 do not know a lot about programming type of crimes'because
they, in fact, have not been discovered. That is one of the frightening
things, but I guess it makes it a little entertaining that the computer does
provide us with the opportunity to create the perfect crime and the perfect
crime, of course, is one that has never been discovered. I expect that there
are many of those. it behoves the EDP audit profession to really dig
deep in this area and to ask management to provide the protection facilities
that are there, and the EDP audit profession after a slow start has started
'to catch up in this area. I believe now that for the ﬁrst time there are
many programmers who are having an auditor look over their shoulders with
some knowledge of what he is doing. As we move into fourth generation
languages and move into user based programming then, of course, the
auditor is going to have a much closer look because the programmes will be
written much more quickly, they will be changed much more quickly and
this whole area of programme change will be a major control factor. I might
hasten to add though that errors and omissions will cause many more prob-
lems in the management sense than crime ever will. ’
Output oriented techniques is where I thinklthe legal profession might
have some problems. The whole area of copying data is something that has
been highlighted by such media events as “War Games", where we are
getting into new communication technologies without the control restraints
which should be associated with them.
Computers are a very exciting area and it is very tempting to put in the
productive elements without worrying too much about the controls. That is
human nature and we tend as entrepreneurs “to go for broke” and pick up
the pieces later. It is very sad if those pieces happen to be taxpayers and
shareholders and obviously the purpose of this seminar is to learn more and
to prepare ourselves for the future. -
In Table 3 (p. 31) I looked at the sort of people involved, and I would
like to underline that computer crime, like white collar crime in general,
can be associated with the ﬁrst-time amateur criminal. The professional
criminal is someone whom we are not seeing a lot of. l have only one case
of a professional criminal being associated with a computer crime. There
may well be many others, but I expect that the opportunist who recognizes
a fault in the system is the one we are talking about—the ﬁrst-time
amateur. That in itself I guess provides some degree of comfort if- we can
rely upon it, but when we look at the people who create these crimes it
swings from year to year whether it is the users or whether it is the EDP
employee. I would like to suggest that the employee or the ex-employee
perhaps is the most dangerous person, and that the ex-employee may be a
contractor or a person who has recently left the organization. If they have
left the organization in a disgruntled manner then it really becomes an issue
that has to be protected carefully.
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Table 4 (p. 32) refers to the job position a little fuier and in the EDP
area we see programmers and input clerks and operators showing up as the
sort of people‘being involved. It is interesting that the programming type
perpetrations that l have in my casebook are not always related to chang-
ing programmes Sometimes they are related to manipulating the input and
it is also interesting to note that some of the crimes perpetrated by input
clerks are not only input manipulations but are also in programming areas,
which is a problem in relation to the division of duties on which the internal
control people have relied upon for many years.
Finally, Table 5 (p. 33) means very little. The industry is such a
sketchy area that at the moment it is not showing up any area that is more
important than any other. Government, which has about a third of the
computers in Australia also has about a third or so of the computer abuse .
cases, which would be expected.
I have come to the conclusion in my research and my own business
practice that we are in a risk situation in relation to the speed of the tech—
nology and in relation to the inability of the law to protect the bUSinessman.
I expect it is a situation that he ﬁnds himself in for the ﬁrst time, and that
he really has to spend money on something he does not want to spend
money on. Who wants to spend money on control when you can be out
there making money? So it is a challenge to the businessmen with whom we
must be sympathetic, and I believe that it is the risk analysis here that might
be the safety valve.
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A POLICE VIEW AND ASSOCIATED INVESTIGATIVE PROBLEMS
Detective Sergeant J. R. Lowe,
Fraud Squad, Police Department, New South Wales.
\
For a variety of reasons “computer crime” or as it should more appro-
priatcly be called “computer related crime" has become the “glamour" crime
of the l970’s and 80‘s.
Although its deﬁnition is many and varied, in this State it comes within
the umbrella of “white collar crime”, which division for statistical annd plan-
ning purposes assists to differentiate between types of crime. The problem
however, seems to arise that the moment that the phrase “computer related
crime” is used, it conjures up in the mind of the listener a totally diﬁerent
view of the criminal. In fact, it appears to me that some areas of our
society regard persons involved in this or other forms of white collar crime
as persons to be admired not abhorred. Perhaps this comes from living in a
proﬁt-oriented society or just through the lack of re-educating members
of the public. After all, computer related crime as we know it, like other
areas of white collar crime, is economic crime, and we all pay the price for
tolerating it in our midst. '
Computer related crime is a people related problem and although com-
puters are engendering a new era of crime as they proliferate into the
activities and environments in which these crimes occur, one on reﬂection
could be excused for likening this crimeto “old wine in new bottles”. That
is, criminals indulging in this area of crime use the computer as their tool, as
a burglar uses a jemmy to gain entry in a housebreaking crime.
The term “computer crime“ is 'a common term used to identify illegal
computer abuse; however, it implies direct involvement of computers in
committing crime, so accordingly, it is far preferable to adopt the term
.“computer related crime" which assists in providing for a far broader deﬁni-
tion. Eminent researchers in the United States have concluded that com-
puters have four roles in crime and all of the known and reported cases
of computer related crime involve one or more of these roleszp
Object. Cases include destruction of computers or of data or pro-
grammes contained in them or supportive facilities and resources such as
air conditioning equipment and electrical power, that allow them to
function.
Subject. A computer can be the site or environment of a crime
or the source of or reason for unique forms and kinds of assets.
Instrument. Some types and methods of crime are complex enough
to require the use of a computer as a tool or instrument. A computer
can be used actively such as in automatically scanning telephone codes
to make unauthorized use of a telephone system. It could also be used
passively to simulate a general ledger in the planning and control of a
continuing ﬁnancial embezzlement.
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S.ymbol A computer can be used as a symbol for intimidation or
deception. This could involve the false advertising of the non-existent
services, such as in dating bureaux.
As businesses become more dependent on computers as a storeroom
of all commercial transactions, there is a growing need for data to be safe
from unauthorized access and interference. In fact, it is paramount for a
computer system to be secure and any sloppy security of data and pro-
grams is parallel to leaving the company safe unlocked and the factory door
open.
The introduction of new occupations has extended the traditional cate-
gories of criminals to include computer programmers computer operators,
tape librarians and electronic engineers who function in environments that
are relatively new Where as crime has traditionally occurred in environ-
ments of manual activities, some crime is now perpetrated inside‘computers
in the specialized environment or rooms with raised ﬂooring, lowered ceilings,
large and small pieces of machinery, ﬂashing lights, moving tapes and the
hum of air conditioning motors.
A new jargon has developed amongst the computer fraternity identifying
automatetd criminal methods such as, date diddling, trojan’ horses, Ilogic
bombs, salami techniques, superzapping, piggybacking, scavenging, and
date leakage. The forms of many of the targets of computer related crime are
also new. Electronic money as well as paper money and plastic money
(credit cards) now represent assets subject to intentionally caused loss.
Money in the form of electronic signals and magnetic patterns is stored and
processed in computers and transmitted over telephone lines. Money is debited
and credited to accounts inside computers. In fact, the computer is rapidly
becoming the vault for the businesscommunity. Many other physical assets, «
including inventories of products in warehouses and of materials leaving or
entering factories, are represented by documents of record inside computer
systems.
- a
The timing of some crimes -is also different. Traditionally, the time of
criminal acts is measured in minutes, hours, days, weeks, months and years.
However, today with computer technology it would be logical to accept that
some crimes are being perpetrated in less than 0.03 of a second (3 milli-
seconds). Thus, automated crime must be considered in terms of a new time
scale because of the speed of the execution of instructions in computers.
Geographic constraints do not inhibit perpetration of this new crime.
A telephone with a computer terminal attached to it in one part of Australia
could be used to engage in a crime. in an on-line computer system in any other
part of Australia. In fact, such action is of course not restricted to Australia
but similarly applies to terminals situated in any part of the world. .
Although there have been only a small number of computer related
crimes reported in Australia this does not mean that the problem is insigniﬁ-
cant. Australia closely follows the trends and growth patterns of their
American counterparts and hence there is good reason to belieVe that the
incidence of computer abuse will not be any different.
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Studies undertaken in the United States by IBM and the US. Chamber
of Commerce estimate that no more than a very small percentage of computer
crime is reported. Therefore it follows, that the same situation no doubt
applies here. Several reasons seem to lie at the base of this non-reporting.
A primary one is the fear on the part of businesses that admitting their
computer's fallibility will have a severe effect on their customer’s conﬁdence
and result in loss of business. Additionally, a further factor is that businesses
have adopted the course of attending to their problems “in house" and
perhaps to some degree are unsure whether law enforcement agencies have
the necessary expertise to deal with this area of crime.
From an investigator‘s point of view it is considered that professional
people such as, systems analysts, auditors, programmers, etc., are likely to be
the source of reports of potential computer crime cases, and although they
are seldom seen in police stations, have an important role in communicating
crimes detected and the dimensions of that crime.
'The Computer Criminal
Analysis of available material and published reports indicates that the
majority of computer criminals are ﬁrst-time offenders. Such a description
suggests the individual was caught on his ﬁrst outing, but realistically should
be interpreted as one who has not been caught before. In most cases they
are highly intelligent, from an academic background and often quite young
by comparison. Their advantage is that they work in a highly technical and
little understood environment, often unsupervised, with the ability to disguise
their actions by converting them to unseen electronic impulses.
I believe that they may set out by posing themselves an academic prob-
lem under the “I wonder if. . .”. premise, not with the intention of
causing loss to their employer or his clients but trying to “beat the machine”.
However, because of lax security, ineffective controls, etc., their academic
research transforms into criminal inclination when they discover the high
potential for personal ﬁnancial gain. Unlike the conventional criminal, they
do not see themselves as stealing from an individual, thereby causing personal
hardship. but from an inanimate object—Abe computer—which has no feelings
at all. Parker (Crime by Computer) contends that the “Robin Hood synd-
rome", that is stealing from the rich, is often apparent and the differential
association syndrome is frequently present. As yet it would appear that
professional criminals have not acquired the knowledge and skills to use
computers, but as computers penetrate into the environment in which the
professional criminal works_ no doubt this situation will change.
To the present time, with the exception of crimes which involve the loss
of federal fundsuall major white collar crime detected within New South
Wales is investigated by N.S.W. police, more particularly the Fraud Squad
and the Corporate Affairs Commission. The police investigator faced with a
computer crime allegation faces two contrasting difﬁculties. On the one hand,
if he or she has not conducted such an investigation before. the computer is
a mysterious instrument. Many people, including investigators. believe that
computers and their operation can never be understood. On the other hand,
a thorough investigation of a computer crime does require an appreciation
of the many unique characteristics of a computer.  
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Consequently, the approach taken by police investigators is to gain an
appreciation of the aspects of the investigative process which are unique
features of a computer, and in so doing it is sought to gain practical solutions
to those unique problems. In various training programs undertaken by
police investigators it is sought to alert the investigator to the variety of
problems which he or she may face. Although we believe that the suggestions
offered in these training programs will prove useful to investigators, an
investigator using his or her own common sense, experience, or intuition
may ﬁnd that all the circumstances dictate a solution different to that which
~may be suggested in any training program.
Police investigators when undertaking the investigation of a complex
computer crime must carefully plan their approach to the problem and
consider the necessity to use “expert assistance". As it will be appreciated
one can no more investigate a complex computer crime case alone than one
could investigate an art forgery or accusation of death by some medical
malpractice. The combination of complexities means that other experts may
be needed to explain the computer context, the business context or even the
legal context. It is important that the police investigator knows where to
ﬁnd these experts, what sorts of questions they can be expected to help him
answer and how to understand their responses.
Given that the allegation is made by management against one or more
of their employees, then the ideal expert could be the I).P. Manager, Soft-
ware Programmer, head of the company's Computer Audit Branch, or any
other senior EDP staff with full knowledge of the system, PROVIDED
THAT the individual is above suspicion. On the other hand, if the allegation
is against management, the EDP staff are likely to be involved and the
expert would need to be drawn from outside industry.
Gathering of Evidence
Unique Aspects
Several aspects of computerized evidence have direct bearing on the
investigator's task. Evidence in a computer is much more “dense" than in
any other information system. That is, a single computer tape can contain as
much information as a shelf full of law books. Consequently, the ease of
destroying the information is much greater and the value of the information
to a potential thief is greater as well. Furthermore, much of the information
is not visible without the use of some device to translate it from electronic
symbology to print. Being invisible, the information is also more subject to
booby traps or illegitimate programming designed to destroy the information
should an investigator attempt to reproduce it.
The Nature of the System
The computer system itself is dynamic: it consists of information and
programs within a computer that is usually in operation. It may not be
possible to gather the information one wants out of the computer Without
shutting down the business operation which the computer has been set up
to run. Furthermore, the data on the magnetic tapes, discs, and other storage
media cannot be used to produce the hard copy reports that were produced
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except through use of the same programs and hardware, and while there are
many areas of computer compatibility, one cannot in general obtain any
information otf tape or disc unless one has compatible systems and usually
a similar computer model. A further practical problem for the investigator is
the enormous volume of evidence that a computer centre may contain. In the
Equity Funding case, some 3000 reels of computer tapes were potential
evidence.
Other Problems
The type of evidence which the police investigator will want to look at
and possibly seize are diﬂerent to that encountered in a normal investigation.
Documentation is the most common form of evidence, other than the com-
computcr tapes, discs, and other storage media. In unusual cases, the equip-
ment itself might be required. The complexity of the computer case may
well make it much more diliicult to specify the instrumentality of a computer
crime before an investigation has begun. Thus, a certain amount of “ﬁshing"
may be necessary to understand how it is that the crime in question was
committed. Likewise, the complexity of the crime involved may make it
hard to determine who the potential offender(s) are in certain cases. Thus
the police investigator must gather information without tipping off the
oﬁendcr(s) and enabling them to cover their tracks.
In the collection of evidence it‘ is of course essential for the police
investigator to establish whether or not his search for evidence will be in
either a hostile or friendly environment. In the event of a friendly environ-
ment, searches are usually carried out with the consent and assistance of the
complainant. However, in the case of such consent searches it should be
borne in mind that where the complexity of the case makes the identity of
the crime perpetrators hard to discern, a request for such a consent search
may be counter-productive as it may afford the oﬂender the opportunity to
destroy the evidence. On the other hand, in the case of a hostile environment,
it may be necessary for a surprise assault to be made on the computer
installation. In such an instance, the police investigator would proceed with
the assistance of a search warrant, the terms of which may require an
enormous amount of description in order to cover each component of the
computer system the investigator seeks to inspect and seize.
In order to ensure proper and detailed preparation of a search warrant
in a computer case, it is advisable for the investigator where the need arises,
to seek the aid of thc'enlisted computer expert who would assist in preparing
a detailed aﬂidavit covering all the technical aspects but be in a position to
make such document comprehensible to a magistrate or justice who may
know nothing about computers. In such instances it is also considered
necessary for the technical deponent to be available to answer any questions
of the issuing magistrate or justice and later accompany the investigator
during the execution of the warrant.
Where appropriate, permission might also be sought to shut down the
operation of the business for a reasonable time to protect the evidence as
part of the search warrant. Such permission would in my submission be
unusual and no doubt require extensive justiﬁcation both factually and legally.
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Therefore, such action would only be resorted to in instances where it could
be clearly shown that anything short of closing down the installation would
severely or_ directly result in the loss of the available evidence.
Additionally, no doubt permission would also be required for an expert
accompanying a police investigator to touch or access a victim company’s
computer. Even though a search warrant might provide for the expert’s
operation of the computer system, it is my considered opinion that it would
be far better to have the written consent of the victim before commencing
such an operation. Such consent would also be useful should any objection
be raised along the line that data was changed by the expert’s meddling with
the victim’s system. - ~
A further matter in the gathering of evidence which might pose a
problem for the investigator is the “right to privacy”. Having this in mind,
the investigator when planning his investigation approach should take all
necessary action to ensure this does not become a problem and impede his
investigation.
Other variables which should be considered by the police investigator
when planning to meet problems which might have a signiﬁcant effect on the
> course of action he takes when actually going to seize evidence are whether
the complaining witness is someone to be trusted, whether the employees
working in the computer environment can be trusted and whether such
police inquiry is already generally known to individuals within the area where
the evidence is housed.
Preservation of Evidence
The police investigator, once he has secured evidence, relative to a
computer crime, is then faced with the problem of what to do with it and
how to store it. Other than in instances where the crime perhaps involves
the machinery itself, there would be few cases where located evidence has,
not been removed. Police may experience problems through improper main-
tenance, storage or just through the sheer enormity of evidence obtained
from a major seizure. In so far as computer tapes are concerned, it will
be readily realized that improper storage may result in warpage or other
damage which may render them unreadable.
Preserving the Chain of Custody
There is nothing unique about a computer tape or magnetic disc. One
tape or disc may be physically indistinguishable from any of a thousand
others. Nor would there appear to be any promise of performance in the
magnetic patterns encoded on a computer tape or disc. The materials are
erasable. In normal use they are used, erased and re—used routinely. They
are vulnerable to alteration and spoilation. Therefore, in order to ensure
that exhibit tapes and other storage media can be placed before the court
in their true form, it behoves the investigator to adopt a permanent marking
system and maintain careful records of the chain of custody for each of his
exhibit items.
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Legislation
To assist law enforcement ofﬁcers and prosecutors to be able to effec-
tively combat the expected growth incidence of computer related crime, a
real need is seen for the updating of our existing law which in New South
Wales largely depends on Common Law principles.
It is my view that those who are responsible for the drafting of our
legislation should rather than attempting a cosmetic approach to the problem
by amending existing New South Wales criminal law, concern themselves
with a Crimes (Computer Abuse) Act with adequate and clear deﬁnitions
and some provision for the following:
(1) Theft or Attempted Theft of—
(a) ﬁnance and/or assets;
(b) computer time;
(c) exclusive information, e.g., secret formulas, etc.;
(d) general information, e.g., mailing lists;
(e) software and/or hardware.
(2) Unlawful Entry to Premises containing a Computer Installation
and/or System.
(3) Unlawfully “Accessing” Computer or its Records—
(a) inputting entries;
(b) extracting information.
(4) Unauthorized Alteration to Program (s) or Data Maintained and
/or Retained in a Computer. '
(5) Illegal Use of a Computer——
(a) time;
(b) space.
(6) Malicious Damage to Software and/or Hardware—-
(a) interference with stored information;
(b) interference with the operation of the computer;
(c) damage to computer software and/or hardware.
(7) Blackmail or Extortion—Holding computer software and/or
hardware to ransom.
(8) Powers of Police—
(a) to enter, search and seize records;
(b) to “access” computer;
(c) to cause computer to generate documents;
((1) to take possession of computer generated documents.
In any legislation, provision should also be made for the searching
and securing of evidence where a point of crime terminal is situated in one
State and the computer in another.
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Juries—Technical Presentation
Technical presentation of evidence to a jury in a computer related
crime case is another matter of concern to the police investigator and the
prosecutor, bearing in mind that the most likely image a jury would have of
computer technology is what they last read on the front page of a news-
paper. This material tends to be highly sensationalized and highly distorted.
Therefore, in order to successfully present evidence to a jury both the
investigator and prosecutor should endeavour to make their case as basic,
simple and free from computer technology and terminology as possible. The
use of analogies, such as magnetic disc phonograph record, is often useful
when presenting technical concepts. However, no matter how hard investi-
gators and prosecutors may try to simplify the presentation of technical
evidence in a computer related crime prosecution, juries as they presently
stand, will as happens in a complicated fraud prosecution, be utterly con-
fused by the actions of askilful defence advocate. Accordingly, and in order
to avoid this situation, it is moved that legislators should also give con-
sideration to the formation of special juries in this, and other complicated
areas of crime.
The prospect of a pre—trial hearing before any lengthy fraud or com-
puter related crime prosecution might also be considered. The advantage of
this procedure would be that the real issues to be contested at the trial could
be deﬁned and thus it would save time and, since often the State is funding
both defence and prosecution, Crown funds. It would also effectively free
investigators from unnecessary court attendance, permit the jury to hear the
evidence without interruption and, because the legal issues have already
been debated, lead to a better presentation of the case.
Training and Resources-—Investigator
Police departments throughout Australia in an effort to keep abreast of
changing crime problems and prepare their investigators to be able to
efﬁciently and effectively investigate computer related crimes as the need
arises, have embarked on a National Training Program similar to that pre-
sently offered to FBI. agents and members of the Canadian Mounted
Police. The program which is termed “Computer Related Crime—Investi-
gative Techniques” is designed to expose the investigator to all aspects of
the computer and equip him with an awareness level of knowledge sufﬁcient
to be able to carry out a professional investigation in a computer environ-
ment.
.In addition to exposing their investigators to this medium of education,
police departments are also conscious of the need for investigators to be
able to readily consult and seek the assistance of computer experts. To this
end consideration is being given to the storage in their own computer of a
national index of experts and business houses who can assist in respect to
problems which might arise whether they be of a technical, hardware or
software nature.
 46
Conclusion
The police answer to computer related crime is prevention and there
is no better form of prevention than the potential offender being aware
that if he commits a crime he will be quickly and surely discovered and
brought to book.
Such prevention might save considerable ﬁnancial loss and later embar-
rassment and might best be achieved by the re-education of E.D.P. auditors
and managers, the people who should be watching, more stringent security
of the machine and software, the continued education of law enforcement
oﬂicers, and the enactment of appropriate legislation.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
Detective Sergeant J. Lowe
In computer related crime as in all other areas of crime the police role
is a practical one. That is, they have the responsibility of investigating com-
plaints, gathering the available evidence and placing those responsible before
the courts.
Therefore, in this particular area of crime the following might be
viewed as necessary considerations:
(a) Are those responsible suﬂiciently skilled to investigate a crime
in a computer environment?
(b) Can they gather and preserve the evidence?
(0) Is there legislation sufficient to prosecute the offenders?
(d) Do prosecutors and the judiciary have sufficient knowledge of
computers to cope with a computer related prosecution?
(e) Will juries as they presently stand be able to cope with the
form of evidence likely to be presented in a computer related
trial?
In so far as New South Wales is concerned, there have only been a
minimal number of reports of computer related crime and in the majority
of instances, police have successfully prosecuted those responsible by using
existing areas of the criminal law. An illustration of such a matter is where
an employee through the falsiﬁcation of documents caused a computer
generated payroll to be altered in order to produce a salary payment some
$1,000.00 in excess of salary entitlement. The offender was successfully
prosecuted for offences of “Larceny as a Clerk” and.“Make False Entry”.
This in my view is not an answer to the considerations as mentioned,
but merely serves to highlight the simplicity of the matters encountered to
date and gives notice that we should adequately prepare for those more
complicated areas of computer related crime, which will undoubtedly occur
in the future. In keeping with this futuristic approach, senior management
within the New South Wales Police Force have taken positive steps to
ensure that investigators have an upgraded education in the area of com-
puters.
Ultimately, it is envisaged that crimes of this type will be investigated
by multi—disciplinary teams comprising of a police oﬂicer experienced in the
investigation of commercial type crime, one or more E.D.P. auditors or
computer experts and a prosecutor. Such a team concept has ‘had notable
success in the United States and Canada and undoubtedly is a most pro-
fessional approach to investigation of this type of crime. In particular, it
provides maximum beneﬁts for the gathering of evidence and pr0vides the
prosecutor with a total understanding of the inquiry from discovery through
investigation to prosecution. However, no matter how skilful the investigator
or team might be, 'where computer related crimes extend outside State
boundaries, any investigation is likely to be frustrated due to the lack of
search and seizure powers. The capabilities of a computer makes this situa-
tion unacceptable and places emphasis on the need for the various States to
enact some consistent legislation to provide for the repatriation of evidence
to the State or point of crime.
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Areas of computer related crime currently causing some concern to
police in this State are those involving the theft of the “intangible”-—time and
space. Time and space on a computer do not come within the deﬁnition of
“Property” as we know it and therefore it is unlikely that a successful
prosecution could be brought against a person involving himself in this area
of crime. An illustration of this is where an offender gains access to a
computer installation by use of a secret code word or account number on
issue to a genuine client, then uses computer time and space, which is later
charged to the genuine client.
Due to the fact that ﬁnance houses, banks and commerce generally,
rely on computers to store ﬁnancial data, exclusive client mailing lists,
etc., a further area of concern is the theft of information. Such concern
results from the fact that information is also “intangible” and therefore police
are unable to satisfy the necessary proofs to launch a prosecution for either
“Larceny” or “Receiving". The ”same situation also applies to a prosecution
for “Goods in Custody” in light'of the High Court decision in the case of
Grant v. The Queen (1980) 147 C.L.R. 503, where “thing” was held to be
“the very thing”.
There is, however, I submit some relief for the theft of information
by ofﬁcers of bodies corporate or former employees of bodies corporate
within the New South Wales Company Code, and when I refer to the New
South Wales Company Code I particularly refer to s. 229 (3). It says:
An ofﬁcer or employee of a corporation or former ofﬁcer or
employee of a corporation shall not make improper use of informa-
tion acquired by virtue of his position as such ofﬁcer or employee to
gain directly or indirectly an advantage for himself or for any othe
person or to cause detriment to that corporation. '
Similarly when we talk about these offences of the larceny or the theft of the
intangible we must look at s. 178 (b) of the New South Wales Crimes Act
which deals with the obtaining of a ﬁnancial advantage by deception. How-
ever, when we talk about this section in regard to the intangible the problem
arises, I submit, that can you deceive a machine as if he were the owner?
It is my view, and the view of those within my department, that this is not
possible. ‘ .
When taking into consideration the theft of the information, a point
to consider is that although the offender copies the computer disc, tape
or hard copy record, he does not deprive the owner of the use thereof,
but more to the point, he deprives the owner of the exclusive right. There-
fore it is my view that any proposed legislation would have to be tailored
to include the deprivation of the exclusive right to information. Additionally,
I am further of the view that when giving consideration to the many com-
plexities surrounding “property” one of needful consideration is the evalua-
tion of intellectual data. A tape or disc might cost several hundred dollars
to purchase, but when the company records are stored thereon, it could be-
come' the principal asset and loss or unlawful reproduction of same could;
cause untold ﬁnancial loss.
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Proper security and controls make beneﬁting from computer manipula-
tion unlikely. With physical crime it has been suggested that a police oﬂicer .
on the beat goes a long way towards suppressing the potential offender. In
the case of computer related crime, it is up to ﬁnancial institutions them-
selves to walk the beat' by instituting proper internal controls and monitor-
ing what is happening within their own areas of responsibility. The com-
puter itself is an ideal device to detect deviations from normal activities.
In a credit card- fraud for example, in handling billings for credit cards,
computer systems are set up to analyse patterns of transactions for unusual
events, like a credit card 'being' used in Sydney and ﬁve minutes later in
Melbourne. That rings a bell in a computer system.
Finally, it is obvious that computer related crime is a people problem,
and the computer whether through misuse or intentional action, is capable of
being utilized as a powerful partner in crime. Therefore, any changes, whether
they be in the area of legislation, or education, which would better equip
police to deal with current problems or the ever present prospect of a major
computer scandal, is a positive move and one which will beneﬁt all areas
of the community. '
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ADEQUACY OF PRESENT LAW TO COPE WITH COMPU
TER
RELATED OFFENCES
The Honourable Mr Justice F. M. Neasey,
A Justice of the Supreme Court of Tasmania.
1. Introduction ' -
In the electronic digital computer the human mind has developed a
most remarkable instrument. It has been truly said that “probably no o
ther
device invented by man has had such a profound and rapidly perva
sive
effect upon his society”. Like most such inventions, its conceptu
al roots lie
substantially in the past, even though development in present form s
tems
only from 1940 or slightly before. The Englishman, Charles Babbage,
Pro—
fessor of Mathematics at Cambridge University, devised a machine call
ed a
“difference engine” to perform automatically and mechanically certai
n com-
putations used in mathematical tables; and he followed that by
designing an
“analytic engine” which was intended to execute an arbitrar
y sequence of
operations and have internal storage of data. His description of the a
nalytic
engine’s stored program is remarkably close to the concept of the
stored
program of modern computers?
A computer, as the name implies, is a calculating device, but one of a
special kind, in that it can store data and instructions internally in electr
onic
form; and these, forming the basis of an internally stored program,
can
interact with incoming data and instructions in the form of an “appli
cations
program", to perform automatically 3 series of steps necessary to pro
vide an
answer to a problem structured in electronically programmed form.
.
A working tool essential to the operation of a computer, at the
most
elementary level, is the binary system of numbering, consisting of Is
and Os,
which can be represented electronically by on and off states of electrici
ty, or
switches, at given points in a circuit; or “charge” and “no char
ge” at those
points. Applied to this are the concepts of Boolean algebra, so nam
ed after
George Boole, whose pioneering work, “The Laws of Thought”,
was published
in 1854.
In Boolean algebra a statement is either true or false. “True” can be
represented electronically by a closed (on) switch which in turn rep
resents
the binary number 1, and false by an open (off) switch which also rep
resents
the binary number 0. These electronic representations of 1 and 0 (t
rue and
false, or vice versa) can be connected in switching electronic logic
circuits
called “gates”. Electronic gates are the building blocks of digital com
puters,
but upon the basis of these simple arrangements an incredible m
aze of
electronic logic devices is built, with mysterious sounding names suc
h as
adder circuits, decoders, inverters, multiplexers and so on.
By connecting
many of these logic devices together in a myriad different ways
, there results
a vastly complex mechanism of combinational and sequential logic sys
tems
 
1 Criminal Justice Resource Manual, Bureau of Justice Statistics
, US. Department of
Justice, p. 163.
2Gordon B. Davis, Introduction to Computers (3rd edn.) Mc
Graw Hill Kogakusha
Ltd, Tokyo 1977, p. 5.
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by means of which it seems that virtually any problem known to man in
which computational processes can play a part, or can be made to serve a
given end, can be worked out. A basic point about computers is that they
have had and are having the effect of stretching the reach of the human mind
to a vast, indeed incalculable, extent, because of the extremely rapid speed
with which many thousands, or, theoretically, millions, of complex compu-
tational exercises can be sequentially followed through and completed, one of
which might take a person or a team of persons years to do by other means.
Thus, with the use of computers mankind can visit the moon and return,
whereas without them it would inevitably have been bound to the earth's
atmosphere. It is difﬁcult to think of any phase of modern life which is not
profoundly affected by computer use.
The computational circuitry of a computer is only one part of an
organized whole, which must deal with incoming instructions and data
(“input”), control and sequencing of internal operations, and production and
display of the desired results, whether they be problem solutions or processed
data (“output”). Basic to computer operation is usually a set of instructions
called a program, which has been set up so as to solve a particular problem
or set of problems, or process data in a particular way. In designing a
program, it is usual to progress downwards from a “statement” in a hi h
level, English-like language, such as Fortran, Cobol, A.P.L., Fourth, Basrc,
etc., through “assembly language” (i.e. a program in high level language
transposed into; mnemonics, and these together or separately being known
usually as “source code”) to “machine language”. The latter which is the
only form of instructions and data usable by the computer, consists, in the
case of any sizeable program, of streams of patterns of binary bits (i.e., 1’s
and 0’s; i.e. on-oﬂ or charge and no charge; i.e. true, false). Since it would
be an impossibly tedious and error-prone operation to transform assembly
language into machine language (the latter being known also as “object
code”, or simply “code”) manually, this operation is usually done by a
compiler or an interpreter; both of which are special programs for translating
from high level language into machine language.
2. Types of Computer Misuse
The problems which computer use poses for the law arise basically out
of their unique position of being all-pervasive in modern society, and at the
same time attended by much complexity in operation. Computerage has
long since developed its own race of high priests and priests, but in recent
times an increasing army of acolytes also, as personal computers have
multiplied.
The knowledge gap between increasing numbers of cognoscenti and
others is rapidly growing. People who are knowledgeable about computer
systems and programs, and use them professionally day by day have oppor-
tunities and are faced with temptations if minded to use the computer to
beneﬁt themselves or to damage others. Such misuse can occur by many
different methods, and it is desirable now to list in a summary way the most
common. Such listing has been done before in various writings", but it is
3See e.g., J. R. Sulan, “Legal Aspects of Computer Crime—Is The Law Inadequate7",
a paper delivered to the Australian Crime Prevention Council Forum in September,
1980; Francine V. McNiﬂ, “Criminal Liability For Computer Abuse", published by the
Computer Abuse Research Bureau, Caulﬁeld Institute of Technology.
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difﬁcult to make a satisfactory categorization. For the present purpose the
following types of misuse can be identiﬁed:
(1) Causing physical damage to a computer installation or any part of
the
system. _
This can occur by different destructive methods, such as bomb attacks
on computer centres carried out by Italian terrorists", or the bomb set off in
a US. Army mathematics research centre in 19705. Arson in computer
centres is also not unknown. These are all examples of intentional and
malicious damage to property, and can be prosecuted in the ordinary way.
(2) Theft of computer equipment without regard to information or data.
This again is ordinary larceny, and can be prosecuted accordingly.
These ﬁrst two categories need not concern us further. '
(3) Theft of physical objects bearing information or data of value.
Such abuse can consist in stealing written applications programs, discs,
magnetic tapes, punchcards, etc., containing stored or input material of value,
which can be used for gain in many ways. This class of computer abuse is
relatively minor, and can be prosecuted under ordinary larceny laws. Prose-
cution would, however, involve the practical difficulty that penalties there-
for would probably be restricted to a consideration of the value of the
physical object stolen. Such offences do not raise particular problems in the
present context, because they would not be those in which most abstraction
of valuable ,data would take place.
(4) Abstraction of data by unlawful access to a computer system.
“Stolen” data would normally be output material, which can be copied
by employees with access to a computer system, or intercepted by tapping-in
techniques commonly used by “joy-riders” and “hackers” in the United
States. Many such cases are not done with intent to commit a crime, but
information so obtained certainly can be used for criminal purposes. A
recent case widely reported6 is of unauthorized access to the computer records
of the Sloane—Kettering Cancer Centre in New York. This was perpetrated
by a young man in Milwaukee, one of a group of unlawful access gainers
which had apparently gained access also to the Los Alamos National Labora-
tory, a large bank, a Dallas consulting ﬁrm, and a Canadian cement com-
pany. Similar examples are being reported constantly from the United States.
It is obvious that large amounts of valuable data can be obtained in this
way by the evil minded, and can be used for commercial gain, e.g., lists of
customer names, credit card information, cred-it information generally, indus-
trial espionage, blackmail, and the like.
 
4Sulan, op. cit. ,p. 39.
5Referred to by Professor Michael J. Magee, in a paper delivered at the Third
Australian Computer Conference.
6 e.g., Newsweek, 29th August, 1983.
 (5) Inducing personal gain by a strategem.
Many computer crimes in the United States, including some of the
largest, have been of this kind. The general method would appear to amount
to a crime of the nature of obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage by deception,
or the like, under United Kingdom and Australian law. The well-known
Rifkin case was one of these. That huge fraud case occurred in 1978, and
involved over ten million dollars.
Another widely reported case was that of Schneider, a young Californian
electrical engineer who managed to penetrate the computer system of the
Paciﬁc Telephone and Telegraph Company in 1972. He had accumulated
knowledge of the company’s automated ordering procedures over a period
of years, and using a telephone and entry codes obtained from these dis-
carded documents, was able to place orders for over one million dollars worth
of telephone equipment to the automated system, and have them delivered.
The fraud was discovered by fortituous means, but difﬁculties of prOof were
such that it could not be proved that he had handled more than some
thousands of dollars worth of the equipment. He was convicted of stealing
and sentenced to 60 days on a prison farm, but only served 20.
(6) Manipulation of computerized data for personal gain or to cause damage
to another.
This area of computer connected abuse, which the available writings
suggest is widespread, may be committed by an expert at the computer site,
or one who telecommunicates with the computer from off site. Examples of
the ﬁrst kind are the well-known “Salami” technique, or altering instruc-
tions so that an interest rate or a rate of payment of commission can be
increased, and the like. Any hacker with the necessary knowledge and evil
intent could commit the second.
Program instruction manipulation for the purpose of doing harm or
damage is sufﬁciently well known in the United States and elsewhere for cer-
tain techniques to have been identiﬁed by a tag-name. For example, the
“Trojan horse” ploy enables an inﬁltrator with some access to a computer
system but with low priority status to insert a. line or two of instructions in at
program which will have the effect, when a person with highest access
priority runs (i.e., operates) the program, of assigning the same high
access status to the inﬁltrator. The latter then has full access to the whole
system’. Another technique is the “time bomb”, which is a set of instruc-
tions having the effect of erasing a part of or destroying the whole of a
program when a given point of time is reached or a condition fulﬁlled.
There are reported cases of employees dismissed as programmers or the like
who leave behind such a destruct mechanism when they leave the job.
This area of computer abuse is said to be extremely difﬁcult to detect,
identify, and prove, because of a number of factors. In the ﬁrst place, it is
difﬁcult to detect and identify because of the prima facie incomphensibility
of object code instructions at machine level. It is relatively easy to
translate assembly language into machine code by the use of compiler
7see Burnside, “The Legal Implications of Computers” (1981), 55 A.LJ.R. 79 at p. 85.
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programs, as earlier indicated, but extremely difﬁcult to reconvert from
machine code to assembly language. Machine code subsists at the binary
level, and may be immensely long in the case of a complex program. The
pleadings in the recent case decided in the Federal Court of Australia,
Apple Computer Inc. and Apple Computer Australia Pty Limited v. Com-
puter Edge Pry Limited and Suss8 (in which Beaumont J. held that computer
software cannot be the subject of copyright) set out that, according to the
agreed statement of facts, a particular program called Microsoft Basic con-
sisted of about ten thousand lines of code. Only a very few alterations made
in such a program by a skilled person will be exceedingly difﬁcult to detect
and understand, even by another expert, if the perpetrator withholds any
information about it. Then, even if it is detected, it may be extremely difﬁ-
cult to prove the identity of the perpetrator, and the intention with which
the alteration was made. These difﬁculties are all accentuated by the know-
ledge gap usually existing between management and computer expert. Finally,
if a prosecution expert identiﬁes the malefaction, it might be very difﬁcult to
prove what was done and the method, so as to have a judge and a jury
understand the evidence. Fortunately, it is said, in most of these crimes,
once detected, pleas of guilty are very common.
A crime prosecuted in Tasmania in 1983 neatly illustrates a number
of these difﬁculties. A person who had been employed as manager of audit
methods and systems at a relatively small State bank pleaded guilty on an
indictment to four charges of dishonestly obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage,
contrary to s. 250 of the Criminal Code. The total amount involved was
$178,171.00. The particulars of each charge were to the effect that he
had by a deception, namely by reprogramming a computer, falsely repre-
sented that funds amounting to a given sum had been paid into his account
at the bank, and thereby dishonestly obtained for himself a ﬁnancial advan-
tage. The offence came to light by accident when the bank’s manager of
computer services was checking a minor problem from the previous day’s
computer processing. He found a line of code in the previous version of
a ledger program which was not present in the current version. Further pro-
longed investigation showed that by making code alterations the defendant
had inﬂated interest on certain term deposits and- diverted the increase to a
false account of his own. He then transferred these funds to two accounts
opened in his name in a Sydney bank. Even so, over a period of some
months in which the fraud operated, no discrepancies had appeared in the
bank’s general ledger or branch controls. The investigators never found out
exactly what code alterations the defendant had made.
The record of interview produced by the police and signed by the
defendant was illuminating in respect of methods and motives. It indicated
that the defendant considered himself very much overworked and relied on
to solve computer problems in the bank. He had complete access to the
whole of the computer system and all programs (both of which facts suggest
lack of proper computer security on the part of his employer). He said the
unfair treatment caused him to want to “strike back”, and then, having
proved what he could get away with he found the temptation too great to
stop.
I
8 As yet unreported, No. 6130 of 1983.
 55
The case illustrates the great difﬁculty of detecting such offences (this
one would not have been discovered when it was except for the fortuitous
happening of an unrelated event), the great deal of work involved and
extreme difficulty of tracing and identifying the exact nature of the offence,
and the difﬁculty there would have been in proving it, had the accused not
co-operated.
There were also the conceptual difficulties of ﬁtting the existing law to
the offence. The charges originally laid were of theft, but they were changed,
presumably because the prosecution realized their doubtful applicability.
One would have thought that the charge of obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage
by deception had its own difﬁculties, mainly arising out of the meaning of
“deception”—see below. However, the plea was accepted, and the defendant
was sentenced to three years’ imprisonment.
(7) Unauthorized use of computer
There have been very many cases of this type in the United States also,
usually by employees, or by persons with acceSs to a computer system. Such
usage varies a great deal, some being for personal gain, and other for
recreation or general interest.- A,policy problem is involved, in respect of
wheher criminal sanctions should. be applied. This type of misuse is to be
distinguished from unauthorized access from sources external to the system
itself. One case in the United States involved two employees of a Long
Island college who were accused of using more than $200,000 worth of the
college’s computer time. They used the college computer to run a business,
which placed more demands upon the computer than the system could
support. ThiS'is one area of computer abuse in which some speciﬁc new
law undeniably seems needed.
(8) Unlawful Access Without Intent to Commit a Crime
In the United States, informal associations of mostly young computer
enthusiasts make an intensive hobby of breaking entry codes, security pass-
words and the like, which are often surprisingly lax, in order to enter into
large and extended computer systems. They also maintain informal com-
munication with each other across the country by use of electronic “bulletin
boards”, where messages can be~left and received, contact established, etc.
This is usually done for pleasure or out of a sense of adventure, and without
any intent to commit a crime; but nevertheless quite frequently “crashes”,
i.e., temporary breakdowns, or damage to data, are caused by these inter-
ferences". The Sydney Morning :Herald of 19th September, 1983, in an-
article1° suggested that such abuse in Australia is likely to become wide-
spread, and gave some examples.
The problem has been manifest in Canada also, and difficulties of
detection and proof have been experienced. It is one of the subjects com-
mented on by a Report of a Standing Committee of the Canadian House of
9A5 to the extent of “joyriding” or “hacking”, see Australian Financial Review, 25th
July, 1983.
1° “The Computer’s Secrets—How Safe Are They?”
 56
Commons, published in June 1983“. It referred to a case, McLaughlin, in
which the Court of Appeal of Alberta”, and then the Supreme Court of
Canada on appeal,13 held that a computer system was not a telecommunica-
tions facility according to the deﬁned meaning of “telecommunication” in
the relevant section of the Code. The Canadian Report observed” that:
the McLaughlin case is important because it demonstrates that, for
certain kinds of conduct which otherwise would be viewed as criminal,
4 no criminal offence iscommitted since the provisions of the Criminal
Code simply are inadequate. Since the relevant provisions of the
Criminal Code were drafted at a time when computers did not exist,
their formulation is not completely attuned to the new technology . . .
The need for legislative action to keep pace with this emergent tech-
nology and protect society from its ill effects is apparent.
The Report went on to say that witnesses before the sub-committee had
agreed that criminal sanctions were required to ﬁll the void left by the
case.
(9) Intentional Damage to and Destruction of Data.
This kind of misuse amounts to sabotage of computer data, usually
either input or output. A case is reported of a person charged in France
during 1975 with intentionally erasing valuable information recorded on a
magnetic tape. He was acquitted on the basis that the tape was undamaged
and therefore no offence had been committed. The “time bomb”15 technique
is also a prime example of thisk ind of abuse, which can be most destructive
and costly. This is the insertion of a set of instructions having the effect
of erasing a part of or destroying the whole of a program when a given point
of time is reached or a condition fulﬁlled. There are reported cases of
employees dismissed as programmers or the like who leave behind such a
destruct mechanism when they leave the job. A number of writers point out
the difﬁculty of successful prosecution of this type of abuse under present
deﬁnitions in common law‘ or statutory offences”. The central difﬁculty
arises out of the intagibility of soft ware data present on disc or tape or the
like in the form of electronic impulses, whereas malicious damage to property,
or mischief statutes ordinarily require observable human action and tangible
damage to property”. For example, 8. 372 of the Canadian Criminal Code
provides that everyone commits mischief who wilfully destroys or damages
property, or renders property dangerous, useless, inoperative or ineffective.
That involves the ordinary concept of damage to property, but the question
in the computer context is whether software in the electronic form, or data
thereon, can be regarded as “property”. The question is discussed further
below.
11 Report of the Sub-Committee on Computer Crime, Standing Committee on Justice
Ridolrﬁ’g)“ Affairs, House of Commons, Canada, June 1983 (hereafter, “the Canadian
P - ’
12 ((1979), 12 CR. (3d) 391. .
13 (1980) 2 S.C.R. 331.
14 op. cit., p. 12.
15 see Burnside, op. cit., p. 87.
‘6 e.g., Sulan, op. cit., at p. 41; McNiff, op. cit., at pp. 8 and 9.
1" s§e e.g. "Computer Crime”, Legislative Resource Manual, US. Department of Justice,
' p. .
 (10) Falsiﬁcation of accounts
A prime example of this kind of abuse is the well know Equity Funding
Insurance Fraud in 1973. It involved falsiﬁcation of the insurance institution’s
list of investors by adding a number greater than the number of actual
investors, thus inﬂating the price of the stock on Wall Street. A vast sum is
said to have been involved”. This is a fertile ﬁeld for computer fraud, and
problems of prosecution and proof are involved, concerned with the meanings
of “forgery”, “document”, “account”, and the like, i.e., deﬁnitional problems
concerning the content of existing offences.
3. Conceptual and Practical Problems for the Criminal Law
There are so many ways in which computer systems can be manipulated,
falsiﬁed, and otherwise abused, and the technological aspects involved are
suﬁiciently alien to traditional concepts involved in the deﬁnition of criminal
laws, that the inadequacy of the criminal law in present form to cope with
computer related offences has become widely recognized. It is proposed now
to discuss some of the legal problems involved.
(a) Information as Property
Data of all kinds stored on external devices such as magnetic tapes or
discs, or within computer memories, may be classed generally for the present
purpose as “information”. The capacity of the digital computer to generate
information for storage, and to transmit it to storage devices, is staggering,
and the amount which can be so held is immense. The Costigan Royal
Commission is said to be aggregating vast quantities of information relevant
to its purpose”, and this is of course only one example. But if any of such
information is manipulated or falsiﬁed, is it “property”, so as to make such
interference amenable :to prosecution by any of the many offences which
have unlawful interference or damage to property, or the like, as an essential
ingredient? It is submitted that the answer clearly, in accordance with prevail—
ing concepts, is no. Further, there is substantial doubt whether it would be
wise to widen the deﬁnition of a basic concept such as property so as to
include such information. In The Federal Commissioner of Taxation v.
United Aircraft Corporation”, an American company had licensed an
Australian company to manufacture and sell aircraft engines and the like
within Australia. The agreement between them, said Latham C.J., “was in
reality an agreement for the communication of information which would
facilitate the manufacture of the engines in Australia”. His Honour said,
in one of the majority judgments, that “knowledge is valuable, but knowledge
is neither real nor personal property. . . . It is only in a loose metaphorical
sense that any knowledge as such can be said to be property.”
13 Burnside, op. cit, p. 81.
19 The Australian, 6th September, 1983, p. 17; The Age, 12th September, 1983, p. 5.
20 (1944) 68 C.L.R. 525. ‘
21ibid., at p. 533.
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It is true that in Phipps v. Boardman“, where there was a questionas
to whether a trustee had a right to use for his own beneﬁt information which
he had acquired in his capacity as trustee, Lord Hodson said:
I agree . . . that the conﬁdential information acquired in this case
,which was capable of being used and was turned to account can be
properly regarded as the property of the trust”.
and Viscount Dilhome and Lord Guest used similar expressions, but it is
suggested they were using the phrase, “property of the trust,” in the sense
of the trust having the exclusive right to the use of or to take advantage of
that information. Lord Upjohn“, it is respectfully submitted, expressed the
true view in saying:
In general, information is not property at all. It is normally open
to all who have eyes to read and, ears to hear. The true test is to
determine in what circumstances the information has been acquired.
If it has been acquired in such circumstances that it would be a breach
of conﬁdence to disclose it to another then courts of equity will restrain
the recipient from communicating it to another“.
Harris J. in Talbot v. General T.-V. Corp. Pty Ltd, a case concerning breach
of conﬁdential information, appeared to accept that View”. The subject of
information as property was‘considered in the Canadian case of R. v.
Stewart”. '
A self employed consultant, at the request of a person he understood
to be a union ofﬁcial, attempted to obtain relevant information about the
employees of a hotel which the union was attempting to organize. This
conﬁdential information could only be obtained from the personnel ﬁles or a
computer print-out used for the payrolls. The accused approached an
employee of the hotel to try to obtain the information, and was charged with
three counts of counselling, contrary to s. 422 of the Criminal Code, alleging
that he counselled the employee to commit (a) the offence of fraud contrary
to s. 338, (b) the offence of theft, namely to steal information the property
of the hotel, etc., contrary to s. 283 of the Code, and (c) the offence of
mischief to the private property of the hotel and its employees, contrary to
s. 387. He elected to be tried by judge alone, and ,was acquitted. It was
held that what he had counselled the hotel employee to do did not amount
to mischief, theft or fraud. As to the offence of mischief, which is deﬁned
in s. 387 (l) (c) as obstructing, interrupting or interfering with the lawful
use, enjoyment or operation of property, the Crown alleged that the
accused’s conduct interfered with the physical premises of the hotel. How-
ever, Krev‘er J. in the Ontario High Court of Justice held that it had not
been shown that removal of the information, had it occurred, would have
obstructed, interrupted or interfered with the real property or physical
premises of the hotel.
22 (1967) 2 A.C. 46.
23ibid., at p..107.
24 ibid., at p. 127.
25 See also as to this question, “Computer Programs—Does the Law Provide an
Adequate Protective Mechanism?", 56 ILL]. 219.
25 (1980) V.R. 224 at 231; and see also Fraser & Ors v. Thames Television Ltd & Or:
(1983) 2 All ER. 101 at 119.
27 (1982) 68 C.C.C. (2d.) 305.
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The charge of theft was laid under s. 283 (1), which provided that
everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour of right takes
or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to his use or to the use
of any person, anything whether animate or inanimate with intent, etc. The
judge pointed out that the action counselled by the accused did not involve
the taking or converting of any physical object or anything corporeal. The
Court said that the Crown had conceded that upon a traditional approach it
could not be said that information was property and thus could be the
subject of theft. The particulars of the indictment itself alleged that the
accused had counselled the employee “to steal information, the property of
the —- Hotel”. The judge pointed out that the subsection referred not to
property, but to stealing “anything”. The Crown submitted that “anything”
in the modern age should include information. (As a point of interest in
relation to the Tasmanian case mentioned, the Court pointed to a decision
of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in which it had been held that the
word “anything’ in a similar context should be construed more widely than
the word “property”, and was wide enough to include credit in a bank
account.) However, in the context of Stewart’s case, his Honour gave
substantial importance to the principle that words in a criminal statute must
be strictly deﬁned and construed in favour of the accused where there is
legitimate doubt. The same principle is, of course, applied in Australia.
Two American cases were said to be of particular value. In one, it
was held by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts that the intellectual
property in cassette tapes of the movie “Star Wars" were not within the
statutory deﬁnition of “property” which could be the subject of larceny
under that State’s law. The other decision was from the Supreme Court of
Colorado, in which it had been held that medical information about insurance
claimants, which had been obtained by telephone and was constituted by a
verbatim reading of hospital medical reports was not a “thing of value”.
The Colorado theft statute provided that a person commits theft when he
knowingly obtains or exercises control over anything of value of another
without authorization, or by threat or deception. “Thing of value” was
deﬁned to include real property, tangible and intangible personal property,
contract rights, choses in action, services, and any rights or use or enjoyment
connected therewith. However, the Colorado court held that to hold con-
ﬁdential information to be intangible personal property would be to “expand
unduly the traditional concept of tangible property . . .”.
The court in Stewart’s case also referred to Oxford v. Mass”, in which a
university student dishonestly obtained the proof of an examination paper,
copied the contents, and then returned it to its place of origin. He was
charged with theft of conﬁdential information, contrary to s. 1 of the Theft
Act 1968 (UK). In respect of that charge, “property” was deﬁned to
include money and all other property, real or personal, including things in
action and other intangible property. The Court of Appeal said in its
judgment, in part, ~
28 (1978) 68 Cr. App.R. 183.
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We have to consider whether there is property in the information
which is capable of being the subject of a charge of theft. . . . It is
clear that the answer to that question must be no”.
.
Having considered all these cases, the court in Stewart held that “anythi
ng”
within the meaning of s. 283 (1) must, whether tangible or intangible, be
capable of being property; and that conﬁdential information is not property
for the purpose of the law of theft in Canada.
The case is a useful indication of the strength of adherence by courts
to traditional concepts of “property” so as to exclude information, and of the
strength of the principle that criminal statutes are construed strictly in
reaching that result. It is submitted that the clear trend of authority in
England, Australia and Canada is to refuse to class information as property,
and thus to render theft statutes or malicious damage to property offences
of little use in the prosecution of computer abuse in the form of abstraction
or erasure or manipulation of computer data”.
(b) The meaning of “deception"
An alternative to the traditional formulation of theft offences is the
more modern offence the substance of which requires the dishonest obtaining
of a ﬁnancial advantage by deception, or variations upon that theme, A
modern exemplar is the UK. Theft Act of 1968, amended in 1978. S. 15 of
the 1968 Act provides that a person who by any deception dishonestly
obtains property belonging to another, with the intention of permanently
depriving the other of it, commits an offence. “Property” is deﬁned by
s. 4 as including money and all other property, real or personal, including
things in action and other intangible property. “Things in action” requires
separate attention, which there is no space to give it here, but the expression
“intangible property” raises the same difficulties earlier adverted to. S. 16 of
the 1968 Act provides in substance that a person who by any deception
dishonestly obtains for himself or another any pecuniary advantage commits
an offence. S. 15 (4) provides that “deception” “means any deception
(whether deliberate or reckless) by words or conduct as to fact or as to
law including a deception as to the present intentions of the person using the
deception or any other person." S. 16 (3) provides that “deception” for
the purposes of that section has the same meaning as in s. 15.
“Pecuniary advantage” is deﬁned very widely by s. 16 (2), but the
question what constitutes a “deception” has been examined in a number of
cases which are relevant to the present discussion. In Davies v. Flackett’”,
the defendant was driving his car from a car park in which the requirement
was to pay on leaving, but he found a person holding up the barrier, and
drove away without paying. A charge against him under s. 16 of the Theft
Act was dismissed by justices. The prosecution appealed, and a divisional
court held that under s. 16 it was necessary .to show not only a deception,
but also that it was effective in securing the pecuniary advantage. Even.if it
was possible for a deception to be practiced without there being a human
mind to be deceived, which was doubtful, the deception had not been so
29ibid., at p. 106. _
3° McNiff discusses this subject in depth, op. cit., pp. 12—21.
31 (1972) Crim.L.R. 708.
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effective. The commentary suggests that a deception requires a human mind
to be deceived, and that “deceiving a machine” cannot amount to an offence
under the Act. S. 1 of the 1978 Theft Act speaks of a person “who by any
deception dishonestly obtains services from another”, but “deception” is
there deﬁned again as having the same meaning as under s. 15 of the Theft
Act 1968.
It is submitted that a deception constituted by words or conduct clearly
points to deception of the mind of a person, and that it is grotesque to
speak of a machine being deceived. In R. v. Laverty”, it was held that the
deception must operate on the mind of the person deceived. An Australian
provision which adopts the British formulation of obtaining pecuniary advant-
age by deception is s. 250 of the Tasmanian Criminal Code, under which
the defendant was charged in the case mentioned. Similar provisions have
been enacted in Victoria also”, but it is not thought that they advance :the
position as it stands in the United Kingdom. That is not to say that,
depending upon circumstances, substantial use may not be made of such
provisions in computer related crime, according to circumstances. For
example, in the Tasmanian case referred to above, all that happened through-
out the transaction was that the defendant was able to raise credits in various
places, but did not obtain any tangible property, including money. He drew
by cheque on the Tasmanian credit to set up an account in a Sydney bank,
and an important jurisdictional question was whether he had stolen the
Bank’s funds at the time he drew on the Tasmanian account. It is doubtful
whether he had, because of the difficulty of ﬁtting his actions into any of the
forms of stealing under the Tasmanian Code. There must also be doubt
whether he was guilty of dishonestly obtaining a ﬁnancial advantage by
deception consisting of reprogramming the Bank’s computer. Reprogramming
the computer certainly was not such a deception. However, probably when
he wrote cheques on the local account and deposited these in the Sydney
account, he did then falsely obtain a pecuniary advantage by deception by
deceiving the Sydney bank oﬁicials into believing that he was entitled to
similar credits with the local bank.
(c) Forgery
The essence of the crime of forgery at common law is making a false
document in order that it may be used as genuine. That is the substance
also of the offence as embodied in s. 11 of the Forgery Act 1913 in the
United Kingdom3‘1 and in the Queensland35 and Tasmanian36 Criminal Codes.
The New South Wales Crimes Act 1900 has a somewhat wider deﬁnition,
but it will serve here to discuss the common law offence, which remains
despite an overlay of numerous statutes the classic deﬁnition of the crime.
32 (1970) 54 Crim.App.R. 495 (CA). ' ' -
33see McNiﬂ, op. cit., p. 68 ff; Weinberg.and Williams, Australian Law of The/I
(Melbourne) 1977, at pp. 129—30.
34 see e.g. Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (London) 1978.
35 S. 486.
36 S. 277 (l).
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It is submitted that the law relating to forgery is little affected by computer
usage, except insofar as a question may arise as to whether a document
printed out by computer data has been “made” by a particular person.
Apart from that, the principal question will remain as always whether the
document is “false".
In most cases the question of the falsity or otherwise- of a document will
depend upon some alteration or counterfeiting operation carried out by a
person after the stage when it» has come into existence if produced by or
from a computer. For example, a letter or cheque or the like which is false
in the sense that it “tells a lie about itself”37 would usually have been made
false by the addition of a signature or endorsement or the like. In other cases,
whether the document is a false document may depend upon what happened
after it had been fully produced—cg, whether a person made false claims
about its authorship”. .In the absence of special deﬁnition it would not
seem that any computerised data could constitute a “document”. McNiff
suggests39 that “it could be said that a person ‘makes’ a computer generated
document, for the purposes of forgery, by false input or program or data
modiﬁcation”, but with respect, it is doubtful whether this is so. However,
there is no reason why by appropriate deﬁnition the word “document” should
not be, in a world in which records of all kinds are being made by way of
electro-magnetic or similar storage, to be reproduced on paper only as
required, made sufﬁciently wide to embrace record storage of that kind.
Some statutory deﬁnitions of “document" have already been enacted
with that object in View. For example, s. 3 of the Victorian Evidence Act
1958 now provides that “document” includes, in addition to a document in
writing, “any disc, tape, sound track or other device in which sounds or
other data (not being visual images) are embodied so as to be capable (with
or without the aid of some other equipment), of being reproduced therefrom”.
That deﬁnition, as Burnside suggests“, ought to be adequate to avoid the
problems of earlier deﬁnitions. Certainly, subject to the word “embodied",
being given a reasonably broad interpretation, it should be wide enough to
cover electro-magnetic storage of data“.
Subject to the deﬁnition of “document” and “account" (see later) being
made wide enough to cover electro-magnetic and similar storage of data
generated by computer, it is suggested that there is no need to amend laws
relating to forgery with the speciﬁc object of covering computer generated
documents.
(d) False A ccounting
Various statutory offences of false accounting should continue to be
adequate for their purpose, provided deﬁnitions of account, record, document
and the like are sufﬁciently wide to cover computer output data in whatever
form. S. 83 (1) of the Crimes Act 1958 of Victoria furnishes a useful
example. It provides——
37 see, e.g., Glanville Williams, “Forgery and Falsity" (1974) Crim.L.R. 70.
33 ibid., at p. 74.
39 op. cit., at p. 67. '
4° ibid., at p. 81.
41 see also McNiff, 0p. cit., at p. 63.
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Where a person dishonéstly, with a view to gain for himself or
another or with intent to cause loss to another—
(a) destroys, defaces, conceals or falsiﬁes any account or any
record or document made or requrred for any accounting
purpose; or
(b) in furnishing information for any purpose produces or makes
use of any account, or any such record or document as afore-
said, which to his knowledge is or may be misleading, false
or deceptive in a material particular—
he is guilty of felony and liable to imprisonment for a term not exceed-
ing seven years“. ‘
The words “destroys, defaces, conceals” should be adequate to embrace
any such alteration or manipulation to computer generated stored data such
as on disc and tape, and the word “falsiﬁes” is a word of wide import which
should be adequate, for example, to cover additional false data inserted in
such record storage. A crime such as the Equity Funding Trust fraud
mentioned earlier would, it is assumed, be able to be prosecuted under such
a provision, provided that “account”, “record” and “document” were widely
enough deﬁned. It might even be possible to prosecute such an offence even
if they were not so deﬁned, it the principle The King v. Solomons” applied.
In that case the Court of Criminal Appeal held that a taxi driver was guilty
of an offence under s. 1 of the Falsiﬁcation of Accounts Act 1875 when he
manipulated the taximeter on his vehicles so as not to register properly
fares taken. The Court said— '
There are now in use a number of mechanical means for counting
money and calculating sums received or paid, and it would be a serious
thing to say that to falsify the mechanical means whereby an account
is brought into existence is not to falsify an account within the meaning
of this Act.
However, it would be unwise to rely upon such an interpretation, and better
to ensure that the relevant deﬁnitions were widened sufﬁciently.
Similar comments may be made about other relevant and,similar
provisions, which are dealt with in detail by McNiﬂ‘“.
(e) Practical Problems
(i) Evidentiary.
In addition to the above matters concerning substantive law, there are
as earlier indicated difﬁcult practical problems in eliciting satisfactory proof
of computer related oﬁences. Computer data for evidentiary purposes are
ordinarily hearsay, because the person who initially fed in the information _
usually does not have personal knowledge of its truth or accuracy. It
42 see McNiﬁ, op. cit., p. 27 and ff.
‘3 (1909) 2 K.B. 980.
4“ op. cit., pp. 27 ff.
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is therefore necessary to have evidentiary provisions which make computer
produced material admissible in evidence notwithstanding the hearsay rule.
Otherwise, it will be practically impossible, and enormously uneconomic in
time usage, to prove offences involving computer misuse. One diﬁiculty
is to frame such measures with sufﬁcient generality to avoid being overtaken
by rapidly advancing technology, and yet to make them sufﬁciently speciﬁc
to achieve the objective.
However, authentication of computer produced records is the major
problem—i.e., deﬁnition of the conditions under which such records will be
deemed to be authentic and admissible. There have tended to be two
approaches to this question, in substance opposite in character. One is to
treat computer produced material with substantial suspicion, and admit it
only subject to detailed and somewhat restrictive provisions, and the other
is to accord it prima facie admissibility provided that the material forms part
of the records of a business and is relied on by the business in the ordinary
course of its operation. The existing Victorian, Queensland, South Australian
and ACT. legislation may be said broadly to follow the ﬁrst path, and the
Commonwealth and New South Wales legislation the second (which has also
been recommended by the Tasmanian Law Reform Commission). Substan-
tial arguments can be raised for both points of view, but it is submitted that
the second approach is the 'better, in that it is reasonable to assume prima
faric reliability for such material where a business relies on it in day to day
operation, and it should be left to the opposing party to query or challenge
its accuracy. Of course, that party should have full opportunity to do so.
To follow that approach should achieve justice, and at the same time relieve
the costly and burdensome task of a party seeking to produce such material
if conditions of admissibility are made too restrictive. The Australian Law
Reform Commission is following the second course so far in its Evidence
Reference relating to hearsay and business records. Its relevant research
paper deals with the subject in depth“.
The same question has also troubled the Americans, anti their latest
response follows a path comparable with what has been called the second
approach above. The relevant provisions are the Federal Rules of Evidence,
which are for use in proceedings in the Federal courts and before United
States magistrates, as amended to 28th February, 1981. These Rules are the
product of a great deal of protracted work by many eminent lawyers. Rule
803 provides for an exception to the hearsay rule to be constituted by
“records of regularly conducted business activity”, which includes reports,
records. data compilations, etc, in any form, made by or from information
transmitted by a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly
conducted business activity“, as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualiﬁed witness, unless the source of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term
“business" is deﬁned to include business, institution, association, profession,
occupation. and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for proﬁt.
As to the interpretation of the US. Federal Rules, it has been said by an
authoritative source47 that:
'5 A.l...R.('. Research paper No. 3 (I981) Hearsay Evidence, pp. 131—135.
‘“ Rule 803 (6).
"7 rec footnote No. l, p. l.
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If a company’s director of computer operations testiﬁes, for
example, that ’
(a) the company’s computer system is designed to keep com-
puterized records of all overseas telecommunications,
(b) the computer was used for that purpose, and
(c) the system used is a software package recognized as accurate
when used with this computer for this purpose,
then the records may well be admitted.
(ii) Trial procedures.
A commonly remarked difﬁculty in respect of proof of computer related
offences is that of presenting evidence in a form which juries, and judges
too, will understand in our society in which computer literacy is still
generally low. Two possible solutions are, providing an option of trial by
judge alone, as is possible under the Canadian Criminal Code, or providing
for special juries. It would seem that a defendant’s option of being tried by
judge alone works well enough in Canada, since reports of such cases in the
Canadian Criminal Cases Reports are common, indicating that the choice is
not unpopular. Stewart’s casevis an example. Whilst the concept appears
alien to the British tradition with which we in Australia are familiar, it is
a possible solution worth considering.
The other alternative, of special juries, although it might be very effec-
tive, is probably unlikely to gain much acceptance. Herbert Spencer spoke
of a jury as a “group of twelve people of average ignorance”“, but Sir James,
F. Stephen was much impressed with the idea of special juries, saying:
. . a really good special jury will usually consist of, or as a rule
contain, men in every respect as competent to judge of the effect of
evidence as any judge, . . .49.
However, many people nowadays would probably regard the notion of
special juries as elitist and un-democratic. Special juries in England, although
often used in earlier times, have now been abolished“. They are, however,
still possible in Tasmania, under s. 404 of the Jury Act 1889. The writer
has only known of one case in which a special jury has been ordered. That
was in about 1960, and concerned a charge of fraud against the director of .
a proprietary company in relation to funds of the company. The writer was
defence counsel, and can testify to the ready ability of the jurors to under-
stand the evidence and the implications of it. In fact they were ahead of
judge and counsel most of the time. The prosecution case was a strong one
and the accused was convicted. In a large Australian State, no doubt, .the
administrative problem of providing for special jury panels might in any
event be enough to rule it out as an option; and indeed that‘was probably
one of the reasons for abolishing the special jury in England.
The problem of inordinate length of some cases involving complex
commercial fraud, and the likely complexity and length of any serious
defended case involving computer related fraud, suggests that some alternative
43 see Glanville Williams, Proof of Guilt (Stevens & Sons Ltd, London, 1955) p. 207.
49 H§s7110ry of the Criminal Law of England (McMillan & Co., London, 1883) Vol. 1,
PP. -
5° Juries Act 1949 (12, 13 &14 Geo. 6 (:27), s. 18 (1).
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to the common jury in such cases will need to be seriously considered in this
country; and if that is so, giving the accused the option of being tried by
judge alone appears to be a useful possibility.
4. Legislation needed
It is submitted to be plain as a pikestaff, that although existing laws
may be made to serve in many respects in computer related offences, some
new law is necessary, and the need for it has been widely acknowledged“.
In the United States the need for speciﬁc legislation has long been seen,
and valiant efforts have been made both federally and in many of the States,
with what success remains uncertain. In “Computer Crime, Criminal Justice
Resource Manual”, published by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, US. Depart-
ment of Justice, circa. 1980, it is said that:
. . . the need for laws directly applicable to computer related crime
has recently been recognized and is currently under development. There-
fore, new laws are being adopted at a rapid rate making it dilﬁcult for
any new discussion to be completely timely“.
Details are set out of computer related crime laws having been passed
in Florida, Colorado and Arizona, and of proposed new laws in thirteen
other States. The content of these existing and proposed statutes is too long
even to summarise here, but they relate to prohibition of computer fraud,
proscription of illegal use of or access to computer equipment and the like.
One proposed Federal Act is of note, namely the “Federal Computer Systems
Protection Act of 1979”, Bill No. 8240 in the United States Senate, commonly
referred to as “the Ribicoff Act” after its leading proponent, Senator Ribicoﬁ.
The Bill has undergone a chequered passage, having been ﬁrst introduced in
1977 and since undergone some vicissitudes, and not yet having been passed
into law. It is a very detailed Bill, but a sample passage relating to “computer
fraud and abuse" provides in part:
Whoever knowingly or wilfully, directly or indirectly accesses,
causes to be accessed or attempts to access, any computer, computer
system, computer network, or any part thereof which, in whole or in
part, operates in interstate commerce or . . . for the purpose of—
(1) devising or executing any scheme or artiﬁce to defraud, or
(2) Obtaining money, property, or services, for themselves or
another, by means of false or fraudulent pretences, representa-
tions or promises, . . . (commits an offence).
’ That gives some indication of the sort of complexity which is involved
in drafting a statute for this purpose.
In the United Kingdom, as of December, 1983, it is understood that the
Law Commission has not so far been concerned with computer crime as a
separate subject, but only as a part of its wider work on the common law
51 In Australia, see e.g. Sulan, op. cit., p. 40; McNiﬁ, op. cit, pp. 3, 77; “Crime and
Computers", by R. A. Brown, Criminal Law Journal, Vol. 7, No. 2, p. 88; Burnside,
op. cit., p. 92.
52 ibid., at p. 129.
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crime of conspiracy to defraud. The Commission published a working paper
in 197453, in which it said that computers presented a serious possibility of
fraudulent misuse considering their increasing use in banking and industry,
but that the Commission’s provisional conclusion was that there was no
necessity to rely upon conspiracy to defraud in prosecuting such cases. Per-
haps curiously, although there are reports of widespread actual and suspected
computer related crime in Britain“, and no doubt there is, the London Times
of 2nd December, 1982, reported what it said was the ﬁrst prosecution for
computer fraud at the Central Criminal Count in that city.
Sweden has legislated for an offence of “data trespass”, in its Data Act,
1973. S. 21 thereof provides for an offence constituted by unlawfully
procuring access to a recording for automatic data processing or unlawfully
altering or obliterating or entering such a recording in a ﬁle. The penalty is a
fine or imprisonment not exceeding 2 years55.
While it is submitted to be clear enough that some speciﬁc legislation
related to computer abuse is needed, it is also necessary to proceed with
caution and restraint. In this respect the Candian Report referred to earlier
is a useful exemplar. In section D, concerning its proposed amendments to
the criminal law, it ﬁrst recommended against granting a proprietary interest
in information as such. For reasons of public policy, it said:
The exclusive ownership of information which, of necessity, would
ﬂow from the concept of property, is not favoured in our socio-legal
system. Information is regarded as too valuable a public commodity to
have its ownership vest exclusively in any particular individual.
It said that another reason for avoiding that course was that it would confer
on computer-stored information a status different from that of conventionally
stored information, and that was undesirable. Secondly, it rejected the
possibility of creating an entirely separate statute speciﬁcally to deal with
matters relating to the computer. In its view, computer related crime should
be ﬁtted into the Criminal Code rather than be granted a separate status.
The Report recommended that the Criminal Code be amended to create
two new offences; namely, unauthorized access without colour of right to a
computer system, and unauthorized alteration or destruction (without colour
of right) of computerized data. The sub-committee did not attempt itself to
draft the amendments, being aware “of the danger of tying the deﬁnitions
down to the current technology“? Necessary deﬁnitions, it said, should be
drafted in terms of function rather than of technology. The Report also
recommended that a comprehensive review of all matters relating to the
eﬂective detection and prosecution of computer crime should be undertaken,
with special attention being paid to the adequacy of existing powers of search
and seizure and, inter alia, the wire-tap provisions of the Criminal Code
as they relate to communications between computers”.
53 Working Paper No. 56, Criminal Law, Conspiracy to Defraud, (HMSO) 1974.
54 see e.g., "New Scientist”, 7th July, 1983, pp. 12—14.
55 Brown, op. cit, p. 87.
53 ibid., p. 16.
5" ibid., para. 47.
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It is to be noticed that the two recommendations made by the Canadian
Report addressed the two areas of computer abuse in which there is presently .
no available prescriptive legislation in Australia, and in which there would,
it is thought, be general agreement that the conduct described should be made
an offence. It is suggested however that amendment of the substantive law
should go further than the Canadian Report recommends, in the following
respects: ‘
(1) Each of the two offences, unauthorized access and unauthor-
ized alteration or destruction should be framed more widely.
The ﬁrst should, as the Ribicoff Bill does, cover unlawful
access or unauthorized attempts to access any computer, com-
puter system, computer network or part thereof; and the
second offence should in the same way be extended to cover
unlawful alteration, damage, destruction etc. to any computer,
computer system, computer network, or any computer soft-
ware, program or data contained in such computer.
(2) It should~also be made an. offence to obtain a pecuniary
advantage by, in addition to deception, devising or executing
any scheme or artiﬁce to defraud, or like expressions.
(3) It would be desirable also to extend the definitions of “docu-
ment”, “record", and “account” for the purpose of extending
false accounting provisions fully to computer generated
accounts.
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PRESENTATION OF PAPER
The Honourable Mr Justice F. M. Neasey
It may appear otiose to have commenced my paper with a short
attempted layman’s description of what a computer is and what it does
but that was done for two reasons. The first is that I found it of assistance
in trying to apply one’s mind to the special problems posed for the criminal
law by computer misuse to try to acquire some elementary knowledge of
how computers and computer systems work in order to have an understand-
ing of the many different ways in which they can be misused. I think this
is the useful path for the would be lawmaker and the law reformer in this
area as it is for investigatory agencies and for those sections of police forces
who are charged with detecting offences and collecting evidence. The
necessity of acquiring at least some amount of elementary knowledge about
the technical aspects of computer working and use is readily acknowledged
as Mr Lowe’s papers show. It seems to me it is also necessary for the
“non-technical” lawyer who is concerned with the question of law reform
in this area of computer misuse.
The second reason was that I found it an interesting and quite diﬁicult
writing exercise to do in any kind of satisfying way, and in particular to
avoid using such anthropomorphic expressions as “the only language that
the computer understands is so and 50”, et cetera, that one often sees in
these descriptions.
The second part of the paper is an attempted listing of the main kinds
of computer abuse which can be found in the literature. Here one comes up
against the problem of categorization which seems to have been found
difﬁcult by a number of writers on the subject, and, as I was attempting in
this part of the paper nothing more than a synthesis of whatever I could
glean from the published writings, I found that the simplest way was just
to set down a brief description of the various kinds of misuse. Little more
needs to be said about that part of the paper except that in order to consider
what appear to be the three main questions facing anyone considering the
applicability of existing criminal law to computer abuse it is clearly necessary
to have a reasonably comprehensive overview of the many different ways in
which misuse can occur. The three main questions seem to be:
Firstly, what kind of computer misuse should be an offence against
the law,
Secondly, of those kinds which should, are present laws adequate
to deal with them, and
Thirdly, to the extent that it is not (or that it is doubtful whether
it is) to what extent should present concepts be modiﬁed and/or new
material or new law enacted, and in what form should it be enacted.
However, one matter in that section of the paper which is perhaps
worthy of a little further comment concerns the crime committed in
Launceston which is deal with on pages 54 and 55 of the paper. There is
quite a deal more material in relation to that crime which I thought was
interesting in the context dealt with in the paper but I couldn’t use it without
throwing the paper out of balance by overloading that section.
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What is particularly striking about that crime I thought is the neat way
in which it demonstrates so many of the problems which surround this kind
of computer offence. For example, it illustrates lack of proper security
methods in the organization concerned which if they had been properly
carried out might have prevented the crime. It probably would have done.
One of the security rules advocated by computer security experts is that as
far as possible no one expert should be in a position of being able to input
critical or sensitive data without check or supervision, or even knowledge as
the situation was in this case, that is to say, without even the knowledge of
another expert. I use “expert” here as including skilled technicians. And
second the case illustrates the difﬁculty of detecting such a crime skilfully_
executed. This one came to light only by accident as, of course, many of
them do. Next, a very large number of manhours were apparently necessary
to detect and follow out what the scheme was. Leaving out the question
of how it was done, the difﬁculty of the latter, that is to say, exactly, what
alterations to object code had been carried out by the perpetrator, is shown
by the fact that the investigators in the case never did ﬁnd out exactly what
the alterations were. The difficulties of preparing a complete and credible
case with admissible evidence which could be made understandable to judge
and a jury, if the perpetrator had not co-operated and pleaded guilty, are
obvious. Lastly the actual legal difﬁculty of ﬁnding an offence which could
have been properly established in the face of serious argument, if that had
occurred, has been dealt with in the paper (p. 55). To illustrate I thought
it might be useful to quote a few lines from the proof of evidence of the
principal expert and a few lines from the record of interview in that particular
matter which is referred to in the paper. From the expert’s evidence it was
said that a check of all the programs which processed the bank’s depositors
systems indicated at least six of the programs currently operated by the bank
were spurious versions which did not correspond with the official ﬁle copies.
This was evidenced by a difference in time and date of the official listing
with the time and date of the object program ﬁle, and the expert said—
There is no way available to determine the actual difference in
coded instructions between the official and operating program versions
but I tested program so and so [which he named] which prints the trial
balance . . . and then processed again using a recompiled oﬂicial version.
The results of the two runs gave identical totals but the ofﬁcial version
printed details of the spurious account and other account of the defen-
dant whereas the operating version did not. It is assumed that the
programs had all been manipulated to suppress record of the defendant’s
three accounts. The only documentary evidence found of actual pro-
gram instructions which were used to suppress records are those in a
particular program [the ﬁrst program he mentioned in which he found
the line of code in the previous version which was not present in the
current version and that led to the investigation]. Apart from this
the precise nature of the code which suppressed records for the three
accounts concerned is not known nor is there any documentary evidence
that the program instructions or methods used to (1) inﬂate the term
deposit interest paid, and (2), to apply the interest to the accounts in
such a way that accrued interest controls were in balance [which they
were], and (3), to transfer the funds to cheque accounts [the ﬁctitious
cheque accounts created by the offender].
and he concluded by saying:
From the computer operation log there is clear evidence of occa-
sions when the programs concerned have been recompiled without
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producing a program listing, the effect being a have an operating
program which may differ from the ofﬁcial printed copy held on ﬁle.
From the record of interview the accused person agreed that he had been
responsible for diverting funds to an account or accounts in his own name
and when asked how he did this he said:
A simple answer is manipulation of computer program. I inserted
code into the interest calculation program to increase the total interest
due to depositors and credited the deﬁcit between that amount and the
amount normally due to depositors to my account.
He was asked “Did you do anything to suppress information in relation to
that calculation of interest" and he said “Yes. That is rather technical.
I wrote some code as I said earlier but I never printed it” and he said that
the effect of the diversions was that the funds were not taken from individual
investors but from the general funds of the Bank.
The next section of the paper deals with conceptual and practical
problems for the criminal law arising out of computer abuse, and by far
the most interesting and wide ranging of these problems is the question
concerning what is often referred to as “intellectual property”. Although
that expression itself begs the large question whether products of the mind
in the computer ﬁeld, whether in the form of data on soft or hard diSCS or
tapes, or embedded within the internal structure of the computer, or programs
of many kinds, so to speak the “pre—data stage”, that is to say in written
form, are capable of qualifying as property; whether tangible or intangible,
within the accepted legal meaning of that word. The relevant section of the
paper is paragraph 3 (a) on pp. 57-60, and of necessity treats the subject
in a fairly summary fashion because it is a very large subject, but the theme
of it is that the cases which have occurred so far in the countries which
have common law origins such as Canada and most of the United States
and the United Kingdom have consistently been to the effect that such
information is not property. Clearly it is not tangible property, but the
interesting aspect of the few cases that have occurred is that they hold that
it is not intangible property either. Nor is it “a thing”, nor “any thing”,
nor “thing of value”, all expressions which are used in particular statutes
under examination. In the 1982 Canadian Case of Stewart, which is referred
to on p. 58, there was a charge of theft laid under a particular section of the
Canadian Code which provided—I quote from p. 59:
that everyone commits theft who fraudulently and without colour
of right takes or fraudulently and without colour of right converts to
his use or to the use of any person anything, whether animate or
inaminate with intent, etc. The judge pointed out that the action
counselled by the accused did not involve the taking or converting of
any physical object or anything corporeal. The court said that the
Crown had conceded that upon a traditional approach it could not be
said that information was property and thus could be the subject of
theft. The particulars of the indictment alleged that the accused had
counselled the employee to “steal information the property of the ——
Hotel”. The judge pointed out that the subsection referred not to
property but to stealing “anything” in the modern age could include
information. '
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In the context of Stewart's case the court gave substantial importance to the
principle that words in a criminal statute must be strictly defined and
construed in favour of the accused when there is legitimate doubt. The
same principle is, of course, applied in Australia.
I go on to mention two American cases which are of interest. One of
them in Massachusetts where the subject matter of the charge was alleged
intellectual property in cassette tapes of the movie “Star Wars”, and these
were held not to be within the statutory deﬁnition of property there. I
mention a case in Colorado also and give some details of it. The rest of
that section of the paper deals with fairly straightforward legal problems.
The paper also deals with two practical problems which it seems to
me are of considerable interest and considerable difﬁculty. The two areas
are, of course, evidentiary difﬁculties and inadequate trial procedures. As to
evidentiary problems the paper sets out on pp. 63 to 65 the two different
approaches which appear to have been taken in different States of Australia.
The paper favours the second approach which is that followed by the
Americans in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and in Australia by the Com-
monwealth and in New South Wales and Tasmania, and is presently being
followed by the Australian . Law Reform Commission in its Evidence
reference. That is to say, the approach which assumes prima facie reliability
of computer produced materials which can be shown to have been part of
records relied upon in day to day operation of a business and produced by a
computer system used for that purpose, and used by virtue of a software
program or programs which can be shown to be genuinely accurate when
used with that computer system for that purpose. This approach which I
have just now described only summarily would achieve prima facie admis-
sibility for such evidence, leaving it to the opposing party to query or
challenge its accuracy. Adequate facilities would of course have to be
provided as part of the relevant legislation to enable such a challenge to be
effectively made, and that aspect of the matter is a complex one also, as to
how you can effectively challenge such material and whether you need access
to the whole system and the programs and so forth. This area is full of
difﬁculty and no one would pretend otherwise.
The other practical question of inadequate trial procedures is one which
is likely to require much consideration in the years ahead, as with developing
complex and protracted white collar crime litigation and related commercial
litigation the relative inadequacy of the common jury system is becoming an
increasing problem. Two possible solutions are brieﬂy discussed; namely,
the possibility of a person opting for trial by judge alone in criminal cases
as can be done under the Canadian Code, or the use of special juries. The
latter would seem to have a number of advantages, but substantial arguments
can be raised against them. They can be argued to be elitist and a derogation
from the fundamental rule that a person is entitled to be tried by a tribunal
consisting of persons selected at random from the general community. In
addition, in a large jurisdiction, no doubt there would be administrative
difﬁculties in maintaining special jury lists.
Having considered these various matters, the paper advocates the con-
clusion that it is quite plain that existing concepts of the criminal law are
inadequate to cope with computer related offences. It then attempts to deal
with what is understood to be the present position in relation to suggested new
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legislation in Canada and the United States and the United Kingdom, and
then it advocates certain amending legislation which is. as the paper proposes
it, in effect an amalgam of proposals by an important report of the Canadian
Committee of the House of Commons on Computer Related Offences, and
the Federal “Ribicoff Act", as it is called in the United States. I have been
bold enough (on pp. 67 and 68) to suggest for discussion purposes the sort
of legislation which ought to be seriously considered now as amending or new /
legislation designed to cope with offences in an area which I would submit
is sufﬁciently new to require some additional law, and such that existing law
really is not sufﬁcient to cope with it.
 _ COMMENTARY
J. A. Coleman, Deputy Chairman,
National Companies and Securities Commission, Melbourne
in an era of rising costs, the real cost of at least two activities has fallen
sharply:
moving eanth; and
handling information.
The purpose of this seminar is to discuss the detection, investigation and
prevention of criminality involving the misuse or abuse of modern techniques
for handling information—its collection, storage, analysis and retrieval—a
wide ranging genus which is now broadly classiﬁed under the rubric of
“computer related crime".
The four papers presented contain, in concise form, a comprehensive
tour d’horizon of computer related crime in Australia.
Dr Brown examines the actual and potential use of the computer in the
commission of crime; he discusses the problems of detection and evidence;
and he suggests that the concepts of fraud, false pretences and deception
require reassessment.
Mr Fitzgerald summarizes the details of computer related crime which
have been collected by the Computer Abuse Research Bureau at Chisholm
Institute of Technology and he suggests that potential victims should be
expected to take steps for their own self-protection before relying on the
law enforcement processes.
Detective-Sergeant Lowe describes the approach of police investigators
when examining alleged computer crimes; he discusses problems involved in
obtaining and presenting admissible evidence; and he suggests that speciﬁc
legislation is necessary to deal with the increased incidence of computer
related crimes.
8
- Mr Justice Neasey reviews the adequacy of the existing law to handle
computer related crime; he classiﬁes the various forms of misuse of computer
systems in ten broad categories; he discusses some problems raised by
criminal law in its present form; he reviews the evidentiary and procedural
difﬁculties involved in proving computer related offences; and he also makes
a proposal for legislative reform.
Each of the authors is an acknowledged specialist.
I have been invited to comment as a layman—but as a layman with an
immediate and compelling interest in developments in this ﬁeld. As you
will know, the National Companies and Securities Commission, of which I
am a member, is responsible for all aspects of policy and administration
concerning the law relating to companies and regulation of the securities
industry in this country.
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The Commission views its task in broad economic terms: to promote
the capital formation and allocation process, i.e., the aggregation of savings
for investment in enterprise rather than for consumption and the distribution
of those investments through an organized, informed and competitive securi-
ties market. It considers that conﬁdence in the management of companies
and the conduct of organized securities markets will depend, among other
things, on public perceptions of the manner in which those involved in
companies and the securities markets organize their affairs and conduct their
transactions. Those perceptions will be diminished if criminality is seen to
ﬂourish. But there are some limits to which a statutory regulatory authority
can reach by persuasion in these matters. Much has to be left to the self-
regulatory capacity of the markets themselves, while the more egregious
forms of behaviour can only berhandled by the law enforcement processes.
I have stated that I am a layman. As such, it would be both patronizing
and impudent for me to catechise the four authors on their conclusions
and the questions which they ask. Rather, to assist our colloquy I should
like to offer a few comments and to ask some questions of my own. The
topic is so vast that my comments must be speciﬁc rather than comprehensive.
In 1980 the Attorney-General of the United States published a report1
on National Priorities for the Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar
Crime. This report contains a “master list of white collar crimes” in which
332 distinct types of white collar criminal activities were identiﬁed in eight
different categories:
(i) irregularities involving management of federal-funded
programs (67);
(ii) irregularities involving federal, state and local government
procurement activities and services (44);
(iii) management of investments and victimization of consumers
(49);
(iv) victimization of employees and union irregularities (24);
(v) misuse of government institutions, legal procedures and
positions of trust (72);
(vi) victimization or manipulation of private institutions (30);
(vii) criminal violations of regulatory provisions (43);
(viii) other activities—a catch-all including illegal trade practices,
illegal tax shelters, investment in drug trafﬁcking and social
security offences (27).
Looking through this list, it occurred to me that the commission of
nearly all these crimes would probably be aided by access to or abuse of
electronic data processing techniques. In other words, if we exclude those
offences involving physical injury to persons or property, e.g., assault or
arson, computer related crime is not merely a speciﬁc and highly technical
new form of offence, sui generis. This would be a serious mistake. Rather,
it is potentially all-pervading. We may, in fact, be close to the day when
the computer is as routine a component of white collar crime as the telephone.
1National Priorities for the Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar Crime
Report of The Attorney General, US. Department of Justice, 1980, pp. 4A—l 1A.
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But do we really know how widespread computer related crime is in
Australia? Mr Fitzgerald has provided an analysis of computer abuse in
Australia, from 1975 onwards, of which his Bureau has details. If this were
the total—124 cases involving $5.6 million over eight years—the community
might consider that, having regard to the totality of criminal activity, com-
puter related crime is not a major problem. For instance, of. the 124 cases
mentioned, only two occurred in the banking industry. Since the banks have
a virtual monopoly of money transmission services and they are leaders in the
development of ﬁnancial technology in this country, their achievements in
preventing computer abuse can only be regarded as outstanding. But Mr
Fitzgerald—perhaps understandably—is rather more sanguine. Icebergs—or
rather the unseen, submerged parts—loom large in his cosmology and I
suspect with good reason.
Krauss and MacGahan2 suggest that reported cases of crime involving
computers in the United States amount to only 5 per cent of the total. Those
which are discovered may be unrepresentative, since their very simplicity is
an element in their detection. Is the same percentage applicable in Australia?
Do we have an Equity Funding fraud in our own midst?
Perhaps the reality, as Edelhertz and Overcast? have observed, is that
. . . crimes are committed both by business and against business. . .
Yet those white-collar criminal violations often are not reported by the
ofﬁcials of the business involved, even where crimes are committed
against them by their ofﬁcers or employees. One can only speculate as
to the reasons for coverups; no empirical evidence is available. The dis-
closure of white-collar crime may be embarrassing and hurt the reputa-
tion of the company. Higher level management may appear negligent to
stockholders and directors, and may lose their jobs or at least their
bonuses. Perhaps worse, the directors and officers may become defend—
ants in stockholder derivative actions and may suffer losses if their
negligence is proved. Last but not least, based on a simple cost analysis,
management may determine that the expense of dealing with prosecutors
and the time in court will make this a red-ink effort. How many corpor-
ate scoundrels have been allowed to resign and leave with honour?
Although Mr Fitzgerald’s sample may be limited, I believe that the
comparatively small role played by outsiders, as distinct from employees, in
the abuse of business computing systems is signiﬁcant. Mr Fitzgerald’s
emphasis on the importance of managerial responsibility, in my view, cannot
be over-emphasized. The basic function of the directors of a company is to
protect their shareholders’ funds in real terms and to provide a return on
those funds commensurate with the risks assumed. Such protection should
be regarded in physical as well as balance-sheet terms. Shareholders’ funds
take many forms and include cash, attractive goods and intellectual property.
Any corporate risk management program should take into account the in-
tegrity and the vulnerability, or otherwise, of the company’s computing
systems which handle those assets. But how far the insurance industry
considers these elements when negotiating industrial insurance rates is not
clear.
2 L. I. Krauss and A. MacGahan, Computer Fraud and Countermeasures (Prentice-Hall,
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1979), p. xi.
3H. Edelherz and T. D. Overcast, White-Collar Crime: An Agenda for Research
(D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass, 1982), P. 8.
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On one view, persons who are capable of protecting their own property
—including computing systems, software, data bases and their output—
should be expected to do so. To what extent are they entitled to the transfer
of wealth which is implicit if the community has to undertake the investigation
of losses which they could have avoided? I appreciate that this is not a new
question, but in the context of this particular form of criminality it has
added force.
A substantial literature already exists on the steps which businesses can
take to safeguard the integrity of their computing systems—including physical
controls, to protect and control access to both the computer itself and its
associated hardware and operating environment; operational and procedural
controls, including constraints on employees; and a wide range of internal
controls on the functioning of hardware and the use of software, ranging from
simple password and interrogation processes to elaborate encryption systems.
At the same time, we must recognize that we cannot treat all employees as
potential criminals.
Perhaps, as Wagner“ has suggested, the auditor’s role in this area might
be more specifically and clearly deﬁned. He suggests that the auditor:
. . . has a greater degree of responsibility for the prevention and detec-
tion of computer fraud than the auditing profession currently accepts
in its expression of auditing standards relating to the subject of fraud.
How many computer related crimes in Australia have ever been discovered
by a company’s auditors—and of those discovered, how many have been
reported? Is the law governing misprision—the concealment of offences——
properly understood by professional advisers? Do we need, in Australia,
legislation along the lines of that introduced by Senator Ribicoff in the
United States Senate in 1978, which would make’the failure to report an
act of computer fraud an offence?
Mr Justice Neasey, Dr Brown and Detective-Sergeant Lowe all discuss,
from widely diverse perspectives, the evidentiary problems involved in the
prosecution of computer related crime.
. The investigation activities of the Corporate Affairs Commissions, as
Delegates of the National Companies and Securities Commission, are primarily
directed towards the examination of offences involving the management of
companies and the conduct of securities business. They also investigate
offences under the Crimes legislation in these areas and work in close col-
laboration with the Police Fraud Squads.
Over 230 people are involved in investigation activities in the Corporate
Affairs Commissions of the States and the Australian Capital Territory.
These men and women have many skills, but few are computing specialists.
Most successful prosecutions arising from their activities concern the adminis-
tration of companies. The offences ooncemed are often ﬁrst revealed by the
liquidators of failed companies and they sometimes involve transparent
cupidilty or stupidity by those companies’ oﬂicers. Successful prosecutions for
offences involving misconduct in the trading of securities are less common.
4C. R. Wagner, The CPA and Computer Fraud, (D. C. Heath, Lexington, Mass,
1979), p. 140.
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Investigations into the disclosure of false information to creditors or investors,
professional misconduct, insider trading, the abuse of company structures
and deceptive accounting are usually lengthy and complex; their diﬂiculty_is
compounded when computer generated evidence is involved; they require
the allocation of the most experienced investigators; the ﬁnanc1al, professronal
and other resources available to those whose activities come under suspicion
are formidable; and, in the Commission’s opinion, the evidentiary problems
—as the law currently exists—are daunting.
The problems of ﬁnding computer-literate juries (and perhaps advocates,
too) and the need to reconsider the criminal concepts of larceny, fraud and
false pretences all require urgent examination. But I believe that the 'most
important single obstacle to be overcome in approaching the subject of
computer related crime is the evidentiary problem.
The Australian editors of Cross on Evidence5 refer to the fertility and
variety of Australian parliaments. As in so many other areas, the comment
is certainly applicable to the law of evidence. The editors note that “it is
impossible to expound this body of law on any general basis”. In his paper,
Dr Brown suggests that in jurisdictions which do not have statutory provisions
concerning “computer evidence", such as New South Wales, common law
techniques for admitting computer output as evidence will be of limited
value. I wonder whether the situation is really much more satisfactory in
those jurisdictions which do have such provisions. As an observer, it seems
to me that the four conditions set out in subsection 5513 (2) of the Victorian
Evidence Act 1958 or the seven conditions listed in subsection 59b (2) of
the South Australian Evidence Act 1929 might create equally formidable
difﬁculties of another kind. I have difﬁculty in envisaging their practical
application to material which is volatile, is not directly accessible or remov—
able and is time-dependent in value. It would be useful to have the comments
of someone who has had—in computing jargon—“hands-on" experience of
preparing prosecutions relying on computer-based business records.
I was taught in the traditions of the common law and am well aware
of the philosophical difﬁculties which the reassessment of common law prin-
ciples to cope with computer evidence may involve for practitioners and
others. Nevertheless, I believe that this is a task which must be faced.
We are living in a highly volatile ﬁnancial world. Historically, the
legislation governing market and ﬁnancial intermediaries in Australia has
been principally concerned with the regulation of market constituencies and
their structure rather than market functions and their substance. Separate
legislation thus exists to regulate banks, companies, building societies, credit
unions, life oﬂices and'securities dealers.
But the boundaries between each are collapsing—much more rapidly
than is generally realized. It has been stated that an inescapable‘rule of
5Cross on Evidence, 2nd Australian edition, ed. J. A. Gobbo, D. Byrne and J. D.
Heydon (Butterworth, Sydney, 1980), paras 20.36—20.57.
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ﬁnancial markets is that if anything is going to happen it will do so quickly.
Thus—‘
(a) while developments in computing technology may involve
substantial ﬁxed costs for ﬁnancial and market intermediaries,
the accompanying decline in unit transaction and money trans-
mission costs will stimulate competition between inter-
mediaries for every type of investor, including small and
perhaps unsophisticated savers previously tied to uncompeti-
tive passbook deposit accounts and lacklustre unit trusts; and
(b) technological developments now permit
(0
(ii)
(iii)
the introduction of assets management accounts, offering
a core of features, including a money market fund (cash
management trust) into which idle cash can be swept on
a daily or weekly basis, cheque-writing facilities, debit
card facilities and share and commodity brokerage
accounts,
the use of electronic funds transfer systems, particularly
automated clearing houses for payroll distributions and
point-of-sale systems for retail sales transactions, and
the provision within a single ﬁnancial institution of
services whereby customers can conduct their personal
banking, borrow money for business, trade shares, invest
in unit trusts, have their tax returns prepared, buy and
sell houses, arrange mortgages and buy insurance
policies.
The rate of introduction of these developments may be inﬂuenced by
market and regulatory considerations. But the necessary computer technology
already exists and is available. On-line systems which trade control for the
sake of efﬁciency may reduce the scope for physical crimes, such as armed
robbery or the theft of inventories. But they may signiﬁcantly increase the
scope for others, such as embezzlement from the sale of non-existent goods
and services and the black-market sale of conﬁdential data and trade secrets.
 PRESENTATION OF PAPER
1. A. Coleman
At the outset I have to make a confession. I hasten to add that I use
the expression in a colloquial rather than a judicial sense. I have never met
a computer criminal. They may be all around us at the present time. There
might be an Equity Funding fraud going on in Australia at this minute. We
don’t know. That is what is scaring, I think, when we consider the subject
of computer related crime. Possibly our difﬁculties in this area arise from
the fact that most of us, and certainly people of my generation, are not
computer literate like our children. We tend to think of computer-related
crime as something sui generis, which is completely different from all other
forms of crime when, in fact, computer crime or the use of the computer is
theoretically all pervading.
I wonder if a seminar was held by what Was the equivalent of the
Institute of Criminology in'Sydney in 1900, a Seminar of telephone related
crime. The idea seems absurd. But possibly in 50 years time we might
think that having a seminar on computer related crime, as if it were some-
thing‘special, might seem equally ridiculous. The fact of the matter is, of
course, that the computer can be used in nearly every form of white collar
crime.
In my paper (p. 75) I drew attention to a report by the United States
Department of Justice which analysed the various types of white collar crime.
It concluded there were 332 distinct types of crime which could be cate-
gorized as white collar crime. Looking at that list, it occurred to me that
nearly every one of them could be aided by the use of computers.
Do we really know the extent of concealment of computer related crime
in this community? The only ﬁgures which we have are those which Mr
Fitzgerald has produced. He himself, I think, would be critical of the paucity
of those ﬁgures. Nevertheless, they do reveal one or two quite interesting
suggestions which would corroborate the material which is available in rather
more comprehensive form from the United States and in Europe. In par-
ticular, computer crime is more frequently committed by “insiders” than by
the general public. That places a very particular responsibility on the
directors of companies, who have the responsibility of looking after share—
holders’ assets and funds. Should then the community effectively transfer
wealth to recover losses or to pursue crimes which certain individuals could,
in fact, have taken steps to prevent?
A computer crime can be unseen, it can happen at the speed of light.
But it can also involve installations and software which can be made secure.
In most large organizations a computer suite is not on the “shop floor”,
accessible by the public. We can understand a retailer losing 1—H per cent of
his stock each year because of what he calls “shrinkage”. In that example,
most of the goods are on the “shop ﬂoor”. But in crimes which involve
the use of computers, access to the computer, access to the software and
access to the discs are not on the shop ﬂoor at all. They are usually in an
area where the company itself can take adequate steps to protect its own
property. I think it is important, however, that companies should work on
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the premise that the computer criminal probably knows as much about a
particular installation—how the software is designed and how it is used——
as the designer himself.
There is a very large literature already in existence on the ways in
which companies can in fact protect their computer installation. To mention
one, Krauss and McFahan, Computer Fraud and Countermeasures, is a
very good book which came out about three years ago in the United States.
It is not a legal text but is technical and concerned with the protection of
computer systems. Certainly it is by far and away the best book on that
subject which I have seen, and I think that any company director who has
responsibility for the integrity of his or her company’s computer system
would do well to look at the material it contains.
To return to the question of concealment. It is stated that in the United
States only about 5 per cent of crimes which involve the use of computers
are discovered and that the losses in dollar terms where computer related
crime is involved are about ten times those for criminal activity as a whole.
If you start doing some sums, even on the fairly limited ﬁgures produced
by Mr Fitzgerald, the potential problem is really quite startling.
I notice from Mr Fitzgerald’s ﬁgures (Table 5, p. 33) that he is aware
of only tw0 cases in this country which involved banks and the amounts
involved are not known. I believe this shows a remarkable achievement by
the banks in protecting their assets, but I wonder if, in fact, that is really
the situation. They have the monopoly of money transmission services, they
are probably the leaders in ﬁnancial technology in this country, but I wonder
if what we see is, in fact, what is really happening. I think they may be
two quite different things.
To turn to the question of evidence. In the Corporate Affairs Commis-
sions in this country we have 230 people working on investigation on-Com-
panies Act and Securities Industry offences. There is a good relationship
between the Fraud Squads in each State and the Corporate affairs Com-
‘ missions. There are tensions at times and that is inevitable. I think that is
in the nature of human failing, but by and large they do some excellent work
together.
As far as the investigators in the Corporate Affairs Commissions are
concerned, it costs the community about $9 million a year to pay them and
keep «them. Most of their investigations are into Companies Act offences,
particularly those which are disclosed as a result of liquidators‘ examination
of failed companies. The company may have failed because of the very
cupidity or the stupidity of the directors concerned. We do not know whether
they are typical of those that are found out or whether the offences are detect-
ed because they are committed by people who are stupid and not clever. We
have some grounds for the view that there are security industry offences in
this country which we have not yet been able to pin down properly. We are
worried about the potential use of computers for such security industries
offences. Our existing investigation staff have many skills: a few of them are
in fact computer specialists; some of them are very good lawyers; some of
them are very good accountants. and I would not like to be examined by
some of them because they can be pretty tough. .But I do not think many
of them would regard themselves as primarily computer specialists; yet this
may be the criminal that they will have to look at in the future.
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They face very substantial and very difﬁcult evidence problems. The
evidence requirements for written documents vary in each State. The seven
criteria set in the South Australian Evidence Act have been cited with
approval by United States authors for use in State jurisdictions in the United
States. I think it would be helpful to have some comments from someone who
has actually had the task of preparing computer evidence for a prosecution.
The task could be enormous. Suppme we had an Equity Funding fraud here
tomorrow. I wonder if the combined resources of the police and the Corporate
Affairs Commissions could handle it. In the Equity Funding case, the FBI
sealed the whole of the operations of Equity Funding. They took away all
of Equity Funding’s tapes but in order that policy holders, bondholders and
shareholders would be protected they had to duplicate everything that was
on that record—three thousand reels of tapes were involved, and that is an
enormous amount of material to work through. I wonder if we could handle
it here. We have enough difﬁculty in this country with what are called
“manual records”, manual evidence. A particular company failure in this
State took place about 12 years ago. About six months ago, in the Corporate
Affairs Commission (New South Wales), I saw an area half as big as this
stage which was full of documental material from that particular group of
companies. It was nearly 12 years ago when the failure occurred, and no
prosecution has yet been brought. Imagine the task if we really did have a
major computer “scam” on our hands in this country.
The problem is compounded by the variety of new ﬁnancial products
which are being developed and also the extent to which the traditional
boundaries between the different types of ﬁnancial and market intermediaries
are breaking down. I noted the other day, for instance, that Merrill Lynch
now has over a hundred and forty different ﬁnancial, investment, insurance
and other products which it can offer to its clients. Imagine the situation
in this country if a large retailer in this country was also a stockbroker, did
real estate transactions and undertook commodity transactions. You can go
to Sears Roebuck in the United States and buy futures contracts or buy
securities or conduct real estate transactions all in a single retail outlet. This
is only possible with the use of computer techniques, but in developing these
techniques I wonder if ﬁnancial and market intermediaries may be trading
efﬁciently at some risk of security. The fact is that we simply do not know.
Finally I would like to talk very brieﬂy about the matter of special juries.
I was brought up in a tradition (that 12 good men and true would give you
the correct solution. I wonder whether 12 good men and true nowadays in
a computer crime involving the use of difﬁcult computer evidence would
provide a satisfactory answer. Mr Justice Neasey in his paper referred to his
own experience as an advocate involving a specialist jury. He was generous
in commending that special jury for what it did (even though they weren’t
disposed to accept his arguments for the defence), and it is interesting to
have judicial comment on what a specialist jury can do. The question is not
new—it was raised in this very room nine years ago by the Crown Prosecutor
for New South Wales in a paper given to this Institute.* He was discussing
that very long and complicated trial in England which was the subject of
much public comment The Queen v. Simmonds and, in passing, he raised
the question whether special juries would have been appropriate in those
circumstances. I hesitate to tread in this particular mineﬁeld but certainly
in terms of the efﬁciency of the system I believe that it has some attraction.
*1. K. Ford, “The Effectiveness of Existing Legal Processes and what they should be".
Syd.1nst.Crim.Proc. No. 23 (1975) p. 9.
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DISCUSSION
T. A. Davidson, Q.C.
One aspect of the papers which surprised me is a matter of omission
in that none of the papers refer to an initiative taken by the National
Companies and Securities Commission, of which one of our speakers is the
Deputy Chairman, which in 1981 set up a Committee, of which I had the
honour to be Chairman, and of which Mr Purvis, 0.0, the convenor of this
seminar, was a member. The only result to date of the deliberations of that
Committee was a Report to the National Commission and also to the New
South Wales Attorney-General which discusses the limitations of the existing
criminal law in so far as it fails to deal with problems thrown up by the
phenomenon of computers, and suggests a set of draft provisions for ﬁlling
the gaps indicated by our deliberations on the Crimes Act. We did not go
further than that, partly because we did not feel competent to deal with the
criminal law of other States and that it would be better to leave that to the
legal people in these States, nor did we think that this was a matter for
Commonwealth legislation because we thought the constitutional problems
would be too great. Nor, indeed, did we thinkthat the administration of
this new law should be a matter for the National Commission, because the
terms of reference of that Commission is limited to companies and securities,
and since there are many computer installations which do not come under
the National Commission’s legislation we thought that it should be primarily
a State matter. We did/ append to our Report a set of provisions dealing
with many of the problems relating to the substantive law of crimes and its
inadequacies which have been referred to in the seminar papers. I make
those observations for the information of the speakers and those attending
this seminar that this set of problems has been addressed and some tentative
proposals have been put forward. Indeed, they are as elaborate as we were
able to make them short of putting up a completed set of legislation—
perhaps one day there will be some public discussion on those provisions.
J. A. Coleman.
I must apologize to Mr Davidson for not referring to the Report. I did
not wish to be ungenerous because, in fact, I have seen that Report. It is a
very impressive examination indeed. The Report is now with the Attomeys-
General and, as Mr Davidson said, it canvasses matters which go far beyond
the matters which particularly concern the National Companies and Securities
Commission: Companies, company takeovers and the securities industry. 'It is
one of the difﬁculties in this country that we have different evidence require-
ments in different States. Also, traditionally we have legislated for ﬁnancial
and market intermediaries in terms of their structure, not their substance nor
the functions they carry out. We have separate legislation covering com-
panies, banks, credit unions and building societies whereas, in fact, more
and more they are performing the same functions. This is happening abroad
and will happen in this country very quickly indeed. Therefore the examina-
tion which Mr Davidson and his colleagues carried out has added urgency,
although not within the context'of the Co-operativc Scheme for companies
and securities because that will only be a part of it. The Report is with
the Attomeys-General and I do not know what the present status of the
Report is with them.
a
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Dr R. A. Brown.
I made some comment upon the suggested legislation in a previous
paper in the Criminal Law Journal (1983)*. The major comment, apart
from those that were published which were somewhat critical of it, would
be the extraordinary difﬁculty of obtaining a copy of the Report in the ﬁrst
place. Ultimately I only succeeded in getting one from the New South Wales
Attorney-General’s Department, and because all identifying marks had been
removed I’ve falsely attributed it in that article to the New South Wales
Attorney-General’s Department and not to the Companies and Securities
Commission. The only reason I have not commented on it is that I have
done that before.
1. A. Coleman.
It is not the Commission’s Report, it is Mr Davidson’s Report, and
proper attribution should be given to Mr Davidson and his Committee.
John Heyting, Solicitor.
I practice exclusively in matters that are related to high technology.
It is less than six months ago when Dr Brown and Mr Fitzgerald and
others including myself were in Queensland where we had the privilege, via
satellite, to ask some questions of Lord Denning. One of the questions asked
was: what did His Lordship think was the greatest danger coming out of
high technology. His Lordship then said that it was the invasion of privacy.
In trying to connect what Lord Denning said and what the four speakers have
been trying to say in their papers, I must say that, as a practicing lawyer,
I identify mostly with the paper of Detective Sergeant Lowe. The reason that
I do this, for fear of insulting the eminent Writers of the other papers, is
evident if I may ﬁrstly show you what really keeps the computer industry
moving and what is behind it all.
I just wrote down three or four “buzz” words used in the industry
over which you may care to mull, and then I will talk to these four buzz
words. The four buzz words are: the dollar, the level of expertise, the
management of current technology, and the security of computer stored
information.
The dollar. The whole computer industry is geared to help the making
of a dollar: a dollar for the programmer, a dollar for the manufacturer of
the equipment, but more particularly and more importantly a dollar for the
end user of the computer.
The level of expertise. The computer technology is vested in very intelli-
gent people- who have a high degree of knowledge, and as we all know:
“knowledge makes; for strength”. .
Management. Whether one is managing computer bureaux or computer
technology, whether one is a manufacturer of large frames or mini or micro-
computers, whether one is an expert writer of compatible software, particu-
larly applications software for these computers, or whether one is an end
* R. A. Brown, “Crimes and Computers” (1983), 7 Crim. L]. 68, pp. 78—81.
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user, there is at the present time a lasting, or potentially lasting, lifetime
relationship between computer ﬁrms on the one hand and large users on the
other hand. I will give you some examples. A well known Queensland racing
authority at the present time, has a very lasting relationship with a, large
frame computer manufacturer. They together make the authority a very,
very successful Queensland racing operation. It can be said that the remark-
able success of a well known large motor company over the last four years
is the result of that company having a lasting relationship with a large
manufacturer of computers. Similarly Australia’s largest banking corporation
recently was able to make some trailblazing announcements (probably forced
to make the announcement prematurely just before Christmas) about Elec-
tronic Funds Transfer because of their deep involvement with the computer
industry.
I work with the manufacturers of computers and the writers of software
and my work is “preventive litigation”. I mostly draft contracts, write
contracts, and insert clauses whereby in case of conﬂict the parties have a
tremendous process for dispute solving to go through, before they start
sending for Detective Sergeant Lowe of the Fraud Squad. Take a recent
example: It has not been mentioned by three of the four writers, but Detective
Sergeant Lowe put his ﬁnger on it, and that example is the “stealing of
computer time”. If you accept that it cost nearly $25,000 to keep a jumbo
aircraft in the air, with a full passenger load for an hour, you can also
imagine what it costs to run a two million computer system for an hour and
what a tremendous amount of commercial computer-data it can spit out in
an hour.
Let us consider three situations: A is a large Commonwealth Depart-
ment, B is a large State Department, and C is a large software house.
C contracts with the Commonwealth Government to develop a customized
software package to run on a peculiar Commonwealth computer—large
frame. He also has a contract with a State Government, who happen to run
the same brand of computer, to write a large software program. The software
house itself has the computer knowledge but it does not own a development
computer and does not have access to it, but it can buy appropriate computer
time, for say $500 per hour. Note also, if you will, that when we talk about
development of a software program we talk in man years. So just see where
the temptation to steal is. The temptation was for software house C to go
to the Commonwealth Government and in the process of saying to the
Commonwealth Government “I am developing your software. Please let me
use your machine and I will ﬁne-tune your machine while I am doing it”
he was, in fact, also developing the State software and another one of his
team was doing the same thing on the State machine. The result of it was,
that by a fortuitous coincidence the computer, while it was unattended by the
software house C, started to produce some information which was totally
irrelevant to the State government software program. The new result was
that the person in charge of the EDP Department of the State government
was able to ring up his colleague in Canberra and say: “I have got some of
your private information on my computer ﬁles. If you like to come and get
it I think it is rightfully yours. It is certainly not mine, and I don’t know
how it came out of my computer, because my computer hasn’t had a direct
link with your computer”.
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Now, I was the one who wrote the contract for the software house
with that State government and fortuitously in there was the clause, and this
is now sometimes known as the “Heyting dispute solving clause” (1 have no
copyright on it by the way). It makes people go through a very lengthy
process'involving high management and decision making management before
they go to litigation, or to Detective Sergeant Lowe, full well knowing that
if they were to go to litigation the software house would possibly incur such
great penalties that it would probably cause the sacking and dismissal of
about 20 or 30 honest programmers. In the end both the Commonwealth
government and the State government were anxious to get on with the job,
because they had already outlaid a large amount of money in the computer
system. I have taken this example to show where indeed the dollar inﬂuences
the computer technologists with good brains to take great advantage and
what is it, in the end? He is straightforward stealing time, and time is money.
I would also like to draw your attention to software manipulation. This
again was brought up by all four speakers, and is a much greater area of
potential crime. I know now of two cases of software houses, where two or
three very clever people sitting in a room writing a piece of software, having
it professionally written against very good speciﬁcations, tested it on the
customer’s machine to the customer’s satisfaction. He signs off on it. When
he signs off on it, that means that the fees are payable, there are. then two
temptations. One temptation is that he says “By cripes, that seems a heck
of a lot of money. $100,000 for a little disc with that software on it”.
While the others aren’t looking he makes himself a copy. Then he says
“I wonder if that is really the price. What is your best price for cash?”
and then the haggling starts, he full well knowing he has already broken the
copyright rules and regulations and that he already has his own copy. He is
now really bargaining from a position of strength. The software fellows are
good software administrators but very bad business people. They didn’t
ask for a deposit up front, they didn’t ask for progressive payments and in
the end they accepted half the money and ran. But one of these fellows
had been very clever and he had written into the program that when the
program was used for the 82nd time, it would regularly start wiping out
one-tenth of the beginning of the program. Now, who is the criminal? The
software writer who builds in a little safeguard to make sure he was getting
paid in the end for his efforts, or the software user who had not paid the fair
and reasonable price for a fair and reasonable job? I could go on and on
like this, but I would just like to give you these practical examples.
Why was I able to settle these disputes? Because there is a dollar ﬁgure
in the end, and it becomes a matter of bargaining to buy peace and ‘to buy
mutual releases and I will not ﬁle for a certain amount of outstanding moneys.
That is why I say it is the almighty dollar that governs the potential crime
in the industry at the present time.
Lastly I have just returned from France where I wrote a contract for an
Australian ﬁrm and a French ﬁrm in the EFT ﬁeld. I negotiated with the
French lawyers for three days to try to be able to say that, to this contract
the law of New South Wales shall apply. They kept on saying “No, the
law of Paris applies. In fact if we have a dispute we go before the Tribunal
du Commerce de Paris, and he will tell us, sitting alone, whether we are right
or wrong or whether they have been bad boys or whether we have been bad
boys”. They would not budge from this and they showed me ﬁfteen other
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contracts they had with other Australian ﬁrms where they had done exactly
the same thing because they could not see protection under Australian law.
When I looked behind all this I came to the conclusion that, as three of the
~ ﬁve writers have so rightly said in their papers, we need complete new
legislation in Australia to be able to enforce all the sanctions that we are
trying to apply to computer crimes.
A great computer crime is still the breaching of software copyright and,
as you know, recently we had two decisions here in New South Wales.
We have the Apple Case which is now on Appeal and which talks about
copyright, whether in fact copyright subsists in computer software or not,
and we have another decision by Mr Justice Rogers where he has decreed
that some software, if an integral part of the hardware, is under the Sale of
Goods Act and the Trade Practices Act classiﬁed as “goods”. They are two
rather far reaching judgments in Australia, and the two most recent judgments.
They really indicate that the law as it stands, is trailing about 15 years behind
the technology, and that is why people like myself and my learned colleague,
Mr Fitzgerald, are doing reasonably well. We know that we can not come
and look for Detective Sergeant Lowe because what he says to us is “Give
me the evidence”, and if we have .to come to him with the evidence we have
to come to him with truckloads of paper. Incredibly, Mr Meagher Q.C. (of
the Costigan Report), is using the best computer in Canberra for litigation
support. In fact, it appears that if you want to prosecute computer crimes you
need a computer to index your evidence in your prosecuting case.
R. P. Miszalski, Stipendiary Magistrate.
I have a question for Mr Justice Neasey concerning the practical prob-
lems in‘your paper speciﬁcally talking about trial procedures. On page 65 you
talk about presenting evidence in “a form which juries, and judges too,
will understand in our society in which computer literacy is still generally
low”.
,
I accept that computer literacy is very low and particularly ,1 include
myself, as a judicial ofﬁcer, whose literacy in this ﬁeld is almost non-existent.
What I would like to know is your experience as far as Tasmania is
concerned and if there is any program for the judicial ofﬁcers there, and
if there are any comments that you would like to add concerning an education
program or anything of that nature.
Mr Justice Neasey.
I can answer that very shortly by saying there is no such program and
that computer literacy is not a popular subject. There is no particular interest
that I am aware of.
R. P. Miszalski, S.M.
As a general rule, do you think that there ought to be such a program?
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Mr Justice Neasey.
I think it is very desirable that people generally including the judiciary,
ought to acquire some reasonable level of elementary knowledge about
computers. As time goes on it will be essential that they do, but I suppose
that that will be a slow process. I can’t imagine any program being set up
and being successful to educate the judiciary in the elementary aspects of
computerage, because I do not think it would attract sufﬁcient interest to
make it successful. I think at the present time it depends on the individual
as to whether he is interested or not. Of course, you will get particular cases
where litigation involving computers will come before a particular judge or
magistrate, and you will ﬁnd it is essential to go away and consult some of
the elementary books and ﬁnd out something about it. That may be the way
in which it will happen for the immediate future anyway. Whether in time
to come some sort of program will be set up I don’t know. At the present
time I think it is purely a matter for individuals whether they are interested
or not, but before very long I think everybody in the professions will be
forced to know by the pressure of events a reasonable amount about how
computers work and their uses in society and the practical applications of
them and so on. I think time will rapidly force a solution in this area but
at the moment, I can’t see any structured effort being made towards it.
Dr R. A. Brown.
Just a side comment which also relates to the question of special juries.
I think that from both the judicial and the jury’s point of View the fault lies
not with their lack of computer literacy but that of the legal advocate. The
Barrister’s role is [to explain and to persuade, of course, but initially particu-
larly in matters of complex facts the Barrister’s duty is to explain to the
jury. If we fail in doing that we can hardly blame either the judge or the
jury if they turn around and say they don’t understand. It is a difficult task
certainly, but the need surely is for a much greater degree of computer
literacy in the practicing legal profession. You can not expect the judiciary
to be specialists in everything, but you can expect the practitioner to know.
He has got his time prepared and has had his case briefed up to him with
time to read it before he goes into court, so that he can try to explain these
matters to an ordinary jury and to an ordinary “non-computer literate” bench.
I must admit that I feel very strongly that the fault, if juries do not understand
and if courts do not understand, lies not with them but with the legal
profession failing to explain it to them.
K. J. Fitzgerald.
It might be of some interest to the questionner that the American Bar
Association has just undertaken a major project to educate their members in
this area. I do not know the details of it.
I. A. Coleman.
I would like to ask if there is anybody at this seminar who has had
difﬁculties or frustrations coping with the turning of computer evidence into
material which will sustain a prosecution. In his paper Mr Brown drew
attention to two cases in South Australia, and indicated that the South
Australian Evidence Act might not be quite as effective as some of its drafts-
men had hoped it would be in handling computer related crime.
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Dr R. A. Brown.
Perhaps I could reply to that myself having done some
of it. The
biggest difﬁculty in the two South Australian cases is that al
though the South
Australian provisions are very nicely set out the two cases
that have dealt
with them have held that they are so complex that the
y are practically
impossible to establish. In a practical sense the major difﬁc
ulty in this State
lie within the business records area, particularly 5. 14cc o
f the Evidence Act
which prohibits the use in evidence of material prepared
in contemplation
of the prosecution. If you are going to sit down and use
the computer to
carefully generate details of what the accused di
d by running through the
audit trail as you prepare the case for prosecution, you ﬁ
nd yourself imme-
diately barred from using the material however good and
however accurate
it may be, by the speciﬁc bars tucked away in those
parts of the Evidence
Act. If you want to go further and try and push
the issue, the accused
can always demand that every person involved in the m
aking of the records
be called as a witness. If you are going to do that
with a large company
tracing through records it is probably a point worth aba
ndoning at that stage
and seeking something else to do. Certainly in the ma
tters I have sought to
prosecute using this type of evidence it has been a h
opeless attempt to get it
in.
John Parnell, Stipendiary Magistrate.
I would like to direct a question to Mr Davidson.
In relation to the
Davidson Report are you in a position to outline an
y of the new oﬁences
projected? It seems to me that in New South Wales
the existing legislation
is adequate for many of the offences. Indeed on the
ﬁgures put forward in
Mr Fitzgerald’s papers, 55 per cent of computer cr
iminals would probably
be caught up by s. 176A of the Crimes Act which
deals with cheating and
defrauding by directors or ofﬁcers of the corporatio
ns. It seems to me
plausible to say that almost all major computer
fraud would involve a
corporation.
The other offence is the old offence of false pretences
in s. 179. True it
is that that involves property, but the operation of
s. 180 allows property
money once removed to be caught up in s. 179. Ob
viously any advantage
gained by acquiring time or pushing buttons to acqui
re anything on com-
puters will eventually involve money. The operati
on of s. 180 would
probably bring it into the ambit of s. 179. If s. 176 (a
) could, with a slight
amendment, include employees of corporations, on
Mr Fitzgerald’s ﬁgures
you would probably catch between 70 and 80 per
cent of the computer
criminals. One problem that might arise from the
public point of view is
that the penalties are probably very low. False
pretences is ﬁve years,
cheating and defrauding by directors is only ten.
These computer crimes
will probably be one off but one transaction may inv
olve countless millions,
and the public might be very disappointed as they
were in some of the
kidnapping cases some years ago when they found
that the criminals were
only liable to be sent to gaol for ﬁve years. Would
Mr Davidson be in a
position to outline any of the legislation projected?
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
It just happens I have a copy of it here, but it is a lo
ng time since I read
it. The major diﬂiculties are the ones highligh
ted in the papers, that is the
difficulty with the deﬁnition of property and the difﬁcu
lty with the protection
of valuable information. To meet those diﬂiculties we
started off with an
interpretation section, and I say this subject, no d
oubt, to Dr Brown’s close
textual analysis of which he spoke and said he was critical
of it.
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The most important interpretation is probably the deﬁnition of “com-
puter related property” which is lengthy, in which we do include within that
term information and data. We include in separate subparagraphs of the
deﬁnition information or data, whether conﬁdential or not, which is protected
already by the law, either the law relating to trade secrets, or relating to
conﬁdential information. We adopted the view that it is not for a Crimes
Act to create rights, it is for the Crimes Act to protect rights which are
already created or recognized by other parts of the law. On that basis we
then set out to try to bring up to date, so to speak, in the computer context
the Crimes Act of New South Wales. For example we proposed that a
Crimes Computer Abuse Act should deal with aspects of computer crime
under the following heads of liability:
Firstly, breaking and entering computer installations because having
gone through those categories of offences already in the Act we thought
that there were one or two amendments to be made in that direction.
Secondly, criminal damage to computers and computer related property.
These are the malicious injury sections which we thought needed to be
brought up to date in some respects.
The third category was theft, and we used the term generically of
computers and computer related property. That was the major one which
required updating.
Fourthly, the use of computers and computer related property for
fraudulent purposes. That is where the computer is employed as a “tool”
for fraud.
Fifthly, the falsiﬁcation of computer data and software.
It may be in our analysis of the Act that we have omitted to deal with
some sorts of computer fraud but in our deﬁnition section we tried to be as
comprehensive as possible in dealing with the gaps in the law as we saw them
and as were dealt with in the literature which was available to us at the
time.
K. J. Fitzgerald.
I would like to ask a question of Mr Davidson. Is the area of theft
of information deﬁned in your Report? I am thinking of invasion of privacy,
the ability to get into ﬁles, etc. Was that part of your deﬁnition?
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
No. It seemed to us, although we have not dealt with this expressly
in the paper, that the question of privacy would need to be dealt with on a
policy basis by the legislature. If it is thought that the criminal law went
too far in protecting conﬁdential information in that it interfered with privacy
rights then the line would be drawn by means of other legislation. We did
not think it appropriate to deal with matters relating to privacy in what is
essentially an extension of the Crimes Act.
K. J. Fitzgerald.
Is the area of theft of output part of that area?
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T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
. Yes. We hoped to deal with that in the interpretation particularly of
computer related property. For example, paragraph C of the deﬁnition reads:
Information or data (this .is included in the concept of computer
related property) whether conﬁdential or not in either machine readable
or human readable form and whether tangible or intangible, received
recorded stored produced collated or processed in or by means of a
computer network or computer system.
It is by means of broad deﬁnitions such as that that we hoped to
include as many interests in computers and computer related properties as
we thought ought to be protected by the criminal law.
John Heyting, Solicitor.
Is stealing of time a crime, if it was done for fraudulent purposes?
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
My recollection is that the misappropriation of computer time was
divided into two categories. -One category is akin to taking and using a
motor vehicle without intent to deprive the owner of his property and
penalized by a relatively minor penalty. The other is the dishonest appropria-
tion of computer time and, since it is dishonest, penalized by a more severe
penalty. So that the misappropriation of computer time was intended to be
covered by the draft legislation.
Det. Sgt John Lowe.
Did that proposed draft legislation make any allowance for the repatria-
tion of evidence which may be lying interstate?
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
No. We were asked to cover matters relating to evidence but we took
the view that we had to put the cart before the horse. There is not much
point talking about difﬁculties of evidence if you have not got substantive
crimes to prosecute.
J. A. Coleman.
\
I have to be careful, but nevertheless it may well be that Mr Davidson
has not had his ministerial response. I am not quite sure where it would
come from or how it would come to his Committee. This Report is a very
impressive piece of work. It took quite a long time to prepare, and in many
ways it breaks completely new ground in Australia. The N.C.S.C. is very
much aware of its contents, but it does go far beyond the ambit of the
particular legislation for which the N.C.S.C. itself was responsible and there-
fore it would be more a matter for Attomeys-General in their capacity as
a Standing Committee of Attorneys-General rather than as the Ministerial
Council for Companies and Securities. I cannot say what the present status
of that report is. I am certainly reminded about it and I will certainly ﬁnd
out. It is about 18 months since it was completed and even in political
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processes that is quite a long time. It may well be, of course, because it is
such a technical subject, that some of the people who have to advise
Ministers on this subject have difﬁculty grasping it. But the process of
cerebration is taking rather longer than it ought to or indeed longer than the
report itself deserves.
R. N. J. Purvis, Q.C.
There are a few matters I would like to mention. Firstly, I might say
in relation to the Report that prior to drafting it in its ﬁnal form we did
pay heed to something like seventeen pieces of legislation that had already
been enacted in the United State (I may be wrong in the precise number).
We did carry out an exercise of comparing section by section the various
Acts in the United States the one with the others, and indeed eventually we
did prepare for ourselves, more for a study guide than anything else, a
compact piece of legislation that took the best piece out of each of the
American Acts. There may lie perhaps in the future a model for us to follow
if it is decided that there is a need for separate legislation in this ﬁeld, i.e.,
separate legislation in contrast to amending the various Crimes Acts or Codes
as they already exist. I think, Mr Coleman, that the matter has progressed
a little bit beyond the stage that you contemplate, and we may hear some-
thing fairly soon as a consequence of that Report.
Another matter upon which I would like to comment is on the question
of special juries. My own feeling is that special juries can be particularly
dangerous. There is a tendency for twelve experts sitting on a jury to
substitute their own knowledge, their own experience, for the facts that are
placed before the tribunal. This can be particularly dangerous, and I very
strongly support Dr Brown’s statement that it is the obligation of the prosecu-
tion to present the factual material to the judge and to the jury in as simple
a form as possible. We have all heard of the person about to be eXecuted
concentrating his mind wonderously on the hereafter. I think we can also
concentrate our minds wonderously on a multitude of factual material and
produce it before a jury in a fairly simpliﬁed form. This has taken place in
a number of commercial trials in New South Wales, where the prosecution
has been able to reduce fairly complicated factual situations to a fairly simple
visual presentation by way of charts and the like. It may be no secret that
such preparation of the charts, graphs etc. takes many many weeks but
nevertheless it can be done. I myself do not see the problems as being
insuperable so far as the judicial tribunal is concerned.
It seerris to me that the issues and the problems that will come before
us are not that different to ones that have come before us in the past, but
it is a matter for we ourselves to come to grips with the new technology.
I thank Mr Justice Neasey for giving us an introduction [to computers, to
computer technology and to computer terms in his paper.
John Heyting, Solicitor.
Could I be permitted to present another point of view and this is the
case against non-expert juries? When we think that we have a case and
we would like to bring it into court, we like to think that we get a proper
jury. We would not like to think that we are completely misrepresented and
completely misunderstood. I have been counsel a few times on simple
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computer matters and have gone nearly as far as the steps of the court on
the morning of the hearing and we settled for the simple reason that we
would not see that the complex issue that had to be settled before a judge
and jury could be presented to them in a simple fashion. If you are not
computer literate and you do not understand any of the principles of it,
you cannot understand any of the eloquent presentations, persuasive as they
may be, given by counsel for both sides. Our experience is that experienced
users and experienced manufacturers, when they have to go through a
dispute settling process, ask the Chairman of the Australian Computer Society
or a Professor from a computer faculty of a university to come and arbitrate.
It is often written into the contract that their arbitration and their decision
shall be ﬁnal. If the parties cannot agree on the selection of one arbitrator
then they each select one, and the two arbitrators select a third one.
I am sure that I am speaking on behalf of the taxpayers that, for the
time being, arbitration is a much better way of solving computer problems
than involving the expensive time of the court. Can you imagine what
happened last Friday? There was a Full Bench sitting in an Appeals Court,
and there was an eminent Q.C. from Victoria who took 2% hours, at dictation
speed, trying to explain to the three judges on the Bench, who appeared
rather bored by it all, what a basic computer was, and what software was.
The eminent Q.C. was going into an analogy that appeared rather far fetched;
one wonders whether all that is productive?
Emeritus Professor K. O. Shatwell, ex Professor of Law.
I wonder about the last speaker’s proposition. It is coming pretty near
to what the old fashioned lawyer would call compounding felonies. The
purpose of the Court is to deal with computer crime, and surely the settle-
ment of such criminal matters out of court is against the public interest, at
least in the eyes of an old fashioned lawyer like myself.
Bron McKillop, Senior Lecturer at the Sydney University Law School and
also of the New South Wales Bar.
I wish to respond brieﬂy to the enquiry of Mr Coleman about practical
\ experience in trying to get computer information into evidence.
I was involved in a prosecution some time ago before a magistrate
against some shopkeepers for using electricity during periods of supposed
blackout in New South Wales and one of the matters we had to prove was
the defendants were using the electricity. They had not registered their
business in any way and they had made no admissions to anybody and they
were not on the premises, and we had resort to a Sydney County Council
computer printout of the electricity account for those premises which showed
the defendants’ names as the subscribers to the account, and it also showed
that the electricity had been consumed at those premises during the period
in question.
The diﬁiculty was to get this document into evidence. It was necessary
to call a clerk from the computer records section of the SCC to explain the
very cryptic information on the computer printout so that we could locate
the names of the defendants and what all the ﬁgures meant in relation to the
time of consumption of electricity. An objection was taken that that lady
in terms of Part IIc of the Evidence Act was not a “qualiﬁed person” and
she clearly was not, she knew nothing at all about the system that was used
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for the keeping of the récords on the computer but she knew how to punch
information out and give it to the public should they enquire. This objection
was overruled on the ground that the evidence-being given did not have to
be by a “qualiﬁed person”. The second difﬁculty was—and this is referred
to in Dr Brown’s paper at p. ZO—under section 14GB (6) (b) (ii) Part IIC
of the Evidence Act (and by this point of'course the magistrate and every-
body else in the court had lost interest in trying to resolve the question about
'whether anything was going to be admissible in that way), but anyway that
provision allows the tender of computer information provided that the
information is not based on information supplied by any person. Now the
difficulty we faced there was that somebody had gone off and read themeter
and gone back to the SCC headquarters and told the computer what the
reading was and that went on to the computer, so strictly that was information
supplied by that person and the evidence strictly should not have been
admitted on that basis. The magistrate eventually admitted the information,
noobjection having been made on the ground that it was based on informa-
tion supplied by a person. The Supreme Court on a case stated by the
defendants upheld the admission into evidence of the printout. '
My overriding impression Of the whole exercise was that it was very
diﬂicult to interpret and apply those provisions. It seems to me that there
is great scope for clariﬁcation. of the legislation.
J. A. Coleman.
That is very interesting. Did you have any problems with the chain of
custody of that evidence? Clearly the point about the person taking a manual
reading is overcome if you have an online meter system, but when you have
your evidence and you think you can use it, you then have the problem of
who handles it, whose hands it gets into. There is the opportunity for tamper-
ing betWeen the «time you decide to use it as evidence and the time of its
presentation. Is that something which you have encountered at all?
Bron McKillop.
That was not the problem in this particular case. My experience is really
limited to this case. The computer records had been subpoenaed and they
were in court consequent upon the subpoena. The lady clerk from the
accounts section recognized the printout as one of hers, that is one from the
SCC, and she was able to explain it in detail as soon as she recognized it and
no point really arose or was taken as to the chain of custody.
Mr Justice F. M. Neasey.
. I would say a word about the Report which Mr Davidson spoke about.
I- am very sorry indeed I didnot have the opportunity of studying that Report
and commenting on it. I am not sure whether I knew about it or not. The
Chairman of the Australian Law Reform Commission who was kind enough
to supply me with a great deal of material told me that he had received, on a
conﬁdential basis, a report from the committee covering this whole subject of
a possibility of an amendments to the law in relation‘to computer offences
and that a member of the committee was Mr Purvis. However, he said that
he had received it on a conﬁdential basis and he doubted whether he ought
to make it available to me. I agreed with that and I did not see it. I am
wondering if that is the same Report that Mr Davidson spoke about.
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R. N. J. Purvis,‘Q.C.
Yes.
Mr Justice F. M. Neasey.
I have already said that I wish I had had the opportunity of studying
and commenting on that Report, and the concept to which Mr Davidson
referred of the wide ranging deﬁnition of computer related material. Obviously,
if I may say so with respect, a most interesting concept and I for one would
very much have liked to have studied it.
John Parnell, S.M.
Mr McKillop has jogged my memory on two matters. The ﬁrst is that
fraudulently using electricity is larceny in New South Wales. I wonder how
Det. Sgt Lowe would feel about charging one of these time thieves with that
offence under s. 154 (c). ‘
The second matter is that a few speakers have commented about expand-
ing the deﬁnition of property to include information. This is something that
has been around in New South Wales for about 20 years now. One of the
problems that it involves as I see it is that most information, particularly trade
secrets, will be subject to copyright and there could be a clash with Common-
wealth law. Indeed the aftermath of the Apple Case would be an excellent
opportunity for the Commonwealth to consider what is to be done in this
ﬁeld in relation to computer fraud. Was the question of any clash with the
Commonwealth law considered by Mr Davidson’s Committee, and what
proposals arose thereout?
T. S. Davidson, Q.C.
Yes, there were as I recollect. My recollection is that there are certain
summary offences under the Copyright Act of aAvery speciﬁc nature, and
we did not think that s. 109 of the Constitution would make that part of the
Copyright Act prevail over our Act. That was our opinion, whether it is
valid or not remains to be seen. I think that we also considered the possibility
of s. 86 (I think it is) of the Commonwealth Crimes Act in relation to con—
spiracy but I am not certain about that.
Det. Sgt John Lowe.
I am aware of s. 154 (c), the stealing of electricity, but to the best of
my knowledge to date I do not know of any prosecutions that have been
launched in respect to the stealing of electricity in relation to computer related
crime.
Dr R. A. Brown.
I hate to keep quoting myself, but I wrote a long piece on that in a
previous article* trying to demonstrate that it was not sensibly usable. I am
not even entirely sure that I still have that opinion, but it just did no seem
to be a feasible possibility for reasons that are rather too lengthy to go into.
‘R. A. Brown, op. cit.
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K. J. Fitzgerald.
Related to the last speaker’s question, it has been proposed as a
scenario that if, say, the Reader’s Digest mailing list (which I expect would
be a trade secret but not a patentable or copyrighted piece of information)
was stolen in Victoria its value, which is purported to be somewhere around
$2—3 million. If it was stolen in New South Wales there could have been
prosecution for the stealing of the use of electricity. That is an illustration
of the problems in relation to different State laws, and I am wondering if
one of the things that this seminar might consider and that is the problem
related to the source of the crime, where did it occur, whether the host
computer is where the crime was committed or whether it was where the
terminal was based. This problem has been raised internationally especially
in the northern hemisphere where of course the different boundary borders
and boundaries between judiciaries are probably more intensive than they
are in Australia. The communications area which is impacting on computers
really does thicken the problem. ~ '
Gordon Hawkins, Director, Institute of Criminology.
I want to ask the speakers a question about public attitudes to this
kind of crime; computer crime. It seems to me that there is an interesting
parallel between the attitude of the public to computer crime and the attitude
of the public to forgery. I remember many years ago when I, was a prison
Governor there was a man incarcerated in the prison who had printed his
own money. He had a printing press in the basement of his house and he
provided himself with an income of about £200 a week. He lived for a very
long time in this way quite comfortably and was only ﬁnally discovered
because he became sick and instead of being able to change his home made
money around the country he was forced to provide his wife with home
made money for housekeeping. This very quickly narrowed down the area
of investigation from the police point of View and led to his arrest and
conviction. ‘-
But when he was incarcerated it was interesting to observe that he was
universally admired within the prison. When I say that I do not mean that
he was admired only by prisoners, he was also admired by the staff. Almost
every member of the prison staff seemed to feel that his crime was a pretty
considerable achievement. I had the feeling that most of them felt that if
they could have a little press down in the basement it would be rather a
nice thing. Moreover, I remember too that most reports of the trial were
rather sympathetic to the offender and took an almgst admiring attitude
towards him. It puzzled me that here was a man who was not just stealing
from particular individuals he was stealing from all of us, for we were all
in a sense victims of this offence, and over a period of some quarter of a
century he had been living at this very comfortable rate at our expense.
But we did not resent this and it seems to me that in relation to computer
crime, as a number of speakers have said, the public regard it as entertaining
and feel that people who carry it out are rather clever. The public would
and do take a much more punitive attitude to housebreakers who steal much
smaller amounts of money from individuals. I would like to ask members of
the platform if they have any thoughts on the question of public attitudes to
this type of crime?  
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K. J. Fitzgerald.
It is a worry, and EFT is probably the basis of a very sobering
thought. Consumer EFT will reduce the amount of cash in society, and
therefore one expects reduce the number of hold ups and violent crimes,
and there is an attitude in society that I see as highly tolerant of computer
fraud in the business community. We do not want to prosecute valuable
employees and take them out of our organizations. Organizations do not
want to waste the time in a questionable prosecution, problems with juries,
problems with gaining evidence, and all that sort of thing that we have been
talking about. It is a tolerance that is born of John Heyting’s dollar and it
is one of the things that might really shock us when we really do get to ﬁnd
that when we do have corporate EFT crime, not consumer EFT crime.
EFT crime at consumer point of sale terminals might be a million or so
remembering that shoplifting is $600 million and I think arson was $500
million last year. In a scale of that nature corporate E.F.T. crime might
number around the $500 million potential. If that is going to be tolerated,
just as what we are seeing now are rather minor events that we know about,
with very low penalties, then the problems are going to be in getting the
laws reformed quickly. We need to speed up the process of law because
it may well be that we are looking at something that will really harm society
and really break down one of our major organizations. We are seeing huge
problems in the government at the moment. If EFT outlets are going to be
used in the future, for instance, for the payment of pensions, if we are going
to use it as a major means of administrating Medicare, these sort of things
are going right to the fabric of our society. Management has not been able
to take the hint and control themselves, and if we are having to rely upon
law enforcement and legal support for our society and do not make a move
quickly enough then I think that we will have a lot of egg on our faces.
When we do look back in the future at having a conference on computer
crime I think it will appear to be a sensible thing to have done.
Dr R. A. Brown.
I might, for argument sake, throw in the alternative point of view which
seems to be indicated very much by the studies that have been done including
Kevin Fitzgerald’s work and that is the reluctance of the major institutional
victims to talk about it. They usually prefer to deal with large scale frauds
internally. This is a situation which is common in the U.S.A. and in Canada
and the reasons are pretty obvious. If a bank has lost a couple of million
through somebody ﬁddling with the computer internally they are not going to
tell their customers about it and have them all ﬂeeing to another bank.
So perhaps the situation we are looking at is the wrong one, perhaps the
response is not to legislate in the area at all but leave the problem entirely
to the institutional users and their own security and deal with it in security
terms. They need to be very careful what they are going to do with their
data. Certainly a great deal of the control of these activities is currently
being done by what is best described as private policing. It is not passing
into the recognized criminal justice system at all. I have my doubts that
whatever legislation we adopt, and it seems fairly obvious that there is going
to have to be some, whether that situation is likely to change very much.
The major institutional users will probably carry on operating by way of
private policing, ﬁring their employees, blacklisting them for other organiza-
tions. Those things happen quite commonly now: freezing their accounts,
taking money from them, and saying “Well, you took so much from us
we are just getting a little bit of it bac ”.
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I have one example from Victoria where this, in fact, occurred with
a bank employee who was operating an automatic teller fraud and was
detected. The bank made him an offer and said “We’ll convert the amount
you have taken into a loan and you can pay it back on your bankcard”.
The only reason the matter got anywhere was that the employee refused to
accept the‘offer and when he ﬁnally went to court he pleaded guilty. The
bank was quite prepared not to make a fuss and deal with the matter purely
internally and to allow the employee to go on paying off the money he had
taken at 18 per cent interest. If that attitude is taken, and I think it is very
common in the ﬁnancial institutions particularly those who rely very much
for their public survival on the public’s belief that they are relatively secure,
then we may not really be likely to see much more of the computer related
crime appearing in the courts whatever we do.
Mr Justice F. M. Neasey.
I think there certainly is a certain attitude in the community which
admires a very clever crook but I think that is part of human nature, and is
really an ephemeral and peripheral sort of thing. There are quite a number
of references in some of the United States authors on this question of computer
crime which talk about the attitude that many people have admiring the
fresh faced young geniuses who carry out reputed large crimes in which they
make enormous proﬁts. The well known case of Rifkin who got away with
something like $10 million. Anybody who reads about this area knows about
the Rifkimcase. He was a 32 year old and bright, university trained and
so forth and there was a great deal of admiration for him apparently in the
United States at that time. That is just typical of that attitude, but it does
not seem to me that it is a serious problem.
The reasons why business and other people who are defrauded by people
who are dealing with their own computer systems, or who in one way or
another are defrauded by computer related crimes, do not report them,
so it is said, in a great number of cases have got nothing to do with the
question of admiration or anything related to that or the sort of person
who commits the crime. It suits their interests not to report for the various
reasons which the literature deals with. This attitude is merely an attitude of
human nature illustrated, for example, by the fact that many people perversely
admire people who carried out the Great Train Robbery because it was
unique, it was enormous, and it had features about it which attracted a sort
of perverse admiration in many people. The fact that this as I say is not a
serious problem is illustrated by Professor Hawkin’s own example of the
forger There is nothing more common nor a crime that has been around
longer than forgery, and yet because it had its clever features it was admired.
I do not think it is a real problem myself.
J. A. Coleman.
I suppose it would be simple to look for a calvinistic outlook on this
but I think perhaps it would be more sensible to look at in terms of a dollar
Sign.
The analogy might not be correct, but when we were talking about the
spreading of risks, who has the risks, who eventually pays? Of course,
companies presumably insure against defalcations by insiders. It may well be
that the insurance market might be able to have a viewpoint about this.
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As an analogy, although it may not strictly be an analogy, I am vividly
reminded of the way'in which the technical integrity of modern airliners has
been stimulated by the trend in cases involving product liability. Litigation
in this area in the United States completely altered the thinking of aircraft
manufacturers about the nature of the liabilities that they were assuming
for their products and the enormous risks which were involved. You lose an
aircraft full of 200—300 people and you have some huge claims on your
hands, at least in the United States (possibly not here). The London Insurance
market started to take a very very tough view indeed about the way in
which it would assess the liability of manufacturers and the sort of premiums
which would have to be paid. I am not sure that this is really correct
way of looking at it, but certainly the attitude of insurers might be a pointer.
In other words, what is the insurance market going to do about it? How
far should people who do not protect their own computer property expect
the risk to be spread across the whole market? There is a huge literature
on the subject of security arrangements which can be taken with employees—
certainly as far as computer suites and the protection of software are con-
cerned. Possibly the insurance market might have a viewpoint.
John Parnell, S.M.
I wonder if I could just make one point arising out of that last propo-
sition. I do not think it is possible to keep the police out of these matters
for the reason that once the crime is committed the failure to inform the
authorities, if felony is committed, may be misprision, and if a misdemeanour
may involve an attempt to pervert the court of public justice. These crimes
will be crimes of some magnitude, they are not shoplifting or petty larceny.
K. J. Fitzgerald.‘
The concern about computer crime should be about deterring it. Our-
rently it is almost encouraged. Society relies on the honesty and loyalty of
those people working closest to the computer. It is not acceptable to say
that management should provide its own protective devices for management
itself is one of the greatest threats. Organized crime will certainly see the
opportunities for attack on society through the computer. They will buy or
become management and perpetrate the major crimes unless the law arms
itself.
This thought was not paraded at the seminar. It deserves serious con-
sideration but those present supponted the view that perhaps the suppliers of
computer equipment and computer software, together with management
should carry all the blame. ‘
I believe the problem should be shared by the above and the legal
fraternity. The latter have a responsibility .to society to speed up law reform
and to prepare themselves for the challenge of organized computer crime.
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